DISSENTING OPINION OF MR H. DANELIUS JOINED BY

MM E. BUSUTTIL, G. JÖRUNDSSON, A. WEITZEL, J.-C. SOYER,

L. LOUCAIDES, M.A. NOWICKI AND D. ŠVÁBY

I have voted against the conclusion of the Commission that there has been

no violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention in the present case. My

reasons are as follows.

I first recall that the Supreme Court expressly stated that it could not

be said that the trial had not taken place within a reasonable time within the

meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. Consequently, there is not in the

present case any acknowledgement at the national level, either expressly or in

substance, of a breach of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Eckle v. Germany

judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 30, para. 66). No remedy for the

alleged violation of Article 6 has therefore been provided by the domestic

courts, although the Court of Appeal did mitigate the sentence in view of the

very long time which had elapsed since the offences had been committed.

As regards the conduct of the proceedings, I note that the Court of Appeal

itself found that some undesirably long periods of delay had occurred at the

stage of the examination of the objection against the indictment. In fact, the

proceedings regarding this matter alone lasted for about four years.

Moreover, after the objection against the indictment had been finally

rejected, it took another four years to reach a final determination of the

criminal charges. It is true that at that stage the applicant could be held

responsible for certain delays by asking for adjournments and that other delays

were due to the fact that a witness was not available. However, there were other

delays which were attributable to the courts. I note, in this regard, the period

of seventeen months which elapsed between the Regional Court's judgment and the

first hearing before the Court of Appeal. I also consider that in view of the

long time which had already elapsed before the charges were examined by the

courts, special efforts should have been made to expedite the remaining

proceedings.

The total length of the proceedings was about nine and a half years, and I

consider that such a length, in order to be acceptable, would call for special

justification in a serious criminal case like the present one whose outcome was

of considerable importance to the applicant. I cannot find that there were

circumstances justifying this long duration and therefore conclude that the

requirements of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention as regards a determination

of criminal charges within a reasonable time were not respected in this case.