FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 41604/11 Alexander BOMAN against Finland lodged on 4 July 2011

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Mr Alexander Boman , is a Finnish national who was born in 1992 and lives in Jomala . He is represented before the Court by Mr Markus Hamro-Drotz , a lawyer practising in Mariehamn .

The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

Criminal proceedings against the applicant

On 26 March 2010 the applicant was charged with, inter alia , causing a serious traffic hazard ( törkeä liikenneturvallisuuden vaarantaminen , grovt äventyrande av trafiksäkerheten ) and operating a vehicle without a licence ( ajoneuvon kuljettaminen oikeudetta , olovlig körning ), both acts having been committed on 5 February 2010. The prosecutor requested that, in relation to the charge of causing a serious traffic hazard, a driving ban be imposed.

On 22 April 2010 the District Court ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 75 day-fines, amounting to 450 euros . A driving ban was also imposed until 4 September 2010.

No appeal was made against the judgment and it became final.

Administrative proceedings

On 28 May 2010 the police imposed a new driving ban on the applicant from 5 September to 4 November 2010. In its decision the police referred to the fact that on 5 February 2010 the applicant had been driving a vehicle without a licence and that the District Court had convicted him for this by final judgment on 22 April 2010.

By letter dated 22 June 2010 the applicant appealed to the Åland Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus , förvaltningsdomstolen ) , claiming that he had been tried and convicted twice in the same matter. He referred to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.

On 20 July 2010 the Åland Administrative Court rejected the applicant ’ s appeal and upheld the driving ban. The court found that the District Court had imposed the driving ban for causing a serious traffic hazard whereas the police had imposed it for operating a vehicle without a licence. Therefore, the applicant was not punished twice for the same offence and his rights protected by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention were not violated.

By letter dated 12 August 2010 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Administrative Court . He stressed that both the criminal and the administrative proceedings had related to the same facts which had taken place on 5 February 2010.

On 19 January 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Administrative Court ’ s decision. It found that the District Court had imposed the driving ban for causing a serious traffic hazard whereas the police had imposed it for operating a vehicle without a licence. Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention had therefore not been violated. The decision was not unanimous and one of the judges expressed a dissenting opinion. According to her , it was not to be ruled out that a driving ban constituted a criminal sanction. Referring to the case Zolotukhin v. Russia , she considered that after the applicant ’ s final conviction by the District Court , a new driving ban based on the same facts on the basis of which he had already been convicted could no longer be imposed. Therefore , she would have quashed the police decision as well as the Administrative Court ’ s decision.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention that he has been tried and convicted twice in the same matter. Both the District Court and the police imposed a driving ban for driving a vehicle without a licence on the basis of the same facts. Even though the District Court ’ s judgment became final on 22 April 2010, the police imposed a new driving ban on 28 May 2010.

QUESTION TO THE PARTIES

Has the applicant been tried, convicted or punished twice for the same offence in the territory of the respondent State, as prohibited by Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention? If so, did the proceedings fall within the exceptions envisaged by Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7?