Lexploria - Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Lexploria beta Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Menu
Browsing history:

PETRESKA v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Doc ref: 16912/08 • ECHR ID: 001-141423

Document date: January 27, 2014

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 2

PETRESKA v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Doc ref: 16912/08 • ECHR ID: 001-141423

Document date: January 27, 2014

Cited paragraphs only

Communicated on 27 January 2014

FIRST SECTION

Application no. 16912/08 Desanka PETRESKA against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged on 26 March 2008

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Ms Desanka Petreska , is a Macedonian national who was born in 1953 and lives in Skopje .

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was employed by a State security agency (“the employer”).

On 28 February 2001, the applicant was dismissed on the basis of the Regulation s for the systemisation of p osts of employment (“the Regulations”) ( Правилник за систематизација на работните места ) .

On 9 April 2001 the applicant challenged her dismissal before the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”).

On 18 March 2002 the first-instance court upheld the applicant ’ s claim.

On 5 March 2003 the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) allowed an appeal by the employer and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration.

On 12 September 2003 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant ’ s claim. It established that the Regulations had been adopted by the employer ’ s director on 26 February 2001 and sent to the Government for approval. The Government had given their approval at the session of 27 February 2001. The decision had come into effect immediately. The first-instance court concluded that the Regulations had abolished the applicant ’ s post and her dismissal was therefore lawful.

On 9 January 2004 the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the applicant and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration as insufficient reasoning had been provided.

On 7 September 2004 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant ’ s claim. It found that the Government had approved the Regulations on 27 February 2001 and had notified the employer of their approval on 28 February 2001, and that the employer had received the notification on 2 March 2001. However, it observed that the date of receipt was irrelevant since the Regulations had come into force with immediate effect on the date of the Government ’ s approval, namely on 27 February 2001, and the applicant had been lawfully dismissed the following day.

On 17 March 2005 the Court of Appeal, sitting as a panel presided over by L.A., allowed the applicant ’ s appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration, instructing it to establish the date on which the Government ’ s approval had been received by the employer.

On 29 November 2005 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant ’ s claim. It reiterated that the Government had approved the Regulations on 27 February 2001, that the applicant had been dismissed on 28 February 2001, that the Government ’ s approval had been received by the employer on 2 March 2001, and that the date of receipt was irrelevant since the Regulations had already come into force on 27 February 2001.

On 14 December 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal regarding the applicability of the Regulations, amongst other things. The applicant relied on another final judgment by a court of appeal in a similar case involving a former colleague, in which it had been established that the Regulations were not applicable (see “Relevant domestic practice” below).

On 23 February 2006 the Court of Appeal, sitting as a panel chaired by L.A., dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal. It found that the Government had approved the Regulations on 27 February 2001 and that the applicant ’ s dismissal of 28 February 2001 was therefore lawful.

On 7 April 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. In it she argued, inter alia , that the Regulations had not yet come into force at the time of her dismissal and that the Court of Appeal had deviated from its established practice on the matter without providing any reasons. She referred to the earlier decisions by the Court of Appeal and stated that the claims of three former colleagues who had been dismissed on the same grounds as her had been upheld and they had been reinstated in their posts.

On 25 October 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law. It found that the Regulations had been in force at the time of her dismissal. On 15 January 2008 the applicant was served with the Supreme Court ’ s judgment.

B. Relevant domestic practice

On 21 April 2004, in a case brought by a former colleague of the applicant, the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court ’ s judgment setting aside the dismissal, finding that the employer received the Government ’ s on 2 March 2001 and that therefore the Regulations had not been in force on 28 February 2001. The applicant alleges that in that case L.A. chaired the panel of the Court of Appeal and that the judgment in question was upheld by the Supreme Court.

The applicant also alleges that the dismissal of another colleague was likewise set aside and that both the first and second instance courts found that the Regulations had not been applicable on 28 February 2001. She argues that the decisions in both these cases became final and that her colleagues were reinstated in their posts.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the domestic proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time and that she did not have a fair hearing on account of the domestic courts ’ di vergent interpretations of the applicability of the Regulations .

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was the principle of legal certainty enshrined in this provision complied with when, according to the applicant, the domestic courts applied different case-law to identical claims (see Stoilkovska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 29784/07, §§ 48-49, 18 July 2013)?

2. Was the length of the proceedings in accordance with the “reasonable time” requirement set forth in this provision?

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2026

LEXI

Lexploria AI Legal Assistant

Active Products: EUCJ + ECHR Data Package + Citation Analytics • Documents in DB: 401132 • Paragraphs parsed: 45279850 • Citations processed 3468846