Information Note on the Court’s case-law 38

January 2002

De Ponte Nascimento v. the United Kingdom (dec.) - 55331/00

Decision 31.1.2002 [Section III]

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Access to court

Refusal of Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal: inadmissible

In June 1994 the applicant, a Portuguese national, was knocked off his bicycle by a car. In June 1997 he initiated proceedings against the drive r of the car. He later left the United Kingdom. In October 1997 the County Court ordered him to file further medical evidence in support of his claim within 28 days, failing which any particulars of injury not substantiated by a medical report would be str uck out. Further medical evidence was filed on his behalf, some within 28 days and some later. Following an application lodged by the defendant, the district judge struck out the particulars of injury on the ground that the order of October 1997 had not be en complied with. The applicant unsuccessfully appealed against this decision. He then applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal applied a Practice Direction according to which in civil cases leave for a second tier appeal cou ld only be granted if it had a realistic prospects of success and raised a point of principle or disclosed some other reason why it should be heard. Two of the three judges forming the appellate court found after examination that permission to appeal shoul d be refused.

Inadmissible under Article 6 § 1: As to whether the decision of the Court of Appeal to refuse permission to appeal was a determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligation, the court spent two days hearing oral argument, including o n the merits of the case, and two of the three judges engaged in a detailed analysis of the merits of the application in their judgments. Moreover, the effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal was to end the greater part of the applicant’s claim. Such a detailed consideration of the case was a determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations within the meaning of the present provision. As to whether the refusal of leave to appeal was arbitrary, unfair or a denial of the right of access to court, taking into account the State’s margin of appreciation, the requirements of the consolidated practice that the applicant would be granted leave for a second tier appeal only if it had a realistic prospect of success and raised a point of principle o r disclosed some other reason why it should be heard were reasonable and proportionate measures taken in pursuit of the fair and efficient administration of justice. Contrary to the applicant’s contentions, only one of the three judges concluded that the e arlier court had reached an incorrect result on the merits. The Court of Appeal’s decision to refuse leave to appeal because the majority of the court thought that the application either did not have realistic prospects of success or that the balance of ju stice lay in upholding the earlier judgment was not arbitrary or unfair: manifestly ill-founded.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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