Published on 25 July 2022

FIRST SECTION

Application no. 46238/20 Beata MORAWIEC against Poland lodged on 20 October 2020 communicated on 4 July 2022

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applicant is a judge at the Cracow Regional Court. She is a former member of the National Council of the Judiciary, a former President of the Cracow Regional Court and a former deputy director of the National School of Judiciary and Prosecution. She is also a member of the Judges’ Association Themis and has been its President since 2018.

On 24 November 2017 the Minister of Justice dismissed the applicant from her post as President of the Cracow Regional Court. This decision was taken on the basis of the Act of 12 July 2017 amending the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, which conferred on the Minister competence to dismiss and appoint at his discretion presidents of ordinary courts during the period of six months following the law’s entry into force (see Broda and Bojara v. Poland , nos. 26691/18, 27367/18, 29 June 2021). A press release published on the website of the Ministry of Justice on 27 November 2017 stated that the applicant had failed to properly supervise the administrative activities of the Regional Court. It also referred to the low efficiency of that court.

Shortly afterwards the applicant lodged a civil claim against the Minister of Justice, demanding an apology for the contents of that press release which, according to her, had infringed her reputation. In January 2019 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the applicant’s claim. On 20 January 2021 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the respondent’s appeal against the first ‑ instance judgment. The Minister was ordered to publish an apology to the applicant and pay a certain sum to a charity.

On 14 September 2020 a prosecutor of the Internal Affairs Department of the State Prosecutor’s Office applied to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, asking that the applicant’s immunity be lifted with a view to charging her with several criminal offences: intentional abuse of power by a public official (Article 231 § 2 of the Criminal Code), misappropriation of funds (Article 284 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and bribery (Article 228 § 3 of the Criminal Code). The prosecutor alleged that the applicant had accepted a mobile phone from a defendant in a criminal case in exchange for delivering a judgment in his favour and that she had accepted public funds in return for writing a report which she had never actually written.

On 12 October 2020 the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, sitting in a single-judge formation (Judge A.T.), lifted the applicant’s immunity, suspended her in judicial duties and reduced her salary by 50%. It noted that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences as alleged by the prosecutor.

On 7 June 2021 the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, sitting in a three-judge formation, quashed the first-instance decision and refused to lift the applicant’s immunity. It held that the evidence adduced by the prosecutor was insufficient to substantiate the charges against the applicant. In particular, it noted that the main witness of the prosecution had often changed his testimonies, which diminished his credibility.

Shortly thereafter, the applicant resumed her judicial duties and the withheld part of her salary was paid out to her. Her suspension lasted for 235 days.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

Article 6 § 1

1. Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the proceedings in the present case in so far as the applicant’s suspension from judicial duties is concerned (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, §§ 104-105, 23 June 2016; Paluda v. Slovakia , no. 33392/12, §§ 33-34, 23 May 2017; Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , no. 36889/18, § 70, 20 October 2020; and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], no. 43572/18, §§ 265-327, 15 March 2022)?

2. Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its criminal head applicable to the proceedings in the present case in so far as the lifting of the applicant’s immunity is concerned?

3. Did the proceedings before the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court violate the applicant’s right to be heard by a tribunal established by law as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Reczkowicz v. Poland , no. 43447/19, §§ 225- 282, 22 July 2021)?

4. Was the Disciplinary Chamber which dealt with the applicant’s case “an independent and impartial tribunal” as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Reczkowicz , §§ 283-284)?

Article 8

1. Has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention on account of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court’s decision of 12 October 2020 lifting her immunity and suspending her in judicial duties (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, 25 September 2018)?

2. If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2? In particular, was the impugned interference “in accordance with the law”, having regard to the fact that the Disciplinary Chamber lacks the attributes of a “tribunal” which is “lawful” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see Reczkowicz, §§ 225-282)?

Article 10

1. Has there been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention? Reference is made to the prosecutor’s application for the lifting of the applicant’s immunity in order to prosecute her; her civil dispute with the Minister of Justice; her being president of a professional association of judges; and her public statements criticising the reorganisation of the Polish judicial system (see Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria , no. 40072/13, §§ 153 ‑ 164, 19 October 2021).

2. If so, was that interference prescribed by law and necessary in terms of Article 10 § 2? In particular, was the impugned interference “in accordance with the law”, having regard to the fact that the Disciplinary Chamber lacks the attributes of a “tribunal” which is “lawful” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see Reczkowicz, cited above, §§ 225-282)? Which legitimate aims did that interference pursue?