Communicated on 27 January 2020 Published on 17 February 2020

SECOND SECTION

Applications nos. 20486/16 and 21874/18 Steinthor GUNNARSSON against Iceland and Steinthor GUNNARSSON against Iceland lodged on 5 April 2016 and 10 April 2017 respectively

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applications concern the applicant ’ s indictment and conviction for financial crimes, following the financial crisis of 2008.

The applicant was the director of brokerage of Landsbanki Íslands hf. (hereinafter “ Landsbanki ”). He was indicted on 15 March 2013 and charged on two counts of market manipulation. On 5 June 2014, he was convicted by the District Court of Reykjavík on one count of market manipulation (count IV), but acquitted on another (count III), and sentenced to nine months ’ imprisonment, of which six months suspended for two years. By judgment of 8 October 2015, the Supreme Court of Iceland convicted the applicant on both counts of market manipulation and sentenced him to nine months ’ imprisonment, unsuspended.

The applicant firstly complains under Article 6 § 1 that his right to a fair trial was violated as he was not allowed to submit a second set of written observations, following the State Prosecutor ’ s written observations, regarding the count on which the District Court acquitted him. Secondly, he complains under the same provision that the Supreme Court reversed the District Court ’ s findings without hearing the defendants or the witnesses in person. Thirdly, the applicant complains that his trial was not conducted within a reasonable time, in violation of Article 6 § 1.

In addition, in a subsequent application lodged on 10 April 2017, the applicant complains that his right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated due to the alleged financial interests of Supreme Court Justices sitting on the panel in his case, namely E.T. and V.M.M.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. In respect of the applicant ’ s complaints regarding the submission of a second set of written observations to the Supreme Court, has the applicant ’ s right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, notably the requirement of adversarial proceedings which respect the equality of arms, been breached (see, inter alia, Murtazaliyeva v. Russia [GC] , no. 36658/05, § 91, 18 December 2018 )?

2. Did the applicant ’ s conviction by the Supreme Court constitute a breach of his right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, did the Supreme Court assess the applicant ’ s guilt, in whole or in part, by re-assessing the evidentiary value of testimony provided by the accused and witnesses before the District Court without the Supreme Court having itself directly heard the accused or the witnesses in question (see, inter alia, Sigurþór Arnarsson v. Iceland , no. 44671/98, 15 July 2003, Botten v. Norway , 19 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ I, Styrmir Þór Bragason v. Iceland , no. 36292/14, 16 July 2019 and Júlíus Þór Sigurþórsson v. Iceland , no. 38797/17, 16 July 2019)?

3. Was the length of the criminal proceedings in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999 ‑ II) ?

4. In respect of the complaints regarding the independence and impartiality of the Supreme Court panel, has the applicant complied with the six-month time-limit in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention? In the light of the nature of these complaints, on which date did the time-limit for the applicant to lodge a complaint before the Court commence?

In respect of the complaints regarding the independence and impartiality of the Supreme Court panel, has the applicant exhausted available domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, what was the available domestic remedy with respect to the applicant ’ s complaints related to the alleged impartiality of Justices E.T. and V.M.M.? At what time did such a remedy become available to the applicant? What relevance in this respect should be ascribed to the procedure which was then in force under Article 9 of the Rules No. 463/2000, on Additional Functions of District Court and Supreme Court Judges and their Ownership in Companies and Undertakings, for requesting information on the ownership in companies of serving judges from the Committee on Judicial Functions ( nefnd um dómarastörf ) ?

Has there been a violation of the applicant ’ s right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Pétur Þór Sigurðsson v. Iceland , no. 39731/98, ECHR 2003 ‑ IV and Sigur ð ur Einarsson and Others v. Iceland , no. 39757/15, 4 June 2019)? In particular, did two of the five Supreme Court Justices who decided the criminal case against the applicants on appeal, namely E.T. and V.M.M., have financial interests in one or more of the three collapsed Icelandic banks, Landsbanki , Glitnir and Kaupthing , when the events occurred which formed the basis for the applicant ’ s convictions? If so, what was the relevance for the assessment of their alleged impartiality of the condition in Article 7 § 3 of Rules No. 463/2000 (see above), then in force, that a serving judge was required to seek permission from the Committee on Judicial Functions to own more than ISK 3,000,000 in a company listed on the stock exchange, or to hold more than a 5% share in other companies?