Communicated on 10 September 2014

FIFTH SECTION

Application no. 16753/11 DRAUPNER UNIVERSAL against Sweden lodged on 31 January 2011

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The first applicant, Draup n er Universal AB, is a Swedish limited liability company registered in Stockholm. The second applicant, Mr Toivo Jurik , is a Swedish legal professional and economic consultant who practises as an associate in a Swedish law firm . H e is also the father of the two owners of the applicant company and its sole director. The applicants were represented before the Court by Mr C. Lindstrand , a lawyer practising in Stockholm.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

On 14 March 2008 the Swedish Tax Agency ( Skatteverket ) decided to take coercive measur es against the applicant company under the 1994 Act on Specific Coercive Measures in the Taxation Procedure ( L agen (1994:466) om särskilda tvångsåtgärder i beskattningsförfarandet – hereafter “the 1994 Act”). The measures were taken by virtue of an interim decision by the Tax Agency in accord ance with paragraph 15 of the 1994 Act, which requires that such a decision is immediately submitted to the competent administrative court of first instance for a decision on whether or not the decision shall stand.

On the same day the measures were carried out in an apartment which was owned by the a pplicant company and was its domicile but which was leased by the s econd a pplicant and also served as his private dwelling. The search conducted at the apartment result ed in, inter alia , the seizure of certain data media and documents which , according to the applicants , includ ed the second applicant ’ s private photographs as well as documents which had been entrusted to the s econd a pplicant by his clients.

The Tax Agency ’ s decision was submitted to the County Administrative Court ( länsrätten ) in Stockholm in accord ance with the 1994 Act. T he court gave the a pplicant company a short respite to respond and thereafter , by a judgment of 26 March 2008, it upheld the Tax Agency ’ s decision. The s econd a pplicant was not provided with an opportunity to respond before the court con firmed the coercive measures.

Both applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal ( ka mmarrätten ) i n Stockholm. The a pplicant company requested that the decision to seize property in the apartment be reversed , the property returned to its owners and all the seized documents be exempt from the Tax Agency´s audit and the s econd a pplicant attempted to intervene on his own behalf and with the same cause.

The Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed, i n a decision o f 22 August 2008, the applicants ’ appeals. In regard to the a pplicant company , the court stated that there was nothing in the case that showed that the company had a strong interest to have the coercive meas ure examined in one more instance. With respect to the s econd a pplicant , the court considered that he had no standing as a party at this stage of the proceedings. The request for exemption of documents was referred to the County Administrative Court since this request had not been reviewed in the lower instance.

The a pplicant company appealed against the Administrative Court of Appeal ’ s decision but , by a decision of 28 January 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court ( Regeringsrätten ) refused leave to appeal.

The second a pplicant lodged a separate complaint to the County Administrative Court claiming , inter alia, that his rights under Article 8 of the Convention had been violated by the Tax Agency ’ s actions. The County Administrative Court dismissed these complaints in a decision o f 17 March 2009, saying that an appeal was neither necessary nor possible since the Tax Agency ’ s decision had immediately been submitted to the appropriate county administrative cour t for a decision on whether or not the decision sh ould stand.

The second applicant appealed t o the Admi nistrative Court of Appeal . He requested that the appeal should either be examined as an appeal against the decision of 17 March 2009 that no appeal lay against the Tax Agency ’ s decision , or against the judgment of 26 March 2008 in which the County Administrative Court had upheld the Tax Agency ’ s decision o n coercive measures.

By a judgment o f 6 May 2009 the A dministrative Court of Appeal denied both requests. It noted, as had the County Administrative Court, that it was not possible to appeal against the Tax Agency ’ s decision since it had been submitted for confirmation to the County Administrative Court. In regard t o the judgment confirming the Tax Agency ’ s decision , the court noted that the s econd a pplicant ’ s right o f appeal had already been reviewed in the court ’ s decision of 22 August 2008.

On 24 July 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal against the appellate court ’ s judgment.

As has been noted above, t he a pplicant company and the second applicant had , in their appeal against the County Administrative Court ’ s judgment of 26 March 2008 , requested that a large number of the documents seized by the Tax Agency on 14 March 2008 be exempt from the Tax Agency ’ s audit , inter alia because the majority of the documents c oncern ed the s econd a pplicant ’ s attorney-client privileges or were his personal possessions. O n 14 September 2009 , after the applicant company ’ s request had been referred to the County Administrative Court, t he r equest for exemption was denied by the c ourt except in regard to a few documents which clearly belonged to the s econd a pplicant (namely his last will and his personal banking codes and similar documents) . In the same judgment the court denied the a pplicant company ’ s request for an oral hearing.

The a pplicant company appealed and requested an oral hearing but , on 14 September 2010, the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected both the request for exemption of documents and the request for an oral hearing . On 26 October 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal .

After the Tax Agency had retrieved the contents of two hard disks and a USB memory, which had been seized in the apartment, the applicant company made a new request for exemption of documents which was partially approved by the County Administrative Court in a judgment of 24 November 2011. On 21 February 2012 this judgment was upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal. On 8 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they were denied an oral hearing before the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal in the p roce edings concerning the exemption of documents.

2. The second applicant asserts under Article 6 that he was denied access to court concerning the Tax Agency ’ s seizure of his property and concerning his allegations of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. He also claims, in this connection, that he did not have an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.

3. Furthermore, the second applicant maintains that there was a breach of Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention due to the Tax Agency ’ s decision of 14 March 2008 to access his private dwelling and there seize property belonging to him.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Did the second applicant lodge his application within six months of the final domestic decision in the case?

2 . Has there been an interference with the s econd a pp licant ’ s right to respect for hi s private life, home or correspondence, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention?

If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention?

3 . Was A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the proceedings in the present case?

If so, d id the applicant s have a fair hearing in the determination of their civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was it justified not to hold an oral hearing in the case and, furthermore, d id the second applicant have a ccess to a court for the determination of his civil rights and obligations ?

4. Did the s econd a pplicant in the present case have access to an effective remedy as guaranteed by Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ?

5 . Has there been an interference with the second applicant ’ s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meani ng of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?

If so, was that interference necessary to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties?