Communicated on 15 September 2017

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 30635/13 Vasiliy Nikolayevich BOKIN against Russia lodged on 22 April 2013

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applicant was an editor-in-chief of Nash Golos , a local newspaper. In July 2009 he chose to publish an article entitled “To stop the genocide” concerning the use of the Mordvinian language in local schools. On 21 June 2012 a prosecutor sought the banning of this article as extremist material and its inclusion into the official list of extremist materials. Judge T. discarded a 2010 expert report commissioned by the authorities (and which concluded that the article justified terrorism), decided to order a new psychological and linguistic report, which was communicated to the applicant on 17 August 2012. The expert concluded that the article ( i ) could “contribute to the incitement” of hatred or enmity in relation to one ’ s nationality or language, namely towards Russians or such Mordvinians who did not support of the teaching of Mordvinian in schools and Universities; (ii) contains degrading or negative expressions in respect of the above people; (iii) expressions that justify a possibility and necessity of use of arms, which could amount to an indirect call for violence against opponents of the teaching of Mordvinian . On 21 August 2012 the judge refused to adjourn and issued a judgment banning the article, endorsing the expert ’ s conclusion. The applicant was also ordered to pay 18,000 roubles for the expert report. On 23 October 2012 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment. The applicant ’ s subsequent cassation appeals were dismissed.

According to the applicant, the request of 21 June 2012 in respect of an article published in July 2009 was related to his recent journalistic activities. On 12 May 2012 the local office of the Federal Security Service wrote to the district prosecutor, indicating that the applicant had been subject to the operational-search activities, had published texts amounting to extremist material and was intending to publish further extremist material in the nearest future (for which he was gathering material).

QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES

1.1. Did the court proceedings concern the determination of the applicant ’ s “civil rights and obligations” or a “criminal charge” against him?

1.2. Did the applicant have a fair hearing as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, were the principles of equality of arms and adversarial procedure complied with, in relation to him contesting the adverse expert evidence?

2. Was there a violation of Article 10 of the Convention on account of the banning of the article that the applicant chose to publish and the order to pay for the expert report? In particular, as regards the blacklisting:

(a) W as the “interference” “necessary in a democratic society”? Could the article, fairly construed and seen in its immediate or wider context, be seen as a direct or indirect call (in particular, by the applicant ) for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance, for instance on account of sweeping statements attacking or casting in a negative light an entire ethnic or other group? Could the article published in 2009, directly or indirectly, lead to any harmful consequences in 2012?

(b) Did the domestic courts adduce “relevant and sufficient” reasons for the interference and base their conclusions on an acceptable assessment of the facts (see Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, §§ 196-97, 204 ‑ 08 and 212-20, ECHR 2015 (extracts) as regards pertinent general principles and factors, and Terentyev v. Russia , no. 25147/09, §§ 20-24, 26 January 2017 as regards the approach), in particular having regard to the requirements imposed on the domestic courts by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia in its ruling no. 21 of 27 June 2013 (in particular, paragraphs 5 and 8)? Did they specify which parts of the impugned material were problematic? Did they draw their own conclusions from the linguistic report (see paragraph 23 of the Plenary Supreme Court ’ s ruling no. 11 of 28 June 2011)?

(c) Regard being had to the specific procedural grievances (see above), was the decis ion-making process leading to the interference fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by the Convention (see, as a recent authority, Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 133, ECHR 2016) ?

3. Were the restrictions imposed by the State in the present case, purportedly pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention, applied for a purpose other than those envisaged by that provision, contrary to Article 18 of the Convention?