THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 48119/17 Grigoriy Mikhaylovich BARINBERG against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 26 April 2022 as a Committee composed of:

Darian Pavli, President, Andreas Zünd, Mikhail Lobov, judges, and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 48119/17) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 June 2017 by Mr G. Barinberg (“the applicant”), who was represented by Mr A.I. Rudnyy, a lawyer practising in Yekaterinburg;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Russian Government (“the Government”), initially represented by Mr M. Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. On 22 November 2016 the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg convicted the applicant and his co-defendant and sentenced them to a term of imprisonment for a drug-related offence. His co-defendant had been followed by the police as a person suspected of drug dealing. As a result of the surveillance, the police identified the applicant and the premises belonging to him where both suspects, assisted by a third person, cultivated cannabis for sale.

2. On 10 March 2017 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court partly upheld the applicant’s conviction. At the trial and in his appeal, the applicant unsuccessfully argued that a confession which he had made on 22 January 2016, shortly after his arrest and without a lawyer present, should be declared inadmissible. At the same time, he insisted that he had fully cooperated with the investigation.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

3. The general principles concerning the right to legal assistance are summarised in Beuze v. Belgium ([GC], no. 71409/10, §§ 119-50, 9 November 2018 ), in which the Court once again reiterated that its primary concern was to evaluate the overall fairness of criminal proceedings.

4. With this in mind, even applying a very strict scrutiny in its assessment, the Court finds that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the overall fairness of the proceedings complained of had been irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (ibid., § 145). In particular, the Government asserted that prior to his confession, the applicant had been informed about his right not to incriminate himself, and that the decisions of the national courts had been based on an abundance of additional evidence which was in any event sufficient for convicting him. The applicant submitted no comments in response to those statements, except to note that he had given his confession under duress and in breach of his right to a lawyer. The Court finds no grounds to conclude that the applicant was coerced by the police. He provided no explanation as to why he had not initiated proceedings in relation to alleged threats at domestic level, in particular once he had been granted access to a lawyer.

5. Moreover, unlike in other cases, it cannot be said that the applicant’s statements provided the authorities with a narrative of what had happened or framed the process of evidence-gathering, because at the time of his arrest, the investigation had already collected enough evidence to charge him (compare Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine , no. 40464/05, § 88, 16 February 2017, and contrast Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 303, 13 September 2016). The Court further observes that the applicant appeared in person in the trial proceedings, was assisted by a lawyer and was able to challenge evidence submitted by the prosecution. In the absence of any explanation in particular as to how the alleged restriction of his defence rights irretrievably prejudiced the overall fairness of the proceedings in his case, the Court considers that the applicant has failed to provide the necessary substantiation for his allegation (see Loboda v. Ukraine , no. 8865/06, § 43, 17 November 2016).

6. Given the above finding, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine any other arguments by the parties and concludes that it is appropriate to dismiss the present complaint as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 19 May 2022.

Olga Chernishova Darian Pavli Deputy Registrar President