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Lie and Berntsen v. Norway (dec.)

Doc ref: 25130/94 • ECHR ID: 002-6125

Document date: December 16, 1999

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Lie and Berntsen v. Norway (dec.)

Doc ref: 25130/94 • ECHR ID: 002-6125

Document date: December 16, 1999

Cited paragraphs only

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 13

December 1999

Lie and Berntsen v. Norway (dec.) - 25130/94

Decision 16.12.1999 [Section II]

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Impartial tribunal

Judge deciding on compensation for the length of criminal proceedings in which he had sat: inadmissible

In 1981 the applicants created a limited liability company in the media industry. In October 1997 a criminal investigation was initiated against them on suspicion of gross fraud, breach of trust and embezzlement. By a judgment of November 1995, the City Court acquitted them of certain charges and convicted them of others. The length of the proceedings was conside red excessive and accordingly the applicants were not requested to pay any costs. The prosecution lodged an appeal to the High Court. The applicants were again partly acquitted and sentenced to 3½ years’ imprisonment without having to pay any costs. They l odged an appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court which, by four votes to one, commuted their prison sentence to a suspended sentence, the only dissenting vote being that of judge T. The first applicant brought compensation proceedings for pecunia ry and non-pecuniary damage caused by the excessive length of the criminal proceedings but his claim was rejected. He challenged this refusal before the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court, on which T. sat. The claim for pecuniary damage was r ejected unanimously, whereas the claim for non-pecuniary damage was rejected by two votes to one, T. being in favour of refusal. The  applicant asked the committee to re-examine his claims for compensation and submitted that T., given the views he had expr essed in the appeal on sentencing, should not have been called to decide on the compensation issue. His request for revision was rejected, the Committee noting that a judge’s participation in a criminal case against a person claiming compensation was not a s such an obstacle to the judge’s taking part in the compensation case.

Inadmissible under Article 6 § 1: In accordance with Norwegian law and in line with the Convention, the Supreme Court, when reviewing the High Court’s decision sentencing the applicant s to imprisonment, was obliged to take the excessive length of the criminal proceedings into account. The Supreme Court accordingly decided to suspend their prison sentences. The determination of compensation, following the first applicant’s request, depen ded on a broad assessment of whether an award would be appropriate and justified by special reasons. The Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court observed that it could not disregard the fact that the excessive length of the proceedings had already been taken into account in the Supreme Court’s review of the sentences and that in view of the circumstances there were no special reasons suggesting that it would be appropriate to make an additional award of compensation. On the other hand, the relevant provisions of domestic law and the Committee’s reasoning in no way implied that a reduction of sentence due to the excessive length of the proceedings excluded the possibility of making an award of compensation. However, the fact that T. participated in t he criminal proceedings, and issued a dissenting opinion on the review of the sentences, did not imply that he would necessarily reject the compensation claim. The compensation case concerned a different kind of remedy governed by different criteria. Altho ugh the length of the criminal proceedings was a relevant factor with regard both to sentencing and to compensation, these remained none the less separate issues. Therefore, the first applicant did not have any legitimate grounds for fearing that T. felt b ound by his opinion on the sentences or had any preconceived idea when deciding on the subsequent compensation claim. There were no reasons either for doubting the impartiality of the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court in his case: manifestly ill-founded.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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