Published on 3 October 2022

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 67568/16 CENTRE FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING against Bulgaria lodged on 15 November 2016 communicated on 15 September 2022

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The applicant association, Centre for Independent Living, was set up in 1995 and has its registered office in Sofia. It is represented before the Court by Ms S. Razboynikova, a lawyer practising in Sofia.

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the association, may be summarised as follows.

3 . The association’s objects, as set out in its constitution, are to help working-age people in Sofia with a disability integrate in society, advocate the philosophy of independent living as a basis for public policies, and create a network of organisations of people with disabilities based on the philosophy of independent living.

4 . The association does not gather fees or contributions from its members and says that its funding comes only from projects which it is awarded. According to its income statement and balance sheet for 2014, in that year almost all of its income came from donations, most made under a condition, and its own capital at the end of the year was minus BGN 9,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN – equivalent to minus 4,601.63 euros (EUR)). According to its income statement and balance sheet for 2015, its income for that year also came almost exclusively from donations made under a condition, and its own capital at the end of the year was BGN 2,000 (EUR 1,022.58).

5 . In June 2014 the association sought judicial review of several rules made by the Council of Ministers. Those rules laid down (a) the criteria for recognising organisations of or for people with disabilities as “nationally ‑ representative”, and thus entitled to participate in a National Council for the integration of such people, a consultative body attached to the Council of Ministers (see paragraph 25 below); (b) the manner of showing compliance with those criteria; (c) the duration of such recognition; (d) the possibility for other organisations to attend that Council’s sittings; and (e) that Council’s power to review reports by “nationally-representative” organisations. The association argued, in the main, that the rules were contrary to a number of constitutional, statutory and treaty provisions on the rights and treatment of people with disabilities, since they prevented smaller or local organisations such as itself from taking part in the setting of policies in that domain, and from obtaining State subsidies and benefits, and various privileges and tax exemptions.

6 . In July 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court’s three-member panel hearing the claim found it admissible. It held, with reference to an interpretative decision on the point (see paragraph 33 below), that in the light of the association’s activities and objects, as set out in its constitution, the rules in issue affected or could affect the rights, freedoms or lawful interests of its members, and that the association therefore had standing to challenge them. The panel designated the Council of Ministers as respondent and directed that the claim was to be published in the State Gazette on the Supreme Administrative Court’s website.

7 . In November 2014 eighteen non-governmental organisations which were members of the National Council under the rules as they stood sought permission to intervene in support of the respondent. One counsel represented eleven of those organisations, a second counsel five, and a third counsel two. The panel permitted all eighteen interveners to join the proceedings, noting that any person having a legal interest could do so (see paragraph 34 below).

8 . At the final hearing in February 2015, the interveners sought awards of lawyers’ fees. The association objected, stating that by Article 78 § 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 42 below), which in its view was applicable, interveners were not entitled to costs. It also submitted that some of the claims were excessive.

9 . In its March 2015 judgment, the three-member panel again found the association’s claim admissible – on the basis that the rules whose review it was seeking affected or could affect rights, freedoms or legal interests of its members – but dismissed it on the merits. It held, essentially, that no higher-ranking rules circumscribed the way in which the Council of Ministers could fix the criteria for recognising organisations of or for people with disabilities as “nationally-representative”. The panel went on to find that the rules under challenge had been made in line with the relevant procedure.

10 . In view of the outcome of the case, the panel, citing Article 143 §§ 3 and 4 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 35 below) ordered the association to pay the lawyers’ fees incurred by seventeen of the eighteen interveners. The sums, which came to BGN 13,580 Bulgarian levs (BGN – 6,943.34 euros (EUR)), were as follows:

(a) BGN 200 (EUR 102.26) each to five interveners;

(b) BGN 300 (EUR 153.39) each to four interveners;

(c) BGN 350 (EUR 178.95) to one intervener;

(d) BGN 400 (EUR 204.52) to four interveners;

(e) BGN 700 (EUR 357.90) to one intervener;

(f) BGN 4,000 (EUR 2,045.17) to one intervener; and

(g) BGN 4,730 (EUR 2,418.41) to one intervener.

11 . The panel rejected, without giving reasons on the point, the association’s contention that the costs sought by some of the interveners were excessive (see реш. № 2998 от 18.03.2015 г. по адм. д. № 8489/2014 г., ВАС, VI о. ).

(a) Substantive proceedings

12 . The association appealed against the judgment, including the costs decision, to a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. In its challenge against the cost decision, it argued that the interveners should not have been permitted to join the proceedings, since the rules whose review it was seeking could affect an unlimited number of persons. The association also submitted that the costs awarded to the interveners were excessive in the light of the complexity of the case, and the fact that the submissions made on their behalf had in essence repeated those of the respondent. Moreover, the award of such high costs unduly restricted the right of access to a court and could deter those willing to challenge secondary legislation.

13. In October 2015, while the appeal proceedings were pending, the Council of Ministers amended some of the rules under challenge.

14 . The five-member panel held one hearing in November 2015. The respondent and all interveners argued that the judgment below was correct. Some interveners claimed lawyers’ fees. Counsel for the association stated “as regards the costs claimed in this hearing, we have not seen a schedule of costs. If such have been presented, we dispute all of them”. The panel did not invite further written submissions, stating that it would take time for consideration and give its judgment.

15 . On 11 February 2016 the five-member panel set aside the part of the judgment of the three-member panel (see paragraph 9 above) which related to the amended rules, declaring this part of the association’s claim inadmissible, and upheld the remainder of the judgment. It found that, so far as it concerned the amended rules, the association’s claim had become moot, since those rules no longer existed in the form in which they had been challenged. Their amended version could be contested in fresh judicial-review proceedings. So far as the judgment of the three-member panel concerned rules which had not been amended in the meantime, it was correct.

16 . The five-member panel refused to examine the association’s appeal against the first-instance costs order (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). It noted that the proper way of challenging an adverse costs order was to ask the court which had made it to vary it, and then appeal against any decision rejecting such a request. The appeal, so far as it concerned that order, was hence to be referred back to the lower panel (see paragraph 20 below).

17 . With regard to the costs on appeal, the five-member panel held that in view of the outcome of the substantive appeal, all costs incurred by the respondent and the interveners were to be paid by the association. Its counsel had objected against them but had not expressly argued that they were excessive. They were hence to be awarded in full. The respondent was to be awarded BGN 300 (EUR 153.39). The award to the interveners, which came to BGN 4,485 (EUR 2,293.14) (see реш. № 1483 от 11.02.2016 г. по адм. д. № 6344/2015 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в (final)), broke down as follows:

(a) BGN 150 (EUR 76.69) each to two interveners;

(b) BGN 185 (EUR 94.59) to one intervener;

(c) BGN 200 (EUR 102.26) each to five interveners; and

(d) BGN 3,000 (EUR 1,533.88) to one intervener.

(b) Request that the five-member panel vary its costs decision

18 . The association asked the five-member panel to vary its decision on the costs on appeal. It argued that the finding that its counsel had not objected against the quantum of the cost claims had been erroneous. It also submitted that the Supreme Administrative Court had already refused to award costs to interveners on the basis of Article 78 § 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 42 below). It reiterated its access-to-a-court argument (see paragraph 12 in fine above).

19 . On 14 July 2016 the five-member panel refused the request. It held that a court could only reduce the award of costs if the party from which costs were being sought had expressly and concretely requested that before the close of oral argument. At the hearing before the panel, counsel for the association had not specified whether she was objecting to the interveners’ costs claims in principle, or also to their quantum. It was true that in its ensuing request for the costs decision to be varied the association had specified that it was objecting to the costs’ quantum, but those follow-up proceedings were solely meant to enable the court to correct mistakes in its initial award of costs, not to give a party an additional chance to raise or expand upon objections in that regard (see опр. № 8990 от 14.07.2016 г. по адм. д. № 6344/2015, ВАС, петчл. с-в (final)).

(a) Refusal of the three-member panel to vary its costs decision

20 . Meanwhile, in February 2016 the three-member panel refused the association’s request, which the five-member panel had referred back to it (see paragraph 16 above), to vary its costs decision. It held that all parties to proceedings for review of secondary legislation, regardless of whether called respondents or interested parties, were parties having a legitimate interest to, respectively, preserve that legislation or have it annulled. They were all placed on an equal footing in the proceedings, and had the same procedural rights and duties, including as regards costs. The court could reduce costs at a party’s request only if it found that they were excessive in view of the complexity of the case. But that was not a test lending itself to a mechanical application, as there were no fixed criteria on whether a case was complex. The assessment of the point turned on the number of disputed issues, the procedural steps taken by the parties, and the volume of each party’s submissions. That was why one had to assume that a court’s finding that an objection that costs were excessive was unfounded was based on an overall assessment of all these factors. The law did not deal specifically with the difficulty engendered by the presence of many persons intervening on the side of the respondent in a judicial-review challenge against secondary legislation, and the consequent high costs, and the issue thus fell to be decided under the general cost rules (see опр. № 2048 от 23.02.2016 г. по адм. д. № 8489/2015 г., ВАС, VI о. ).

(b) Appeal against that refusal

21 . The association appealed against the three-member panel’s refusal to vary its costs decision to another five-member panel, reiterating its access-to-a-court argument (see paragraph 12 in fine above).

22 . On 19 May 2016 that five-member panel partly allowed the appeal.

23 . It agreed with the three-member panel that all parties to proceedings for judicial review of secondary legislation, including those who had intervened, had equal procedural rights, including an entitlement to costs if the case turned their way. It added that in such proceedings the Code of Administrative Procedure did not envisage third parties assisting the main parties, simply permitting interventions by persons having a legal interest in the outcome of the litigation. It followed that the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure on third-party intervention, including the no-third-party costs rule in its Article 78 § 10 (see paragraph 42 below), did not apply.

24 . The three-member panel had also been correct to refuse the association’s request to reduce the awards of lawyers’ fees to fifteen of the interveners to the minimum amounts envisaged by law for such cases. In the light of the complexity of the case, those awards had not been excessive; they had moreover not been more than double the minimum awards. The awards of lawyers’ fees to the remaining two interveners – respectively BGN 4,730 and BGN 4,000 (see paragraph 10 (f) and (g) above) – had however been incorrect, as the three-member panel had not explained why it had opted not to reduce those claims. In view of the true complexity of the case and the real involvement of counsel for those two interveners, the appropriate awards had been BGN 900 (EUR 460.16) for each, which came to three times the legal minimum for such cases (see опр. № 6065 от 19.05.2016 г. по адм. д. № 4631/2016 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ).

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

25 . The rules challenged by the association were contained in the Rules of the National Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities and the Criteria for Representativeness of the Organisations of and for People with Disabilities. Those Rules were adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 2004 and came into force in the beginning of 2005. They were amended in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2014, February and October 2015, and 2018. They were repealed in mid-2019 and replaced by similar rules.

26 . The Rules defined the work and structure of that National Council – a consultative body attached to the Council of Ministers and consisting of, among others, representatives of “nationally-representative” organisations of or for people with disabilities. They also laid down criteria, such as number of members, for recognising an organisation as “nationally-representative”, and empowered the Council of Ministers to make that assessment. The Council of Minister’s refusal to recognise an organisation as “nationally ‑ representative” was amenable to judicial review (rule 10(4)).

27 . By section 40(1) of the Integration of People With Disabilities Act 2004 (superseded in 2019 by the People With Disabilities Act 2018), the State budget covered half of all pension, social-security and health-insurance contributions payable by the employer for, among others, enterprises and cooperatives of people with disabilities which are members of “nationally-representative” organisations of or for such people.

28 . By section 52 of the 2004 Act, “nationally-representative” organisations of or for people with disabilities were entitled to a State subsidy under conditions laid down in the Act’s implementing regulations.

29 . By section 48(1)(1)(d) of the Local Taxes and Fees Act 1997, “nationally-representative” organisations of or for people with disabilities are exempt from property-acquisition tax.

30 . By Article 186 § 1 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure, secondary legislation can be challenged before the courts by individuals or organisations whose rights, freedoms or legal interests have been affected or might be affected by it, or who might incur obligations under it.

31 . In late 2006 the Ombudsman of the Republic asked the Constitutional Court to declare that provision contrary to the constitutional provisions proclaiming the rule of law and guaranteeing the right to judicial review of administrative action. He argued that it was inconsistent with those to limit standing to seek judicial review of secondary legislation to persons with a direct, proximate and personal interest to do so, since all persons within the jurisdiction had an interest to be governed lawfully. In April 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the request. It held, among other things, that all persons to whom secondary legislation could apply were affected by it within the meaning of Article 186 § 1. A mere possibility that secondary legislation could affect those concerned was sufficient to qualify them to challenge it; the existence of damage was not a prerequisite. Broader standing would be tantamount to an actio popularis , and the Constitution did not require that (see реш. № 5 от 17.04.2007 г. по к. д. № 11/2006 г., КС, обн., ДВ, бр. 35/2007 г. ).

32 . According to the Supreme Administrative Court’s case-law, there is a legal interest within the meaning of Article 186 § 1 if the secondary legislation at issue can be applied to the claimant or affect the claimant’s legal sphere (see опр. № 11287 от 30.08.2011 г. по адм. д. № 9505/2011 г., ВАС, III о. (final); реш. № 5861 от 25.04.2013 г. по адм. д. № 505/2013 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в (final); реш. № 7817 от 06.06.2013 г. по адм. д. № 9387/2012 г., ВАС, III о. (final); реш. № 9814 от 28.06.2013 г. по адм. д. № 10117/2012 г., ВАС, III о. , upheld by реш. № 891 от 22.01.2014 г. по адм. д. № 13200/2013 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ). That is the case if a rule creating a privilege or exemption does not apply to the claimant (see реш. № 6282 от 12.05.2014 г. по адм. д. № 11061/2013 г., ВАС, VII о. (final)), or when a rule creates rights for another person and thereby injures the claimant (see реш. № 9045 от 24.07.2015 г. по адм. д. № 11689/2014 г., ВАС, VII о. ). A merely hypothetical risk that a rule might affect the claimant’s rights does not however confer standing (see опр. № 2132 от 17.02.2010 г. по адм. д. № 6804/2009 г., ВАС, V о. , upheld by опр. № 5457 от 27.04.2010 г. по адм. д. № 3606/2010 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в , and реш. № 6862 от 22.05.2014 г. по адм. д. № 16649/2013 г., ВАС, III о. (final)).

33 . As regards specifically claims by non-profit organisations, in a 2010 interpretative decision the Supreme Administrative Court held they could seek judicial review of secondary legislation if it could affect (a) the rights, freedoms or legal interests of their members, or (b) their own rights or legal interests, flowing directly from their sphere(s) of activity and the object(s) for which they have been set up (see тълк. реш. № 2 от 12.02.2010 г. по т. д. № 4/2009 г., ВАС, ОСК ). A patients-rights’ organisation could thus not challenge rules on the requirements for obtaining a medical degree, but an organisation protecting the rights of medical practitioners could do so (see опр. от 05.11.2012 г. по адм. д. № 12716/2012 г., ВАС, III о. , upheld by опр. № 1826 от 07.02.2013 г. по адм. д. № 1114/2013 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ). An organisation promoting efficient governance could not challenge rules fixing fees for personal identification documents, since those could only affect individuals (see реш. № 7169 от 25.05.2011 г. по адм. д. № 12183/2010 г., ВАС, II о. , upheld by реш. № 954 от 19.01.2012 г. по адм. д. № 13190/2011 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ). An organisation promoting civic initiatives could not challenge rules on the sale of medical products, but an organisation of pharmacists could do so (see реш. № 10795 от 26.07.2012 г. по адм. д. № 5194/2011 г., ВАС, V о. , upheld by реш. № 1601 от 04.02.2013 г. по адм. д. № 14049/2012 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ).

34 . The parties to a claim for judicial review of secondary legislation are the claimant and the authority which has made that legislation (Article 189 § 1 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure). Any person having a legal interest can join the claim or intervene as a party alongside the respondent authority (Article 189 § 2).

35 . By Article 143 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure, in all sorts of judicial-review proceedings governed by the Code costs follow the event. If a court quashes the administrative decision or secondary legislation under challenge, the costs of the litigation – court fees, the fees of one lawyer, and other expenses – must be borne by the authority which has made it (Article 143 § 1). The same applies if that authority withdraws the decision or secondary legislation, and the proceedings are discontinued on that ground (Article 143 § 2). If the court dismisses the claim or the claimant withdraws it, the claimant must bear all costs incurred in the proceedings, including the minimum remuneration for one lawyer, if the other party has retained one, fixed in line with the regulations governing the minimum lawyers’ fees (Article 143 § 4, as worded until February 2021). In that case, the party for whom the administrative decision, rule or regulation is favourable is also entitled to costs (Article 143 § 3, as worded until February 2021).

36 . In February 2021 Article 143 § 3 was amended to say that if the claim is dismissed or the proceedings are discontinued, the respondent is entitled to fees for one in-house counsel fixed under the legal-aid rates. Article 143 § 4 was amended to specify that if the claim is dismissed or the proceedings are discontinued, the interested parties for whom the administrative decision or secondary legislation is favourable are also entitled to costs.

37 . By Article 144 of the same Code, all matters not specifically dealt with in the part of the Code governing judicial review are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

38. In his 2006 request (see paragraph 31 above), the Ombudsman also asked the Constitutional Court to declare Article 143 § 4 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 35 above) contrary to the constitutional provisions enshrining the rule of law and the rights to an effective remedy and to judicial review of administrative action. He argued, among other things, that the risk of being made to pay costs could deter those affected by unlawful administrative action from challenging it in the courts, especially if they were impecunious. In its 2007 judgment (see paragraph 31 above), the Constitutional Court dismissed that request as well. It held that it was not in breach of the constitutional provisions relied on to require those seeking judicial review of administrative action which turned out to be lawful to bear the costs of the proceedings, and that it would be unfair to require taxpayers to fund such litigation regardless of its outcome.

39 . According to the Supreme Administrative Court’s settled case-law, an objection to the quantum of a costs claim must be raised before the close of oral argument (see, among many others, опр. № 8659 от 29.06.2009 г. по адм. д. № 8162/2009 г., ВАС, IV о. ; опр. № 5262 от 22.04.2010 г. по адм. д. № 3893/2010 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ; опр. № 11539 от 07.10.2010 г. по адм. д. № 13818/2009 г., ВАС, V о. ; опр. № 5142 от 09.04.2012 г. по адм. д. № 6312/2011 г., ВАС, седемчл. с-в ; опр. № 1028 от 27.01.2014 г. по адм. д. № 763/2014 г. ВАС, V о. ; and опр. № 7705 от 25.06.2015 г. по адм. д. № 13127/2013 г., ВАС, VII о. (all final)). In one case that court held that even an objection made in subsequent written submissions was belated (see реш. № 9256 от 24.06.2013 г. по адм. д. № 11130/2012 г., ВАС, V о. (final)). It has also held – like in the present case – that a mere objection to the costs claim, without a specific challenge to its quantum, it not sufficient (see опр. № 11193 от 24.09.2014 г. по адм. д. № 11660/2014 г., ВАС, VII о. (final)).

40. In a 2013 interpretative decision ( тълк. реш. № 3 от 13.05.2013 г. по тълк. д. № 5/2009 г., ВАС, ОСК ), the Supreme Administrative Court held, among other things, that questions relating to costs not specifically covered by Article 143 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 35 above) could be resolved by applying Article 78 of the 2007 Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 41 below). But that court has – like in the present case – refused to apply the no-third-party-costs rule in Article 78 § 10 (see paragraph 42 below). In September 2017 it held that a party intervening in support of a claim for judicial review of secondary legislation was in the same position as the claimant rather than that of an interested party and was hence entitled to costs should the claim succeed; the rule in Article 78 § 10 could not apply in that situation (see опр. № 11239 от 27.09.2017 г. по адм. д. № 9853/2017 г., ВАС, VIII о. (final)). It has also refused to apply the rule in proceedings for judicial review of administrative decisions (see опр. № 3384 от 25.03.2015 г. по адм. д. № 848/2015 г., ВАС, IV о. , upheld by опр. № 6839 от 10.06.2015 г. по адм. д. № 6492/2015 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в ; опр. № 5928 от 18.05.2016 г. по адм. д. № 5308/2016 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в (final); and опр. № 5206 от 23.04.2021 г. по адм. д. № 3999/2021 г., ВАС, II о. (final)).

41 . By Article 78 § 1 of the 2007 Code of Civil Procedure, in civil proceedings costs also follow the event: the claimant’s costs – litigation costs and the fees of one lawyer – must be borne by the defendant in proportion to the part of the claim which is allowed. If the lawyer’s fees paid by a party are excessive in the light of the complexity of the case, the court may reduce the costs payable by the opposing party – should it request that – so long as they do not go below the legal minimum for lawyers’ fees (Article 78 § 5).

42 . Third-party interveners are not entitled to costs (Article 78 § 10 of the same Code).

COMPLAINTS

43 . The association complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the two orders against it to pay the interveners’ costs:

(a) were unlawful, in particular because the rules on interveners’ costs in in proceedings for judicial review were unclear;

(b) did not pursue a legitimate aim and were disproportionate, in particular because (i) they were not made in application of the “loser pays” rule because they were in favour of interveners who had themselves chosen to take part in the litigation; (ii) having been made in judicial-review proceedings against secondary legislation, they could – in the absence of any possibility for cost-capping – have a chilling effect, since the claimant risked being made to bear the costs of any number of interveners supporting the respondent; and (iii) their quantum was excessive and out of all proportion with the association’s financial means.

44 . The association further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the two orders against it to pay the interveners’ costs were in breach of its right of access to a court.

45 . The association also complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court refused to deal with its objection to the quantum of the costs sought by the interveners for the appeal proceedings.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Has there been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? In particular, did the costs orders against the applicant association pursue a legitimate aim, and were they proportionate (see, mutatis mutandis , National Movement Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria , no. 31678/17, §§ 74-83, 15 December 2020)? Did the fact that they were made in favour of a number of interveners affect those points?

2.1. Did Article 6 § 1 of the Convention apply to the judicial-review proceedings brought by the association, and by extension to the proceedings relating to the costs in those judicial-review proceedings (see Beer v. Austria , no. 30428/96, §§ 12-13, 6 February 2001; Lamprecht v. Austria (dec.), no. 71888/01, 25 March 2004; and Macri v. Italy (dec.), no. 38897/04, 12 June 2007)? In particular, were those judicial-review proceedings – to the extent that they concerned secondary legislation rather than a decision relating specifically to the association – decisive for a “right” of the association? If so, was that “right” a “civil” one?

2.2. If Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied to the cost proceedings, has there been a breach of that provision? In particular, did the costs orders against the association unduly restrict its right of access to a court (see Collectif national d’information et d’opposition à l’usine Melox – Collectif Stop Melox and Mox v. France , no. 75218/01, § 15, 12 June 2007)?

2.3. If Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied to the costs proceedings, was the refusal of the Supreme Administrative Court’s five-member panel which dealt with the association’s substantive appeal to assess whether the costs sought by the interveners for the appeal proceedings were excessive in breach of that provision (see, mutatis mutandis , Trevisanato v. Italy , no. 32610/07, §§ 35-45, 15 September 2016; Succi and Others v. Italy , nos. 55064/11 and 2 others, §§ 73-115, 28 October 2021, and Ghrenassia v. Luxembourg , no. 27160/19, §§ 29-38, 7 December 2021)?