Communicated on 13 July 2017

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 26147/15 Zlatica GREŇOVÁ against Slovakia lodged on 16 May 2015

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Ms Zlatica Greňová , is a Slovak national who was born in 1953 and lives in Krupina .

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

In 2005 an individual sued the applicant for payment of what would later be established as some 20,250 euros (EUR) on the basis of a loan arrangement between them.

After a payment order and two first-instance judgments were quashed following a protest and appeals by the respective parties, the action was granted by the Zvolen District Court on 18 March 2010. That judgment was upheld by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 23 September 2010 and it thereby became final, binding and enforceable.

The courts concluded that a loan contract existed between the applicant and the claimant, that under that contract the claimant had provided the applicant with an amount of money, that the amount in question was now due, and that the applicant had failed to repay it.

The courts partly diverged in their views as to what exactly constituted the contract. There had been a series of partial arrangements which were later to be restated in a single document. The first-instance court held that that document was void and that the loan contract was based on the previous arrangements. In contrast to that, the court of appeal held that the document in question was a part of what constituted the contract.

Nevertheless, both courts concurred that they were not prevented from granting the action by a judgment issued previously by a court in the Czech Republic ordering another defendant to pay the same amount to the same claimant in the context of the same transaction. This was so because the parties to that litigation, and in particular the defendant, were not identical.

The applicant then challenged the judgments of 18 March and 23 September 2010 by way of an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. She argued that her procedural rights had been curtailed in that there had been no hearing of her appeal against the judgment of 18 March 2010 and that the impugned judgments had been arbitrary. On the latter count, she claimed in particular that it was absurd to issue two orders for the payment of one and the same amount on the basis of one and the same contract against two different defendants. At the same time, she asked that the enforceability of the judgment under appeal be suspended.

On 21 June 2011 the Supreme Court suspended the enforceability of the challenged judgments pending the outcome of the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law.

On 25 February 2014 the applicant received from the Constitutional Court a copy of the observations filed previously by the claimant in response to her appeal on points of law. From the summary in the Supreme Court ’ s decision on that appeal (see below), it transpires that the claimant contended that, in so far as the applicant had relied on the fact that there had been no hearing of her appeal against the judgment of 18 March 2010, she had failed to specify the statutory grounds on which this would make her appeal on points of law admissible. He also contended that the applicant ’ s remaining arguments were unfounded and that the legal assessment of the case by the appellate court was correct.

On 26 February 2014, sitting in camera , the Supreme Court declared the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law inadmissible.

In so far as there had been no hearing of the applicant ’ s appeal, the Supreme Court found that this was in compliance with the applicable statute. At the same time, it noted that the court of appeal fully endorsed the final conclusions of the first instance court on all relevant questions of fact and law. Therefore, on the facts, no hearing of the applicant ’ s appeal was necessary.

As to the applicant ’ s remaining arguments, the Supreme Court concurred with the lower courts ’ conclusion that the judgment from the Czech Republic constituted no obstacle of res judicata in relation to the present proceedings since the defendant in that judgment was different.

Finally, neither the applicant ’ s disagreement with the lower courts ’ assessment of the evidence taken, nor her com plaint that they had refused to take some of the evidence she had proposed, constituted grounds on which the appeal on points of law could be admitted for an examination on the merits.

The applicant then turned to the Constitutional Court with a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. In so far as relevant, she directed the complaint against the Supreme Court and alleged a violation of her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the applicant argued that by having a copy of the claimant ’ s observations served on her one day before deciding her appeal, the Supreme Court had effectively deprived her of the possibility of responding to those observations.

On 1 October 2014 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant ’ s complaint inadmissible. In relation to its part specified above, it observed that there had been nothing in the claimant ’ s observations other than matters on which the applicant had previously already had an opportunity to comment. It held that, accordingly, the relevant part of the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.

The Constitutional Court ’ s decision was served on the applicant on 29 December 2014 and it not amenable to appeal.

B. Relevant domestic practice

Relevant domestic practice in respect of communication for comment of the observations of one party to the proceedings in response to any legal remedy to which the opposing party has recourse has been summarised in the Court ’ s judgment in the case of Tran č íková v. Slovakia (no. 17127/12, § 23, 13 January 2015).

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the observations filed by the claimant in response to her appeal on points of law were not communicated to her early enough before the decision on that appeal and that, as a result, she was in reality deprived of the possibility o f responding to them.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the proceedings before the Supreme Court in the present case (see Čičmanec v. Slovakia , no. 65302/11, §§ 57 and 64, 28 June 2016)?

2. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?

In particular, was the principle of adversarial proceedings respected as regards the fact that a copy of the claimant ’ s observations in reply to her appeal on points of law was served on her a day before her appeal was determined and her contention that, in consequence, she was prevented from responding to those observations (see, mutatis mutandis , Milatová and Others v. the Czech Republic , no. 61811/00, § 65, ECHR 2005-V; Hudáková and Others v. Slovakia , no. 23083/05, §§ 28-31, 27 April 2010; Juričić v. Croatia , no. 58222/09, §§ 72-78, 26 July 2011; Trančíková v. Slovakia , no. 17127/12, §§ 37-47, 13 January 2015; Čičmanec v. Slovakia , no. 65302/11, § 59-65, 28 June 2016; and contrast Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s . v. Slovakia ( dec. ), no. 35090/07, §§ 88-91, 4 October 2011)?