Information Note on the Court’s case-law 27

February 2001

Teytaud v. France (dec.) - 48754/99, 49720/99, 49721/99 et al.

Decision 25.1.2001 [Section IV]

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Access to court

Autonomy of courts dealing with texts previously interpreted by the Foreign Ministry: inadmissible

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1

Possessions

Supplementary compensation claim ed on the basis of the Evian Agreements in respect of properties nationalised by Algeria: inadmissible

Deprivation of property

Properties nationalised by Algeria: incompatible ratione personae

The applicants or their ascendants owned immovable property in Algeria but were dispossessed of it when the country gained its independence. Under legislation promulgated by the French authorities, they were awarded a lump sum as partial compensation. In 1 992 they wrote to the State Secretary for Social Affairs requesting payment of the remaining value of the property that had passed into State ownership, with interest. They complained that they had only been partly compensated, even though – in their view – the “Evian Agreements” and written undertakings such as a 1962 booklet issued by the French High Commission in Algeria placed France under an obligation to pay fair compensation to persons dispossessed of their property. In June 1994 the Paris Administra tive Court dismissed their application to set aside the State Secretary’s implicit decisions to refuse their request. This judgment was upheld by the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal in June 1996 and subsequently by the Conseil d’Etat , which dismissed the applicants’ appeals on points of law in November 1998. The applicants complained that they had not been compensated in full. They also alleged that they had been discriminated against in relation to other repatriates who had been compensated in full be cause the value of their property was lower than the ceiling set on the level of compensation. Lastly, they complained that the domestic courts had considered themselves bound by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ interpretation of the Evian Agreements.

Inad missible under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The applicants’ first complaint regarding the deprivation of their property as such had to be declared inadmissible ratione personae because it was the Algerian State which had dispossessed them. It remained to b e determined whether the “Evian Agreements” and the High Commission booklets had given the applicants title to a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It was pointed out that no practical steps had been taken by either Algeria or F rance to implement the Evian Agreements with regard to the property rights of French nationals. The Act of 8 April 1962 (passed by means of a referendum) empowering the French President to enact legislation to implement the Agreements had not specified any right to compensation. The Agreements had consequently not entailed a right to compensation for the applicants. Nor had the booklets issued by the High Commission – which had been nothing more than declarations of intent – afforded repatriates the right t o compensation. Consequently, the applicants’ alleged entitlement to compensation from the French authorities did not constitute a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: manifestly ill-founded.

Inadmissible under Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The aim of limiting public spending, especially as the claim for compensation had derived from an act of despoliation by a foreign State, served as objective and reasonable justification fo r imposing a ceiling on compensation: manifestly ill-founded.

Inadmissible under Article 6: The domestic courts’ decisions had not made any reference to the Ministry’s interpretation; the fact that the courts’ conclusion had been similar to that reached by the Ministry and in the Conseil d’Etat ’s Moraly judgment did not mean that they had considered themselves bound by that interpretation. The applicants were condemning a practice which was no longer current and of which they could not claim to be victims: manifestly ill-founded.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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