Communicated on 6 October 2015

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 22715/07 Tamaz ILIASHVILI against Georgia lodged on 30 April 2007

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Tamaz Iliashvili , is a Georgian national, who was born in 1963 and lives in Tbilisi. He is represented before the Court by Ms L. Mukhashavria and Mr V. Vakhtangidze , lawyers practising in Tbilisi.

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

3. The applicant was elected judge of the Supreme Court of Georgia on 28 September 2000 for the term of office of ten years. He sat in the Criminal Affaires Panel of the Supreme Court, which body had jurisdiction of trying particularly complex criminal cases at first instance.

4. According to the applicant, in April-May 2005 a conflict between him and five other members of the Criminal Panel, on the one hand, and the President of the Supreme Court, on the other, occurred. In particular, given a reorganisation of the judicial system, the forthcoming discontinuation of the above-mentioned Criminal Affaires Panel and the consequent plan to reduce the overall number of Supreme Court judges, the President proposed them to step down from office by either continuing their judicial service at the Tbilisi Court of Appeals or retiring. The applicants refused, referring to the principle of irremovability of judges from office.

5. According to the applicant, starting from May 2005 the President of the Supreme Court would regularly make public statements, through various media sources, about the need to free the judicial system from “corrupt” and “undignified” judges.

6. On 6 July 2005 the President of the Supreme Court sent a complaint to the High Council of Justice (“the HCJ”) concerning the applicant ’ s judicial activities, requesting to launch disciplinary proceedings against him. The recommendation was grounded on the President ’ s suspicion that the applicant was intentionally protracting proceedings in a criminal case that he was dealing with at that moment.

7. On 12 July 2005 the HCJ instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant under Article 6 § 2 of the Act on Disciplinary Liability of Judges. Subsequently, the President recommended the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against certain other judges of the Supreme Court, including the members of the Criminal Affaires Panel.

8. On 28 July and 8 August 2005 the President of the Supreme Court addressed the HCJ with the second and third complaints against the applicant, suggesting that two additional sets of disciplinary proceedings be launched against him for multiples breaches of procedural rules in two other criminal cases that had been examined by the applicant between 2002 and 2003. Both complaints were examined by the HCJ, and two more sets of disciplinary proceedings were consequently launched, on 31 August and 19 September 2001, against the applicant.

9. Starting from 29 September 2005 the applicant, who fell ill, was granted sick leave from work.

10. On 5 October 2005 the Disciplinary Board of the Courts of Common Jurisdiction, the first instance of disciplinary jurisdiction (hereinafter “the Disciplinary Board”) which had been composed according by the HCJ, invited the applicant to attend a hearing of his case scheduled for the following day. The applicant requested adjournment in view of his state of health. Despite that request, the Disciplinary Board still held the hearing in his absence, found him disciplinary liable under Section 2 § 2 (a) of the Act on Disciplinary Liability of Judges and imposed upon him the sanction of dismissal from office, as provided for under Section 4 § 1 (d) of the Act, by its decision of 6 October 2005.

11. After a series of remittal of the case between various instances of jurisdiction, on 11 July 2006 the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court of Georgia (“the Disciplinary Chamber”) quashed the decision of 6 October 2005 as ill-founded and remitted the case to the first instance of the disciplinary jurisdiction for a fresh review.

12. By a decision of 4 August 2006 the Disciplinary Board, after having examined the case materials related to all three sets of disciplinary proceedings jointly, found the applicant guilty of “gross and/or multiple violation of law” and sanctioned him again with dismissal from office, in accordance with Sections 2 § 2 (a) and 4 § 1 (d) of the Act on Disciplinary Liability of Judges.

13. The applicant appealed again to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.

14. The latter, final instance of jurisdiction delivered its decision on 1 November 2006, rejecting the applicant ’ s appeal as ill-founded and upholding in part the decision of 4 August 2006. Thus, whilst the Supreme Court acquitted the applicant of the disciplinary charge as regards the first set of disciplinary proceedings, he was nevertheless found liable for the disciplinary offence of “gross and/or multiple violation of law” with respect to the additional two cases under Section 2 § 2 (a) of the Act on Disciplinary Liability of Judges. The sanction of dismissal from office remained intact.

B. Relevant domestic law

15. Section 2 § 2 (a) of the Act of 23 February 2000 on Disciplinary Liability of Judges, as amended on 23 June 2005 and applicable at the material time of the events, provided, amongst other, for the following type of disciplinary offence – “gross and/or multiple violation of law committed during the adjudication of a matter in court”.

16. Section 2 contained a further comment, which read as follows:

“A gross violation of law committed during the adjudication of a matter in court is a violation of significant scope which has already caused in actual fact or could potentially have caused disadvantage to the legitimate rights and interests of a main party to the proceedings or a third party. Violation of law is considered to have been multiple when it was committed three or more times.

If misinterpretation and misapplication of law has been prompted by the judge ’ s inner faith, it shall not be considered as ‘ a gross and/or multiple violation of law ’ .”

17. Section 4 § 1 of the above-mentioned Act provided for the list of various disciplinary penalties in order of their severity: admonishment, reprimand, rebuke, and dismissal from office of an acting judge.

18. Pursuant to Section 6 § 2 of the Act, the High Council of Justice was vested with the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judge for an offence liable under Section 2 § 2 (a).

COMPLAINTS

19. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the disciplinary proceedings against him were not conducted by “an independent and impartial tribunal established by law” and that the principle of equality of arms was upset during those proceedings.

20. Under Article 7 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant further complains that the legislative provisions under which the disciplinary proceedings against him were instituted, his guilt determined and the sanction imposed – in particular, Section 2 § 2 (a) of the Act on Disciplinary Liability of Judges, lacked the requisite precision, clarity and foreseeability.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applicable to the proceedings in the present case under its civil or criminal heads?

In the affirmative, was the court which dealt with the applicant ’ s case “established by law” and “independent and impartial”, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?

Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of the criminal charge against him, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was the principle of equality of arms respected during the disciplinary proceedings against him?

2. Was Article 7 of the Convention applicable to the proceedings in the present case?

In the affirmative, was the wording of Section 2 § 2 (a) of the Act on Disciplinary Liability of Judges precise and the matter, as required by Article 7 of the Convention?