Communicated on 10 September 2014

FIRST SECTION

Applications nos. 56960/13 and 58446/13 Mikhail Petrovich SHAVORSKIY against Russia and Svetlana Nikolayevna GLOT and Mikhail Vasilyevich IVANOV against Russia lodged on 26 August 2013 and 26 August 2013 respectivel y

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant in the first case (application no. 56960/13 ) , Mr Mikhail Petrovich Shavorskiy (hereinafter referred to as the first applicant) , is a Russian national, who was born in 1946 and lives in Aleksandrovskaya .

The applicants in the second case (application no. 58446/13) , Ms Svetlana Nikolayevna Glot (the second applicant) and Mr Mikhail Vasilyevich Ivanov (the third applicant) , are Russian nationals, who were born in 1949 and 1950 respectively and both live in Prokhladnyy town .

The second applicant is the widow of Mr Sergey Glot , who died on 6 March 2012. She lodged the application before the Court on 26 August 2013 , after the death of her husband .

The applicants are represented before the Court by Mr M. Abubakarov , a lawyer practising in Nalchik .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

A. The circumstances of the case

The first applicant, the second applicant ’ s deceased husband, Mr Glot , and the third applicant served as clean-up workers at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident. As a result they suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions which later led to their disability. In late 2010 the y lodged a complaint with the Nalchik Town Court of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) against the Russian Ministry of Fina nce, seeking compensation for non ‑ pecuniary damage sustained this connection.

By a judgment of 17 January 2011 the Town Court allowed the claims in part and awarded 1,100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 25,500 euros ( EUR) ) to the first applicant and RUB 1,300,000 each (approximately EUR 30,0 00) each to Mr Glot and the third applicant. On the same day the Russian Ministry of Finance appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Cou rt of the Republic of Kabardino ‑ Balkaria (“the Supreme Court of Kabardino-Balkaria ”).

On 16 March 2011 Mr U. , acting on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Finance, retracted the appeal and the judgment of 17 January 201 1 became final and enforceable.

On 1 June 2011 the Department of the Federal Treasury Fund in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (“ the FTF”) , on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Finance , lodged through the Town Court an appeal with the Supreme Court of Kabardino ‑ Balkaria against the judgment of 17 January 2011. They also requested that the statutory ten-day time ‑ limit for lodging such an appeal against the judgment be restored.

On 6 June 2011 the Town Court refused to restore the time-limit, stating that the FTF provided no valid reasons for missing it. The latter decision was not ap pealed against and became final.

On 5 July 2011 the judgment of 17 January 2011 was enforced and the applicants and Mr Glot received the awarded sums.

On 23 October 2012 the FTF lodged an a ppeal against the decision of 6 June 2011 with the Town Court. T hey also requested that the ten ‑ day statutory time-limit for appealing against that decision be restored on the ground that a copy of the decision had not been forwarded to them in due course.

On 15 November 2012 the Town Court refused to restore the time ‑ limit for appeal , mainly on the grounds that the FTF had already used their right to appeal as they had submitted a complaint against the judgment of 17 January 2011 , but had later retracted this on their own initiative.

In November 2012 the FTF appealed against the Town Court ’ s decision of 15 November 2012 to the Supreme Court of Kabardino ‑ Balkaria .

On 26 December 2012 the Supreme Court of Kabardino ‑ Balkaria quashed the latter decision and restored the time-limit for appeal against the decision of 6 June 2011 , as requested by the FTF. The Supreme Court of Kabardino ‑ Balkaria found that the Russian Ministry of Finance could not be said to have been represented in those court proceedings as the relevant hearing t ranscript did not indicate the details of the power of attorney of Ms B., who had acted as a representative of the Russian Ministry of Finance. In such circumstances the Town Court should have forwarded a copy of the decision to the respondent, but it had failed to do so. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that the Russian Ministry of Finance had a valid excuse in missing the statutory time-limit for appealing against the Town Court ’ s decision of 6 June 2011 .

On 28 February 2013 the Supreme Court of Kabardino-Balkaria quashed the decision of 6 June 2011 and restored the time-limit for appealing against the judgment of 17 January 2011. It noted, in particular that:

“ ... On 14 March 2011 ... the Supreme Court of Kabardino-Balkaria received a request from the FTF signed by Mr U., which indicated his intention to withdraw an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2011.

... the case materials contain no information of Mr U. ’ s authority allowing him to challenge the court ’ s decisions on behalf of t he Russian Ministry of Finance.

Accordingly, the court finds unsubstantiated the [applicants ’ ] representative ’ s arguments that the respondent submitted an appeal against the court ’ s decision, and subsequently retracted it.

... It follows from the case materials, that in violation of the abovementioned norms [Article 214 of the CCP] a copy of the Town Court ’ s judgment [of 17 January 2011] was not forwarded to the respondent (the Russian Ministry of Finance).

Besides, the respondent ’ s interests in the To wn Court were represented ... by Ms B. ... who participated in the first instance court hearing on examination of the case on the merits and, accordingly, was aware of that judgment [of 17 January 2011].

In such circumstances, the submission of an appeal against the Town Court ’ s judgment [of 17 January 2011] within the time-limit provided by Article 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure depended on the representative ’ s good faith ...

Accordingly , the failure to comply with the time-limit by the respondent evidently was a consequence of improper fulfillment of the obligations by the representative ... and non ‑ compliance of the first instance court with the re quirements of Article 214 o f the Code of Civil Procedure ... ”

On 28 February 2013 the Supreme Court of Kabardino-Balkaria quashed the Town Court ’ s judgment of 17 January 2011 and dismissed the first and third applicants ’ and Mr Glot ’ s claims in full. It noted that the domestic law concerning compensation for non ‑ pecuniary damage had been introduced on 31 May 1991 after the Chernobyl nuclear accident had oc curred; therefore the claimants were not entitled to any compensation. The Supreme Court further ordered the m to return the money they had received pursuant to the judgment of 17 January 2011.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

Article 112 of the Russian C ode of C ivil P rocedure (“CCP”) provides that a compe tent court may extend a time-limit for procedural actions, such as lodging an appeal, if the court finds that a party has a valid excuse for a failure to comply with that time-limit.

Article 227 of the CCP stipulates that a copy of a decision concerning termination of proceedings shall be forwarded to the parties to the proceedings if they were not present at the hearing within three days after its delivery .

Under Article 338 of the CCP , in force before 1 January 2012 , an appeal in a civil case could be lodged within ten days after the delivery of a first ‑ insta nce judgment in its final form. After 1 January 2012 the time ‑ limit for lodging an appeal has been extended to one month under Article 321 of the CCP .

Under Article 392 of the CCP a final judgment in a case may be reviewed, inter alia , on the ground that the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the Convention on account of the domestic judicial proceedings or decisions taken in t hat case. Articles 393 ‑ 94 set out a procedure for reopening of domestic judicial proceedings in any such case.

Article 1109 § 3 of the CCP stipulates that , if a decision to grant compensations for damages to health to a person in the absence of a bad faith and miscalculations on his or her part is quashed on appeal or by way of supervisory review, the compensation itself cannot be claimed back .

COMPLAINTS

The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the restoration of the time-limit for an appeal which had resulted in the quashing of the final judgment , that had previously been rendered in their favour , violated the principle of legal certainty. The applicants further complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the reversal of the compensations awards made by the Town Court, which had already been paid to the applicants, violated their right to property.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. D oes the second applicant have locus standi , satisfying the requirements of Article 34 of the Convention, to file the application on behalf of Mr Sergey Glot ? If so, does this standing extend to all the complaints raised in the application (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08 , §§ 97 ‑ 100, 17 July 2014) ?

2. Regard being had to the decisions of 26 December 20 12 and 28 February 2013 by which the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kabardino ‑ Balkaria restored, at the request of the Russian Ministry of Finance , the time-limit for appealing against the decisions of 6 June 2011 and 17 January 2011 respectively, were the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and in particular the principle of legal certainty, respected (see Bezrukovy v. Russia , no. 34616/02, §§ 32-36, 10 May 2012 ) ?

3. Have there been any other examples, not stemming from the facts as described in the present cases, where a time-limit for an appeal was restored on similar grounds? The Government are invited to submit their reply with references to domestic practice, if any.

4. Did the quashing of the final judgment s that had been delivered in the applicants ’ favour constitute an i nterference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of the ir possession s, in the form of a judgment debt? If so, was the interference justified for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ?