Communicated on 10 December 2018

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 35468/18 Eduard Valeryevich MOCHALOV against Russia lodged on 16 July 2018

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applicant is the editor-in-chief of Vzyatka , a newspaper published in the Chuvashiya Republic, Russia. [1] Yunga village legislative authority approved a proposal by a group of local citizens to hold a “gathering” ( c обрание , within the meaning of the Public Events Act (PEA)) of citizens for expressing a no-confidence vote in respect of the village mayor, the district administration and the district prosecutor. The applicant ’ s newspaper published an article with allegations of his corruption and also mentioning the above initiative. Sixty-nine people attended the gathering on 16 September 2017. The applicant and another newspaper ’ s editor-in-chief were invited to attend the gathering and were present at it, arguably, as journalists. He was then sentenced to a fine for acting as the gathering ’ s organiser (within the meaning of the PEA) in that he had omitted to make a prior notification of the gathering to the appropriate local authority (the mayor ’ s office) and had carried out prematurely – in his capacity of the newspaper ’ s editor-in-chief – a “public event campaigning”. In upholding this conclusion the appeal court then also mentioned that the event had contained elements of a “gathering” and a “rally” ( митинг ).

QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES

1. Was there “interference” under Article 10 of the Convention into the applicant ’ s right to freedom to receive and impart information or to hold opinions?

2. Was this “interference” “prescribed by law”? In particular:

2.1. Was it in compliance with Russian law to punish for non-notification of a “gathering” ( собрание ) or premature campaigning for such “gathering”? Did Russian law contain clear criteria for distinguishing between ( i ) a “gathering” and other types of public events subject to the notification procedure, and ( i ) a “gathering” under the PEA and a “gathering” under municipal law, in particular as regards the notion of “political” aim of an event?

2.2. Was it foreseeable that the applicant (acting as an editor-in-chief of a newspaper) would be held liable under Article 20.2 § 1 of the CAO read together with the PEA for non-compliance with:

(a) the prior notification requirement incumbent on public events ’ organisers, following the courts ’ choice to classify him as the gathering ’ s “organiser” because of his article? In particular, was it established that he had “undertake[n] the obligation to organise and/or run” this specific public event (see, as regards the definition of “organiser” and “organisation”, sections 21 and 28 in fine of ruling no. 28 of 26 June 2018 by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia)?

(b) the campaigning requirement incumbent on public events ’ organisers, following the courts ’ choice to classify his articles as intending to organise a group event and incite others to take part in it (see section 2.2 of ruling no. 4-P of 14 February 2013 by the Constitutional Court, and Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia , no. 42911/08, §§ 117-35, 21 February 2017)? Did Russian law contain clear criteria for distinguishing between an event campaigning by an event organiser within the PEA and the journalist ’ s exercise of his freedom to receive and impart information or to hold an opinion?

3. Was the “interference” “necessary in a democratic society” in the pursuance of a legitimate aim?

[1] see also application no. 9163/13 pending before the Court.