Information Note on the Court’s case-law 210

August-September 2017

Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC] - 56665/09

Judgment 14.9.2017 [GC]

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Access to court

Supreme Court ruling that civil courts had no jurisdiction to hear pastor’s claim for wrongful dismissal by church: Article 6 not applicable; inadmissible

Facts – The applicant was a pastor employed by the Reformed Church of Hun gary. In 2005 he was dismissed for a comment he had made in a local newspaper. He brought a compensation claim against the Church in a labour court but the proceedings were discontinued for want of jurisdiction, since the applicant’s relationship with his employer was regulated by ecclesiastical law. The applicant subsequently lodged a claim in the civil courts, but this too was ultimately discontinued after the Supreme Court ruled, following an analysis of the contractual relationship, that the civil court s had no jurisdiction either. Before the European Court the applicant contended that the Supreme Court’s ruling that the State courts had no jurisdiction had deprived him of access to a court, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In a judgment of 1 December 2015 (see Information Note 191 ) a Chamber of the Court held, by four votes to three, that there had not been a violation of Article 6 § 1. The Chamber found that, although the Supreme Cou rt had held that the State courts had no jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s claim, it had in fact examined the claim in the light of the relevant domestic legal principles of contract law. The applicant could not, therefore, argue that he had been dep rived of the right to a determination of the merits of his claim.

On 2 May 2016 the case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the applicant’s request.

Law – Article 6 § 1: For Article 6 § 1 in its civil limb to be applicable, there had to be a dispute over a “right” which could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether that right was protected under the Convention. In order to decide whether the “right” in question had a basis in domestic law, the st arting-point had to be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts. Save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it was not for the Court to question the interpretation of the domestic law by the national cour ts. It was the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceeding that had to be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 was applicable. Where there was a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of the right asserted b y the claimant under domestic law, the domestic courts’ decision that there was no such right did not remove, retrospectively the arguability of the claim.

It was undisputed that, in accordance with domestic law, claims involving internal laws and regulations of a church could not be enforced by State organs. It was further uncontested that, should domestic courts establish that an ongoing dispute concerned a n ecclesiastical claim unenforceable by domestic organs, they had to terminate the proceedings. The main question that arose before the domestic courts therefore revolved around the exact nature of the applicant’s relationship with the Reformed Church.

Th e applicant’s ecclesiastical service was based on his Letter of Appointment, issued by the parish presbyters assigning him to the position of pastor in the Reformed Church of Hungary. Pursuant to the text of that letter, the applicant was asked to perform tasks “defined by ecclesiastical laws and legal provisions”. However, instead of turning to the ecclesiastical courts with his pecuniary claims, he first instituted labour proceedings. When those proceedings were discontinued he turned to the civil courts. Following detailed examination of the issue of the State court’s jurisdiction and the right of access to a court of persons in ecclesiastical service, all of the national courts discontinued the proceedings holding that the applicant’s claim could not be enforced before the national courts since his pastoral service and the Letter of Appointment on which it was based were governed by the ecclesiastical rather than the State law. The Supreme Court had confirmed that the applicant’s relationship with the Chu rch had been of an ecclesiastical nature.

Domestic legislation did not provide churches or their officials with unfettered immunity against any and all civil claims. The applicant’s claim did not involve a statutory right. Instead, it concerned an asserti on that a pecuniary claim stemming from his ecclesiastical service, governed by ecclesiastical law, was actually to be regarded as falling under the civil law. Having carefully considered the nature of his claim, the domestic courts, in so far as they deal t with the substance of the matter, had unanimously held, in accordance with the provisions of domestic law, that that was not the case.

Given the overall legal and jurisprudential framework existing in Hungary at the material time when the applicant lodged his civil claim, the domestic court’s conclusion that the applicant’s pastoral service was governed by ecclesiastical law and their dec ision to discontinue the proceedings could not be deemed arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.

Consequently, having regard to the nature of the applicant’s complaint, the basis for his service as a pastor and the domestic law as interpreted by the domestic courts, the applicant had no “right” which could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. To conclude otherwise would result in the creating by the Court, by way of interpretation of Article 6 § 1, of a substantive right which had no legal basis in the respondent State. Accordingly, Article 6 did not apply to the facts of the applicant’s case and the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

Conclusion : inadmissible (ten votes to seven).

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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