FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF BARTL v. SLOVAKIA

( Application no. 50360/08 )

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

14 December 2010

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Bartl v. Slovakia ,

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section ), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Lech Garlicki , President, Ján Šikuta , Vincent Anthony de Gaetano , judges, and Fatoş Aracı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 23 November 2010 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in an application (no. 50360/08) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Mr Jaroslav Bartl (“the applicant”), on 23 June 2005 .

2 . The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Piro šíková .

3 . On 9 February 2009 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government . In accordance with Protocol N o. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4 . The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Dunajsk á Lu ž n á .

5 . On 23 July 1996 the applicant challenged his dismissal from a job. The Bratislava II District Court and, on appeal, the Bratislava Regional Court found against the applicant. The decision was served on the applicant and became final on 17 December 2003.

6 . On 13 January 2004 t he applicant lodged an appeal on points of law.

7 . On 22 September 2005 the Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible, stating that this remedy could be lodged only in certain circumstances. The applicant had not invoked any such circumstances and the Supreme Court had not established their existence when examining ex officio the issue of admissibility of the appeal on points of law.

8 . On 23 August 2007 the Constitutional Court rejected t he applicant ' s compl a int a b out the overall length of the above proceedings , lodged on 16 July 2004. It held that the District and the Regional Court ' s proceedings had already ended in 2003 and the applicant ' s complaint in respect of that part was belated. It found no delays in the Supreme Court ' s proceedings.

9 . On 3 June 2008 the applicant requested reopening of the above civil proceedings. No decision in this respect has been adopted yet .

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

10 . The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” r equirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“ In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal... ”

A. Admissibility

11 . The Government argued that the applicant had not lodged his constitutional complaint in accordance with the formal requirements . I t was the Constitutional Court ' s practice to examine the length of proceedings complaints only when the proceedings were still pending before the authority liable for the alleged violation at the moment when the constitutional complaint was lodged, and to reject the complaints which were introduced after the proceedings complained of had been concluded.

12 . The applicant reiterated his complaint.

13 . In view of its established case-law on the subject (see A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia , no. 13960/06, §§ 35-38, 9 February 2010), the Court does not accept the Government ' s argument that the applicant should have separately complained before the Constitutional Court of the individual parts of the proceedings in his case at the time when they were pending before each of the authorities involved. The Government ' s objection must, therefore, be dismissed.

14 . The Court observes that the proceed ings lasted from 23 July 1996 until 22 September 2005 . Their overall duration was thus nine years and two months at three levels of jurisdiction. It notes that the applicant request ed reopening of his case. However, as no decision granting the request has been adopted, this fact is not relevant , at the present stage, for determination of the period of the proceedings under the Court ' s consideration (see Hollý v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 29239/03, 3 November 2009).

15 . It follows that this complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies with in the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. The Court further finds that this part of the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

16 . The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). The Court reiterates that special diligence is necessary in employment disputes ( Ruotolo v. Italy , judgment of 27 February 1992, Se ries A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17).

17 . The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender , cited above).

18 . Having examined all the material s submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.

II. ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

19 . In his application form the applicant did not invoke Article 13 of the Convention. Given that the Court is free, in the performance of its task, to attribute to the facts of the case a characterisation in law different from that given by the applicant (see Camenzind v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997-VIII, § 50), it considered it appropriate, when communicating the case to the Government, to examine it also under Article 13 of the Convention. Article 13 provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. Admissibility

20 . The Government argued that the co mplaint procedure under Article 127 of the Constitution was an effective remedy, but the applicant had not used it in accordance with the formal requirements.

21 . The applicant claimed that he had not had an effective remedy at his disposal.

22 . The Court notes that this part of the ap plication is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

23 . The Court takes the view that the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution is likely to provide appropriate and sufficient redress to applicants where it allows for examination of the entire duration of the proceedings complained of.

24 . However, the applicant in the present case complained to the Constitutional Court about the overall duration of the proceedings , but the Constitutional Court excluded from its review their substantial part . In these circumstances, t he Court considers that in the present case the applicant ' s right to an effective remedy has not been respected (see A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia , cited above, §§ 59-60).

There has therefore been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention .

III . APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

25 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial rep ara tion to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

26 . The applicant claimed 85 , 242 euros (EUR), as a minimum, in respect of pecuniary damage and non-pecuniary damage.

27 . The Government co ntested these claims.

28 . The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained non ‑ pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 6,600 under this head .

B. Costs and expenses

29 . The applicant stated that the over all amount claimed (see point A above) also covered his costs and expenses .

30 . The Government left the matter to the Court ' s discretion.

31 . T he Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 100 covering out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court.

C. Default interest

32 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2 . Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;

4 . Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant , within three months , the following amounts:

(i) EUR 6,600 ( six thousand six hundred euros) , plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage ;

(ii) EUR 100 (one hundred euros) , plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and ex penses ;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be pa yable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5 . Dismisses the remainder of the applicant ' s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 December 2010 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

FatoÅŸ Aracı Lech Garlicki              Deputy Registrar President