Information Note on the Court’s case-law 246

December 2020

Uzun v. Turkey (dec.) - 37866/18

Decision 10.11.2020 [Section II]

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

Right to education

Proportionate ban, reviewed by domestic court, on detainee who was suspected of terrorism taking university exams during state of emergency: inadmissible

Facts – The applicant, who at the relevant time was in pre-trial detention on suspicion o f belonging to a terrorist organisation, had been enrolled in a higher-education distance-learning programme. Following declaration of a state of emergency in 2016, legislative decrees were passed which inter alia prohibited prisoners detained or convicted in connection with a terrorist offence from sitting any kind of examination. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 

Law – Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: The ban on the applicant being able to sit his university exams had represented an interference with his right to education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. It had had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining order and security in prisons. The Court had to determine whether the interference had been “necessary”, with regard to the no rmal and reasonable requirements of detention and to the breadth of the margin of appreciation afforded to the national authorities in regulating prisoners’ access to education.

The restriction in the present case had been a limited one, which had lasted just under two years. The provision in question had imposed a restriction solely for the duration of the state of emergency. As the state of emergency had been lifted in July 2018, the restriction in question had ceased to apply on that date and the applic ant had been authorised to sit his examinations.

Although the restriction had applied automatically, it had not been a general prohibition imposed on all detainees and convicted prisoners, irrespective of the nature of the offence with which they had been charged. The restriction had concerned only one specific category of prisoners, namely those who had been detained or convicted in respect of terrorist offences. In this respect, the present case was to be distinguished from cases concerning prohibitions w hich affected a group of people generally, automatically and indiscriminately, based solely on the fact that they were serving a prison sentence, irrespective of the length of the sentence and irrespective of their individual circumstances (see Hirst v. th e United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 74025/01, 6 October 2005, Information Note 79 ). The legislature had made the application of the measure conditional on the nature of the offence committed ( Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 126/05, 22 May 2012, Information Note 152 ).

The contested restriction had also been reviewed by the Constitutional Court in the context of numerous individual applications, including that of the applicant. The Constitutional Court had carefully examined the compatibility of this measure with the Con stitution and the Convention. To that end, it had broadly based its analysis on the principles laid down by the Court in its case-law and had examined the proportionality of the contested interference in the light of the criteria established by its case-la w (see Mehmet Reşit Arslan and Orhan Bingöl v. Turkey , 47121/06 and 2 others, 18 June 2019, Information Note 230 ); it had provided an explanation in its decision, with extended reasoning. Although t he Constitutional Court’s reasoning had not shown that the applicant’s personal situation had been specifically taken into account, this might be accepted in the light of the background to the adoption of the restriction in question. It thus had taken into consideration the sudden and exponential increase, after the attempted coup d’état , of the number of persons placed in detention on terrorism-related grounds, an increase which had been accompanied by a decrease in the numbers of prison staff responsible for supervising prisoners. This extraordinary situation might have rendered it difficult in practice to organise participation of the applicant and other detainees in educational programmes they had been enrolled in.

Those were relevant and acceptable cons iderations, including with regard to the applicant’s personal circumstances, which had followed logically from the principle that the State must strike a balance between, on the one hand, the educational needs of those under its jurisdiction and, on the ot her, its limited capacity to accommodate them.

The contested restriction had to also be assessed in the context of higher education. The State’s margin of appreciation in this domain increased with the level of education, in inverse proportion to the impor tance of that education for those concerned and for society at large.

Lastly, it had not been established that this period of restriction had constituted a significant obstacle to the applicant’s ability to complete his studies. Nor had he alleged that he had been obliged to complete his university studies within a given period of time. The applicant had been able to re-enrol in the university and sit his exams. He continued his studies, apparently without any further hindrance.

A ccordingly, the contested restriction had been neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and had been necessary and proportionate.

Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).

(See Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria , 16032/07, 27 May 2014, Information Note 174 ; see also Guide on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights - Right to education and Guide on the case-law of the European Convention of Human Rights – Prisoners’ rights )

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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