Communicated on 17 November 2014

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 70264/13 Arkadiusz MAJEWSKI against Poland lodged on 18 October 2013

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Mr Arkadiusz Majewski , is a Polish national, who was born in 1979 and lives in Wroc ł aw . He is represented before the Court by Mr P. Rał , a lawyer practising in Warsaw .

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

1 . The applicant ’ s placement in overcrowded cells and subsequently in a cell for dangerous detainees

The applicant was deprived of his liberty in the Wroc Å‚ aw Prison from 18 June 2009 until 9 September 2010, from 17 September until 17 November 2010 and from January until November 2011.

Since there was a problem with overcrowding in ordinary cells in the Wroc Å‚ aw Prison – the applicant was placed in a cell in which the surface per person was below the statutory 3 square metres – it was proposed to the applicant to transfer him to another cell which normally was considered for so-called dangerous detainees, which meant, among other things, that the cell, including the sanitary corner, was constantly monitored via closed ‑ circuit television. Apparently the applicant agreed to be transferred to this cell under the condition that the monitoring would be switched off.

On 9 June 2011 the applicant was transferred to a cell with reinforced security measures for dangerous detainees. However, the monitoring of the cell was switched off only on 10 September 2011.

2. Civil proceedings for just-satisfaction

The applicant lodged a claim against the State Treasury represented by the Wroc Å‚ aw Prison for the protection of his personal rights. He sought acknowledgement by the court that his personal rights had been violated and 95,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in just satisfaction.

On 31 January 2013 the Wroc ł aw Regional Court found the applicant ’ s claim only in part well-founded and granted the applicant PLN 5,000 as just-satisfaction. The court found that, indeed, the applicant had been kept in overcrowded cells where the surface per person was below the statutory 3 square metres and that this alone had constituted a violation of his personal rights. It also found, however, that according to the relevant provisions, granting of just satisfaction was not obligatory in every case of violation of an applicant ’ s personal rights. In the present case, according to the Regional Court, the applicant had not shown that he had suffered any material or immaterial loss in connection with his imprisonment in overcrowded cells and his claim in this respect had a purely pecuniary basis. The court went on to conclude that the applicant ’ s claim, in so far as it concerned overcrowding, had constituted an abuse of his right to claim damages contrary to the principles of community life. Consequently, the court refused to grant any just satisfaction for the overcrowding. The court further examined the applicant ’ s claim as regards his alleged discrimination by placing him in a monitored cell for dangerous detainees and interference with his right to protection of his privacy. It found that, contrary to the relevant provisions of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, there was no formal decision given to place the applicant in a monitored cell nor were there any grounds to place him in such a cell, because the applicant had not been qualified as a “dangerous detainee”. The court found that the applicant ’ s personal right to “minimum privacy while in prison” had been violated and granted him PLN 5,000 under this head.

Both parties appealed against the first-instance judgment.

On 8 August 2013 the Wroc ł aw Court of Appeal amended the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicant ’ s claim. The court found that the prison authorities did not breach the law by transferring the applicant to a cell for dangerous detainees. It further found that the applicant ’ s personal rights were not infringed by monitoring of the cell in question.

The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1 . Monitoring of prisons and prison cells

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the monitoring of “dangerous detainees” are set out in the Court ’ s judgment in the case of Piechowicz v. Poland (no. 20071/07, §§ 11 2 -117, 17 April 2012).

2 . Overcrowding in prisons

A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning general rules governing the conditions of detention in Poland and domestic remedies available to detainees alleging that the conditions of their detention were inadequate are set out in the Court ’ s pilot judgments in the cases of Orchowski v. Poland (no. 17885/04) and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland (no. 17599/05) adopted on 22 October 2009 (see §§ 75-85 and §§ 45 ‑ 88 respectively). More recent developments are described in the Court ’ s decision in the case of Łatak v. Poland (no. 52070/08) adopted on 12 October 2010 (see §§ 25-54).

COMPLAINTS

The ap plicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention about the fact that he had been placed in overcrowded cells. He also raises a complaint under Article 3 about his placement in a cell for “dangerous detainees ” . In this respect he also complains about a breach of his right to privacy .

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Having regard to the fact that the applicant was deprived of his liberty in the Wroc Å‚ aw Prison in overcrowded cells, was he subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention?

2 . Having regard to the applicant ’ s placement in a cell for “dangerous detainees ” on 9 June 2011 and in particular to the fact of constant monitoring of the cell via closed-circuit television , has he been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention? The parties are requested to refer in their observations to the leading judgment of Piechowicz v. Poland , no. 20071/07, 17 April 2012.

3. Having regard to the applicant ’ s placement in a cell for “dangerous detainees” on 9 June 2011 and in particular to the fact of constant monitoring of the cell via closed-circuit television, were the conditions of the applicant ’ s deprivation of liberty compatible with Article 8 of the Convention? In particular:

- has there been an interference with the applicant ’ s right to respect for his private life, in particular his right to protection of private space?

- if so, was that interference “in accordance with the law”, in terms of the relevant legal provisions being foreseeable in their application and was it “necessary in a democratic society”, as required by Article 8?