Published on 28 February 2022

FIFTH SECTION

Application no. 54387/20 M.T. against Ireland lodged on 9 December 2020 communicated on 7 February 2022

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applicant is a Cameroonian national who arrived in Ireland in 2006 and was granted subsidiary protection in 2014. In 2017, he applied for family reunification in respect of two children in Cameroon, providing, first, birth certificates naming him as their father and, subsequently, a Cameroonian court order naming him as their legal guardian. He refused to consent to DNA testing to confirm his paternity, as he contended that his application was based on his position as their sole legal guardian. His application was rejected, as section 56 of the International Protection Act 2015 only allows such an application to be made by a biological or adoptive parent. He complains under Article 8, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, that this decision failed to recognise his de facto family ties with the children or to give effect to a relationship legally recognised in Cameroon, and that it discriminated against him by failing to treat his relationship in the same manner as that of a biological or adoptive parent. He also complains under Article 8 that the request that he undergo DNA testing lacked a legislative basis and that it was an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with his right to privacy.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Has the applicant exhausted all domestic remedies with regard to his complaints under Article 8 and Article 14? In particular, did the applicant raise in substance before the Supreme Court the discrimination claim which he now raises before this Court?

2. Has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to respect for his family life contrary to Article 8, alone and/or in conjunction with Article 14, as a result of the interpretation and application of domestic legislation which limits the right to family reunification of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to biological or adoptive children?

3. Was there a legislative or administrative basis for the request that the applicant undergo DNA testing, and was such a request appropriate, having regard to the applicant’s right to respect for his private life under Article 8?

4. To the extent that the definition of “child” under section 56(9)(d) of the 2015 Act may transpose provisions of EU law (see, for example, Article 2(h) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, to which the 2015 Act gave further effect and Article 2(j) of Directive 2011/95/EU), the respondent Government is invited to provide concise information on how that same notion has been defined in the corresponding transposing legislation in other EU Member States.