Communicated on 24 May 2016

FIRST SECTION

Application no. 62904/12 Yevgenya FIDANYAN against Armenia lodged on 19 September 2012

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Ms Yevgenya Fidanyan , is an Armenian national who was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service (the Service), Division no. 2.

On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant ’ s employment.

On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to (1) quash the decision of 23 February 2009; (2) be reinstated in her previous position; (3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement in the previous position.

On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant ’ s three claims. In particular, it quashed the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her in her previous position and pay her the average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned, inter alia , that while the Service was under obligation to offer the applicant another position in the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time.

This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and became final on 4 November 2009.

On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009.

On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution.

On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (DEJA) initiated enforcement proceedings.

On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks.

It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011.

On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of Section 41 § 1(8) of the Law on the Enforcement of Judicial Acts. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748, while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible, because that position was no longer vacant.

On 29 May 2012 the applicant requested the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings.

On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant ’ s request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings.

On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to (1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; (2) reinstate the applicant in her previous position; (3) pay her average monthly salary between the period of her dismissal and her reinstatement in the previous position.

On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of Section 41 § 1(8) of the Law on the Enforcement of Judicial Acts. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009, while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible, because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.

B. Relevant domestic law

The Law on Compulsory Enforcement of Judicial Acts

Section 41 prescribes the grounds for termination of the enforcement procedure by the bailiff. According to paragraph 1(8), the bailiff shall terminate the enforcement proceedings if, during the enforcement concerning non-proprietary claims, it becomes evident that the enforcement of the judgment is impossible.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the non-enforcement of the judgment of the Administrative Court of 17 September 2009.

QUESTION TO THE PARTIES

Was the non-enforcement of the final judgment of the Administrative Court of 17 September 2009 compatible with the applicant ’ s rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?