Communicated on 7 November 2017

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 28117/11 Vitaliy Vladimirovich TULUPOV against Russia lodged on 19 April 2011

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

In 2008 the applicant, a public official, signed supplementary contracts authorising additional expenses beyond the amount set in several public ‑ purchase contacts. In September 2009 a non-judicial authority convicted him of an offence under Article 7.32 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“CAO”) punishing violations relating to the modalities of a public-purchase contract. The applicant sought judicial review. In November 2009 a court discontinued the prosecution because the authority had omitted to mention Article 7.32 in the operative part of its decision. On 28 January 2010 the appeal upheld the judgment, also stating that the time ‑ limit for prosecution had expired. In March 2010 the applicant was accused and then convicted of an offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code punishing abuse of power by a public official.

QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES

1. Was there a violation of Article 7 of the Convention? In particular, could the applicant foresee in 2008, if need be with appropriate legal advice, on the basis of the domestic “law” (including Federal Law No. 94-FZ of 21 July 2005 and Ruling No. 19 of 16 October 2009 by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia) that authorisation to exceed the amount set in a public-purchase contact amounted to a criminal offence, namely abuse of power defined as actions “manifestly outside the scope of [one ’ s] duties” and causing “a significant violation of rights and legitimate interests of citizens and organisations or a significant violation of the public interests protected by the law”?

2. Was there a violation of Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention? In particular:

- Was the applicant “acquitted” of the administrative offence?

- Did Russian law make in 2009-10 provision for the application of the ne bis in idem principle to bar criminal prosecution on account of a final judgment in a CAO case? If not, did it dispense/prevent the criminal courts from applying the ne bis in idem principle?

- In 2009-10 did the criminal prosecution in relation to public-purchase contracts entail, in substance or in effect, double jeopardy vis-à-vis the prosecution under the CAO concerning the same subject-matter to the detriment of the individual or whether, in contrast, it was the product of an integrated system enabling different aspects of the wrongdoing to be addressed in a foreseeable and proportionate manner forming a coherent whole (compare Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], no. 14939/03, §§ 48 ‑ 122, ECHR 2009; Khmel v. Russia , no. 20383/04 , §§ 65-68, 1 2 December 2013; and A and B v. Norway [GC], nos. 24130 /11 and 29758/11, §§ 121-24 and 131-34, ECHR 2016)?