Communicated on 1 December 2017

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 61462/16 Laima ZIZEVIÄŒIENÄ– against Lithuania lodged on 14 October 2016

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Ms Laima Zizevičienė , is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1964 and lives in Šilutė . She is represented before the Court by Mr D. Cvetkovas , a lawyer practising in Klaipėda .

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

In 1992 the authorities decided to allow the applicant to purchase 0.06 hectares of land that she had been using. In September 1993 the mayor of Å ilutÄ— formally decided to provide the applicant, as the owner of an uncompleted residential house, with a plot of land of that size.

On 10 September 1993 the applicant sold the house, which was 51 percent finished, a cellar, garage and a garden storage shed ( viralinÄ— ) , to J.P. The same day, the applicant and the mayor concluded a lease agreement for the 0.06 hectares of land for three years.

In February 1996 the authorities decided to allow J.P. to purchase 0.0602 hectares of land under and near the buildings he had purchased from the applicant.

In 1998 J.P. sold the land and the buildings to A.Č.

In 2000 the applicant finally purchased 0.06 hectares of land from the State, which was at the same address as the land J.P. had purchased. The agreement was concluded with the KlaipÄ—da County Administration. The applicant paid 523 Lithuanian litai (approximately 151 euros).

In 2003 A.Č. sold the land and the buildings to A.Z., whose heir resold them to D.D. in 2012.

In November 2013 the applicant asked the National Land Service to explain how the same plot could have been sold to two people under different legal provisions and at different times. The National Land Service replied that both land purchase agreements (J.P. ’ s and the applicant ’ s) had been approved by a notary. The issue of which purchase agreement was valid and which was to be annulled was not within the service ’ s competence and the matter had to be resolved in court.

In April 2014 the applicant started court proceedings. She asked to renew the time-limit to lodge her claim because she had missed the period of limitation. She also asked the court to annul the purchase agreements for the buildings and land of 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2012. She argued that J.P. had not registered the purchase agreement within three months, meaning the purchase procedure had not been completed and the subsequent purchase agreements had to be annulled. The applicant also submitted that she had been deceived into selling the buildings because she had thought that the agreement was aimed at ensuring the return of a loan taken by her ex ‑ husband from J.P. She also stated that she had only found out about the breach of her rights in 2013, when she had received the National Land Service ’ s reply. Finally, she submitted that she had been living at the same address since 1988 and had been using the plot of land in question. None of the buyers of the land and buildings had sought to defend their property rights, which she thought reflected negatively on them in the case.

On 7 April 2015 the Klaip ėda Regional Court dismissed the applicant ’ s claim because she had missed the period of limitation established in the domestic law by a large margin (the period of limitation was three years under the old Civil Code and ten years under the new one). The applicant ’ s argument that she had only found out about the breach of her rights in 2013, when she had received the reply from the service, was not accepted. The court held that the applicant had sold her property in 1993, which was the most significant date in her case. The court was not convinced by the argument that the applicant had not understood the consequences of the agreement. Moreover, she had been asked in 1999 to vacate the house, thus she must have understood that other people had rights over the property in question. As regards the registration of the purchase agreement, the court held that the three-month period was not applicable because J.P. had bought a house that was only partially built.

The applicant appealed. She also asked for an oral hearing. On 18 January 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision. The court decided that there was no need for an oral hearing because there was already enough information for the court to examine the case in a written procedure. The court also held that the period of limitation started to run from the date the right to bring an action could be enforced. When a person stated that he or she had found out about a breach later on, the court had to examine at what point a diligent person would have found out about that breach. In the case at hand, the applicant had stated that she had found out about the violation of her rights in 2013 after receiving the National Land Service ’ s reply. She had also stated that none of the buyers had asked her to move in over twenty years. The court disagreed with her position. It found that in 1998 J.P. had informed the applicant that he was selling the buildings and that she had received a note approved by a notary on 24 June 1999 that she had to move from the house and vacate the garage. If she had thought that her rights were being breached, she could have initiated an action to end that breach. The court found that the applicant should have been aware of the alleged breach of her rights on 24 June 1999 at the latest. However, she had only started court proceedings on 2 May 2014 and had missed the period of limitation to submit her claim.

The applicant lodged two appeals on points of law but on 18 and 21 April 2016 the Supreme Court dismissed them as not raising important legal issues.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

Article 84 of the old Civil Code, valid until 30 June 2001, provided that the general term of limitation was three years.

The new Civil Code, which came into force on 1 July 2001, provides that the general term of limitation is ten years (Article 1.125).

The period of limitation begins to run from the date on which the right to bring an action can be enforced (Article 86 of the old Civil Code and Article 1.127 § 1 of the new Civil Code).

The Supreme Court has held that when a court is applying the legal norms regulating the limitation period it should not do so mechanically as that would be contrary to the court ’ s duty to administer justice (for example, decisions of 18 December 2007 (no. 3K-3-578/2007) and 14 March 2008 (no. 3K-7-38/2008)).

The Supreme Court has also held that in order to properly assess when the limitation period begins to run, the objective moment in time has to be determined first (the point at which a person ’ s rights were breached). Sometimes the objective and subjective moments coincide. The limitation period is counted from the date the person became aware of a violation of his or her rights. In cases where a person has stated that he or she did not become aware of the violation of his or her rights on the day of the breach, the court dealing with the case has to ascertain whether there is any evidence indicating the contrary and whether a claimant became aware of the violation of the law no later than any prudent and careful person in the same situation. If a person has not been diligent enough, the limitation period has to be counted from the date the person should have become aware of the violation of his or her rights. The subjective understanding of a violation is connected with the person – he or she has to provide relevant evidence. When deciding on the date that a diligent person should have become aware of a violation of his or her rights, the nature and time of the violation has to be taken into account (for example, decision of 21 June 2013 (no. 3K-3-362/2013)).

The Supreme Court has held that when a court is deciding on the application of the limitation period, it must take into account the complexity of establishing the violation, the actions or omissions of the claimant in the subjective assessment of his or her situation and other relevant circumstances (for example, decisions of 6 October 2008 (no. 3K ‑ 3 ‑ 447/2008), 18 April 2011 (no. 3K-7-34/2011)).

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she has been deprived of a fair hearing because the domestic courts dismissed her complaint solely on the basis of the limitation period.

She also complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the State erred in transferring the same plot of land to two persons and thus breached her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Was the dismissal of the applicant ’ s complaint solely on the basis of the limitation period in line with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, did the dismissal of the applicant ’ s complaint result in a restriction which impaired the very essence of the applicant ’ s right of access to court. Did the restriction pursue a legitimate aim and was there a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved?

2. Has there been an interference with the applicant ’ s right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, within the m eaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? If so, was that interference justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention?

The parties are requested to inform the Court about any further developments regarding the applicant ’ s situation.