DISSENTING OPINION OF MM S. TRECHSEL, G. JÖRUNDSSON,

            A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK, D. SVÁBY AND E. BIELIUNAS

     We agree with the majority that the interference with the

applicant's rights under Article 10 para. 1 of the Convention was

"prescribed by law" and aimed at "the protection of the reputation

(and) rights of others" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 of the

Convention.

     However, we disagree as to the finding that the measure was not

"necessary in a democratic society".

     We consider, first, that the applicant was only prevented from

publishing his views on the dangers associated with eating food thawed

or heated in a microwave oven in publications aimed at the public at

large.  There was also no obstacle for him to continue his research,

and he was free to publish his views and the result of his research in

publications addressed to scientifically educated readers.

     Second, the applicant had presented certain theories as being the

result of serious scientific research while, in fact, they were highly

contested.  In this respect the national courts relied on the fact that

Professor B. had disclaimed his support of the earlier research in

which he had participated and Professor T. had declared that the

applicant's views could not seriously be upheld.

     Third, we note that the national courts attached considerable

weight to the manner in which the applicant had presented his views.

His language had been highly emotionalised, in particular the

association between microwave ovens and a Nazi extermination camp was

considered as being exceedingly polemic and creating anxieties which

were in no way scientifically justified as the applicant alleged.  The

use of a reaper as a symbol was considered equally unacceptable.

     On the whole, the Swiss courts carefully weighed the competing

interests at stake.  We also consider that the exercise of the rights

guaranteed under Article 10 "carries with it duties and

responsibilities".  In this respect, it does not appear unreasonable

to impose some restraint on publications alarming consumers in

connection with the use of very popular appliances.  Taking these

considerations into account, we do not find that the national

authorities exceeded their margin of appreciation when they imposed the

restrictions at issue upon the applicant, particularly as that margin

of appreciation is relatively wide in matters of unfair competition

(see Jacubowski v. Germany judgment, loc. cit.).

     We therefore consider that the interference with the applicant's

right to freedom of expression was justified under Article 10 para. 2

of the Convention in that it could reasonably be considered "necessary

in a democratic society ... for the protection of the reputation (and)

rights of others" within the meaning of this provision.

     We conclude that in the present case there has been no violation

of Article 10 of the Convention.