Published on 5 July 2021

THIRD SECTION

Application no. 31674/20 Yegor Sergeyevich ZHUKOV against Russia lodged on 18 May 2020 c ommunicated on 17 June 2021

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The application concerns the applicant ’ s criminal conviction for public calls to extremist activities after he had published four videos on his YouTube channel calling on viewers to use all possible nonviolent means to oppose the government.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against him, in accordance with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention? In particular, as regards the non-admission of “specialist” opinions submitted by the defence as evidence at the trial, coupled with the admission as evidence of the expert report obtained by the prosecution, was there a disbalance between the defence and the prosecution in the area of collecting and adducing expert evidence (see Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05, §§ 717-35, 25 July 2013, and Matytsina v. Russia , no. 58428/10, §§ 166-208, 27 March 2014)?

2. Has there been a violation of the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression, contrary to Article 10 of the Convention?

( i ) Was the interference “prescribed by law”? In particular, did the domestic law meet the “quality of law” requirements? Did the interference have a basis in the domestic law? Calls to what types of activities listed in section 1 of the Suppression of Extremism Act were imputed to the applicant? Was it sufficiently foreseeable, under domestic law or jurisprudence, that “representatives of the current government” would be taken to constitute a “social group” for the purposes of applying the imputed domestic provisions?

(ii) Did the interference pursue a legitimate aim?

(iii) Did the domestic courts adduce “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons for the interference and base their conclusions on an acceptable assessment of the facts and the applicable standards under Article 10 of the Convention? In particular, d id they discuss whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, having regard to the social and political context in which the videos had been published, their nature and wording, the manner in which they had been disseminated and the scope of their reach, as w e ll as their potential to lead to harmful consequences? Did the domestic courts convincingly establish the applicant ’ s criminal intent to bring about the commission of extremist activities? Did the national courts delve into whether the applicant ’ s statements contributed to a debate on a matter of public interest? Did the domestic courts specify which parts of the videos were problematic (see Kommersant Moldovy v. Moldova , no. 41827/02, § 36, 9 January 2007)? Did they draw their own conclusions from the expert reports (see point 23 of the Supreme Court ’ s resolution no. 11 of 28 June 2011)? Would the definition of “the representatives of the current government” as a protected social group be necessary in a democratic society for achieving one or more legitimate aims? Was the sanction imposed proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued?