Communicated on 10 May 2017

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 45784/15 Marian LONSKÝ against Slovakia lodged on 4 September 2015

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Mari á n Lonský , is a Slovak national who was born in 1986 and lives in Bratislava. He is represented before the Court by Mr B. Drgoňa , a lawyer practising in Bratislava.

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

3. The applicant is his mother ’ s only child and her sole heir. His mother was the owner of a piece of land situated in the centre of Bratislava.

4. In April 1998 the applicant ’ s mother was informed by the Bratislav a I Land Registry that it had registered a new owner of the property on the basis of a sale and purchase contract of earlier that month.

5. In response, the applicant ’ s mother filed a criminal complaint and challenged the validity of the contract in court, arguing that she did not know the buyers or the real estate agency involved in the transaction and that she had neither concluded the contract h erself nor authorised anyone to do so on her behalf.

6. The investigation into her complaint was stayed as no grounds were found to bring charges against a specific person. The validity of the contract was confirmed in a judgment that became final and binding.

7. Nevertheless, the applicant ’ s mother subsequently succeeded in obtaining another final and binding judgment in a different set of proceedings, declaring her to be the owner of the property in question.

8. However, following an application by the buyers, who were the defendants in the ownership proceedings, the Prosecutor General exercised his discretionary power to challenge the judgment in favour of the mother in the Supreme Court by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law.

The Prosecutor General argued in his appeal that the lower courts had erred in law when examining the applicant ’ s mother ’ s title to the property, by determining anew the validity of the contract in question as a preliminary issue. As that issue had already been settled by a final and binding judgment, the lower courts should have based their assessment of that preliminary point on that judgment.

9. In her observations in reply to the appeal, the applicant ’ s mother disagreed with the reasoning of the Prosecutor General and argued that the appeal was inadmissible. In support of her contention, she relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and submitted that the extraordinary appeal had been no more than an appeal in disguise, that it had arbitrarily interfered with a final and binding judgment in her favour, and that it had been contrary to the principle of equality of arms.

10. On 30 October 2014 the Supreme Court allowed the Prosecutor General ’ s extraordinary appeal, fully endorsing his arguments and concluding that the lower courts had erred in the proceedings by applying an “erroneous legal assessment of the matter” within the meaning of Article 243f § 1 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court dealt with the arguments of the applicant ’ s mother by holding in particular that an extraordinary appeal on points of law provided for an extraordinary means of interfering with adjudicated matters if it was necessary to redress unlawfulness of a fundamental character and to protect an individual ’ s rights and interests. The extraordinary appeal in the case at hand had served those objectives and had thus been admissible.

As a result, the judgment concerning the applicant ’ s mother ’ s title to the property was quashed and the matter was remitted to the first ‑ instance court for re-examination, with the court being bound to follow the legal views of the Supreme Court.

11. On 2 February 2015 the applicant ’ s mother challenged the Supreme Court ’ s judgment in the Constitutional Court by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, alleging a violation of her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and their constitutional equivalents. She argued, inter alia, that the quashing of the final and binding judgment in her favour in the given circumstances had been contrary to the principles of legal certainty and equality of arms. Developing that argument, she submitted that the reason behind the extraordinary appeal and the Supreme Cour t’s decision had been merely an error of law rather than a procedural irregularity or other reason of fundamental importance.

12. The applicant ’ s mother died on 11 March 2015 and the applicant expressed the wish to continue the constitutional proceedings in her stead. He argued that the case essentially concerned interests of a pecuniary nature, such interests were transferable and he was his mother ’ s only heir and legal successor.

13. On 2 June 2015 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings. It referred to the special character of the proceedings in complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution as concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms of a personal nature par excellence , the protection of which was in principle not transferrable. It found that the subject matter of the present proceedings did not allow for them to be continued after the applicant ’ s mother had passed away. As the legal protection offered under Article 127 of the Constitution was of a non ‑ pecuniary and personal nature, it could not be afforded to the applicant just because the underlying matters concerned property rights and he was his mother ’ s sole heir.

The Constitutional Court ’ s decision was served on the applicant on 17 July 2015 and it was not amenable to appeal.

14. The applicant, as sole heir to his deceased mother, became a party to the proceedings initiated by his mother after the Supreme Court had quashed the judgment declaring her to be the owner of the property in question and remitted them to the first-instance court for re ‑ examination. However, no information has been made available about the further course of the proceedings and their outcome, if any.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice and European texts

15. The relevant domestic law and practice and European texts have been summarised for example in the Court ’ s judgment in the case of DRAFT- OV A a.s . v. Slovaki a (no. 72493/10, §§ 39-56 and 58-61, 9 June 2015).

16. In decisions of 12 May 2011 and 14 January 2016, the Constitutional Court discontinued proceedings in cases nos. IV. ÚS 185/2011 and II. ÚS 15/2016 in unrelated complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution on the grounds that the complainants had died in the course of the proceedings.

COMPLAINTS

17. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the discontinuation of the constitutional proceedings and his being prevented from continuing them in his late mother ’ s stead was arbitrary and contrary to his right of access to court. In support of that complaint and the remaining ones, he argues that in his capacity as his mother ’ s legal successor he has been directly affected by the underlying matters and that it has been impossible for him to complain about them before the Constitutional Court by a separate complaint in his own name owing to the sequence of events and the time-limit for making such a complaint.

18. The applicant also complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the quashing of the final and binding judgment in favour of his legal predecessor was contrary to the principles of legal certainty and equality of arms. In support of that complaint he argued that the Prosecutor General ’ s extraordinary appeal and the Supreme Court ’ s decision were motivated by no more than a different view on a question of law, which could have and in fact had been determined by the lower courts. In other words, there were no issues that could not have been raised before the lower courts and no circumstances of a substantial and compelling character in terms of the Court ’ s case-law justifying the interference complained of.

19. The applicant also complains that the quashing of the final and binding judgment in favour of his legal predecessor deprived him of his possessions, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

20. In substance, the applicant also alleges that he has been denie d an effective remedy for his complaints under Articles 6 § 1 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to the quashing of the final and binding judgment in his legal predecessor ’ s favour, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Can the applicant claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 34, in so far as he alleges a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the quashing of a final and binding judgment in his mother ’ s favour (see, for example, Ressegatti v. Switzerland , no. 17671/02, §§ 17-26, 13 July 2006, and Milionis and Others v. Greece , no. 41898/04, §§ 20-26, 24 April 2008) ?

2. In view of the termination of the constitutional proceedings and the applicant ’ s being unable to continue them in his late mother ’ s stead, did he have a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was his right of access to court respected?

3. Having regard to the fact that a final and binding judgment in favour of his legal predecessor was quashed by the Supreme Court following an extraordinary appeal on points of law by the Prosecutor General, prompted by an application by the defendants in her action, did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, were the principles of legal certainty and equality of arms respected (see, for example, DRAFT- OV A a.s . v. Slovakia , no. 72493/10, § 86, 9 June 2015)?

4. Has there been an interference with the applicant ’ s peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, within the m eaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as a result of the quashing of the final and binding judgment in favour of his legal predecessor (see DRAFT - OV A a.s . , cited above, § 92)? If so, was that interference justified in accordance with that provision (see DRAF - OV A a.s . , cited above, § 93)?

5. Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to the quashing of the final and binding judgment in his legal predecessor ’ s favour, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?