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Olivieri and Others v. Italy

Doc ref: 17708/12;17717/12;17729/12;22994/12 • ECHR ID: 002-11066

Document date: February 25, 2016

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Olivieri and Others v. Italy

Doc ref: 17708/12;17717/12;17729/12;22994/12 • ECHR ID: 002-11066

Document date: February 25, 2016

Cited paragraphs only

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 193

February 2016

Olivieri and Others v. Italy - 17708/12, 17717/12, 17729/12 et al.

Judgment 25.2.2016 [Section I]

Article 13

Effective remedy

Effectiveness of “Pinto” remedy for length of administrative proceedings where no application for expedited hearing was made: violation

Facts – In August 1990 the applicants lodged separate applications with the Regional Adminis trative Court. They applied jointly for the case to be set down for hearing. In February 2008 the registry notified them of the requirement to lodge a fresh application for the case to be set down for hearing, failing which the proceedings would lapse. The applicants complied. At the same time they lodged applications with the Court of Appeal on the basis of the “Pinto Act”, complaining of the excessive length of the administrative proceedings. Between February and April 2009 their applications were declare d inadmissible on the grounds that, during the administrative court proceedings, the applicants had not requested an urgent hearing as required by a new condition for the admissibility of “Pinto” applications which had come into effect on 25 June 2008.

Law – Article 13: On 25 June 2008 the legislature had introduced a new procedure for complaints concerning the excessive length of administrative court proceedings. The procedure comprised two stages. The first stage consisted in making an application during the administrative proceedings for the case to be set down for an urgent hearing. The second stage, governed by the “Pinto” Act, allowed individuals to lodge a claim for just satisfaction with the competent Court of Appeal.

The President of the Administrat ive Court simply had the option of setting the case down for an urgent hearing. Furthermore, the domestic legislation did not appear to lay down detailed provisions governing the examination of applications for a case to be set down for an urgent hearing, and specifically the criteria to be applied in order to reject or grant such requests and the implications, where the courts found in the applicant’s favour, in terms of the conduct of the proceedings. In view of these factors and of the courts’ practice, an application for the case to be set down for an urgent hearing did not appear to be an effective means of speeding up the court’s decision. It had no significant impact on the length of proceedings, as it did not result in their being speeded up or preve nt them from exceeding a duration that might be deemed reasonable. The outcome of such an application was therefore uncertain. Furthermore, in the absence of transitional arrangements, the new provision applied automatically to all “Pinto” applications, ir respective of the length of the main administrative proceedings. This meant that the parties were obliged to lodge a series of applications aimed at the conclusion of proceedings whose duration was already unreasonable. This condition of admissibility was apparently a formal condition which had the effect of impeding access to the “Pinto” procedure and thus rendering it ineffective for the purposes of Article 13. Since failure to comply with this condition automatically resulted in “Pinto” applications bein g declared inadmissible, the applicants had been deprived of the opportunity of obtaining appropriate and sufficient redress.

Furthermore, the legislature had amended the provision in question in 2010, confirming the doubts expressed by the Court in its Da ddi decision. The findings expressed at that time also applied to the new wording of the legislation. In other words, if the legislation were interpreted by the Italian courts in such a way that periods prior to 25 June 2008 were not taken into account in determining the period giving rise to compensation, certain categories of applicants were liable to be systematically denied the possibility of obtaining appropriate and sufficient redress under the “Pinto” Act.

Conclusion : violation (unanimously).

The Co urt also found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings in issue.

Article 41: EUR 22,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

(See Daddi v. Italy (dec.), 15476/09, 2 June 2009, Information Note 120 )

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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