SECOND SECTION

CASE OF GÜLBAHAR ÖZER AND OTHERS v. TURKEY

( Application no. 44125/06 )

JUDGMENT

This judgment was revised in accordance with Rule 80 of the Rules of Court

in a judgment of 10 June 201 4

STRASBOURG

2 July 2013

FINAL

02/10/2013

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Gülbahar Özer and Others v. Turkey ,

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Guido Raimondi , President, Danutė Jočienė , Peer Lorenzen , Dragoljub Popović , Işıl Karakaş , Nebojša Vučinić , Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque , judges, and Stanley Naismith , Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2013 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in an application (no. 44125/06) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by five Turkish nationals, Ms Gülbahar Özer , Mr Yusuf Özer , Mr Halil Esen , Mr Hüseyin Esen and Mr Abdurrahman Çınar (“the applicants”), on 19 October 2006 .

2 . The applicants were represented Ms R eyhan Yalçındağ Baydemir , Ms Aygül Demirtaş and Mr S elahattin Demirtaş , lawyers practising in Diyarbakır . The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

3 . The applicants alleged, in particular, that the killing of their five children by a number of soldiers and the lack of an effective investigation into their killing had been in violation of Article 2 of the Convention .

4 . On 20 September 2010 the application was communicated to the Gove rnment. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5 . The applicants were born in 1963, 1965, 1947, 1952 and 1946 respectively. The first and second applicants live in İ zmir, the third and fourth applicants live in Mardin and the fifth applicant lives in Diyarbakır .

6 . The facts of the case as submitted by the parties, and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows.

7 . Gülbahar Özer is the mother of Sibel Sartık , Yusuf Özer is the father of Nergiz Özer , Halil Esen is the father of Zerga Esen , Hüseyin Esen is the father of Zühal Esen , and Abdurrahman Çınar is the father of Hamdullah Çınar .

8 . Sibel Sartık , who was 24, and her cousin Nergiz Özer , who was 15, were living in İzmir and working as a singer and a textile worker respectively . On 17 December 2004 they left their homes in İzmir. Sibel Sartık told her family that she was going to visit her three children who were living with her ex-husband in the city of Siirt .

9 . Zühal Esen and Zerga Esen were 16 and 13 years old respectively and were working on farms in Manisa . On 20 December 2004 they left their homes and told their families that they were going shopping.

10 . Hamdullah Çınar was 22 year s old and was working on a building site in Ankara. The last time his family heard from him was towards the end of December 2004.

11 . On 19 January 2005 Sibel , Nergiz , Zuhal , Zerga and Hamdullah were killed by soldiers in a place one and a half kilometres to the north of a small village in south-east Turkey.

12 . According to a report prepared on 20 January 2005 by twenty-six soldiers who had taken part in the incident, at about 6 .00 p.m. on 19 January 200 5 special police teams who had observ ed with their night vision cameras nine or ten persons in an area near Cudi mountain , informed the military about the presence of the group.

13 . A number of units of soldiers were then dispatched to the area at 6.30 p.m. where they came under fire from members of the group. The soldiers retreated to a safer area and issued verbal warnings, in Turkish and Kurdish, and ask ed members of the group to surrender. When their calls for surrender were rejected and they came under more fire, the soldiers blocked all exit routes and opened mortar fire on those who tried to run away. Both sides also threw hand grenades at each other during the clash.

14 . The following morning the soldiers found the bodies of the applicants ’ five children and a number of weapons and food stocks near to them . There were no other casualties and no ne of the soldiers suffered any injuries. On arrival of a different unit of soldiers responsible for crime scene investigations , the soldiers who had taken part in the operation left the area.

15 . Soldiers responsible for crime scene investigations photographed the bodies and the weapons next to the bodies, and drew up sketches showing the position of the bodies. It was stated in a report drawn up by the investigating soldiers that, “as it was raining the weapons [found next to the bodies] were wet and mudd y and [the investigators] ha ve thus been unable to carry out fingerprint analysis on the weapons ” . Five automatic rifles found next to the bodies, together with a number of spent bullet cartridges found in the area, were taken away as evidence.

16 . With the help of a number of villagers brought to the area by soldiers from the nearby village, t he bodies of the applicants ’ children were brought to the Şırnak State Hospital where they were examined by a doctor and a prosecutor at midday on 20 January 2005. It appears from a number of report s drawn up the same day that the prosecutor had been told by members of the security forces that the place where the five persons had been killed was not safe for the prosecutor to go and the prosecutor had asked the soldiers to bring the bodies to Şırnak .

17 . As there were no identity cards on them, the prosecutor was unable to identify the five deceased. In his report the prosecutor, who referred to the five deceased as “PKK terrorists killed in a clash with the security forces ” and instructed the soldiers to search for the remaining “terrorists” who had managed to escape, stated that “ anti- terrorism experts and crime-scene investigators from the gendarmerie had carried out the necessary examinations and searched for evidence at the place of the incident”.

18 . At the recommendation of the doctor who examined the bodies and who concluded that the applicants ’ five children had died as a result of loss of blood and damage to their internal organs caused by firearms , the prosecutor decided that there was no need to carry out a classic autopsy.

19 . A decision was also taken to destroy some of the clothes the deceased had been wearing.

20 . On 22 January 2005 the applicants and their relatives formally identified the bodies of the five deceased. In official identification documents the prosecutor again referred to the applicants ’ five children as “members of the PKK killed in an armed clash with members of the military”.

21 . On 25 January 2005 the applicants ’ lawyers asked the Şırnak prosecutor for copies of documents from the investigation file. They were provided with the above-mentioned post mortem report, documents relating to the formal identification of the bodies, documents for the release of some of the bodies , and copies of the identity cards of some of the applicants. None of the documents drawn up by members of the military w ere handed over to the applicants.

22 . The Human Rights Association of Turkey released a report on 27 January 2005 on the killing of the applicants ’ five children. It was stated in the report that the authorities had refused to hand over the bodies of Nergiz Özer and Sibel Sartık to their families and had buried them in an undisclosed location [1] .

23 . The report, drawn up after having interviewed a number of villagers living near the place where the applicants ’ five children were killed by the soldiers, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation , and the families of the deceased, criticises the prosecutor ’ s failure to go to the place of the incident and the collecti o n of the evidence by the soldiers. The report also criticises the fact that the documents drawn up by the soldiers in the aftermath of the incidents had not been sent to the prosecutor in charge. The report concludes it to be highly probable that the applicants ’ five children had run away from their homes in order to join the PKK , and had then been killed by the soldiers even though they were unarmed.

24 . On 31 January 2005 an army major sent to the prosecutor the documents drawn up by the soldiers after the killings (see paragraph s 12-16 above).

25 . On 1 February 2005 the applicants Gülbahar Özer and Yusuf Özer , with the assistance of their lawyers, lodged a formal complaint against the soldiers responsible for the killing of the five persons. In their petition t he two applicants asked the prosecutor to carry out an investigation and prosecute those responsible for the killings. They invited the prosecutor to, inter alia , question the soldiers and the residents of the nearby villages, and to examine whether the ir children were likely to have been able to handle the weapons allegedly found next to their bodies , given their young age and their lack of training in firearms. They also asked the prosecutor to obtain swabs from the hands of the deceased with a view to assessing whether they had indeed handled the weapons. They further asked the prosecutor to recall the items of evidence which had been sent to the g endarmerie ’ s forensic laboratories, and send them instead to the independent and impartial Forensic Medicine Institute.

26 . The prosecutor starte d an investigation on 23 February 2005 against the applicants ’ five dead children, as well as against “PKK members” , for the offence of undermining the territorial integrity of Turkey.

27 . On 23 February 2005 the applicants Gülbahar Özer and Yusuf Özer were questioned by a police officer in relation to their complaints to the prosecutor. Both applicants told the police officer that they wanted those who had killed their children to be found and punished.

28 . According to the report of the ballistic examination conducted by the gendarmerie, twenty-one of the empty bullet cases found in the area had been discharged from the five rifles found next to the bodies of the applicants ’ children.

29 . In a report of 13 April 2005 a police firearms expert concluded that it would be possible for children from the age of 11, with one to two hours ’ training, to use the weapons found next to the bodies of the five deceased.

30 . On 7 April 2005 the police forensic laboratory examined a number of spent bullet cases found in the area. On 25 May 2005 an expert examined the thermal camera footage recorded by the police special teams on the day of the incident , and confirmed the sighting of seven persons in the footage.

31 . On 2 6 May 2005 the Şırnak prosecutor visited the area and recovered forty-two spent bullet cases at the spot where the bodies had been found. He also found an unspecified number of bullets, used in his opinion by the soldiers, in two places 50 and 150 metres away from the place where the bodies had been found. The prosecutor also questioned five villagers who were living in a nearby village and who had assisted the soldiers in recover ing the bodies on 20 January 2005.

32 . The weapons and ammunition found in the area by the prosecutor were examined by the police and gendarmerie forensic laboratories and their findings were recorded in reports drawn up on 10 August and 23 September 2005.

33 . On 7 and 9 February 2006 a prosecutor and a gendarme non-commissioned offic er questioned fifteen of the twenty-six soldiers who had t a k en part in the operation (see paragraph 33 above) . The soldiers were questioned as “eyewitnesses”. The non-commissione d officer was entrusted the task of taking down the minutes of the soldiers ’ questioning “because of the nature and the urgency of the investigation” . The soldiers ’ names were not written down in the statements and they were referred to by their military identification numbers.

34 . In the fifteen identical statements t he soldiers were quoted as having stated that the PKK members had ignored their warnings to surrender, which had been made in Turkish and Kurdish. Instead, the PKK members had opened fire on them and they had returned fire. The clash had lasted for approximately two hours. They also stated that, although they had initially seen a group of approximately eight to ten persons with their night vision cameras, they did not know what had happened to the remaining ones other than the five killed by them .

35 . On 6 March 2006 the Şırnak prosecutor decided not to prosecute any of the soldiers responsible for the killing of the applicants ’ five children. In his decision the prosecutor summarised the documents in the investigation file, and held , inter alia , the following: “Members of the security forces issued warnings [to the group] to surrender. However, [ the group] responded by firing on the soldiers . Those found dead at the end of the clash had been armed. According to the examination of the place of the incident the following morning, as well as according to the examination s subsequently conducted by the prosecution service and the forensic authorities, the spent bullet cases had been discharged from the weapons which had been in working order. There is no evidence or eyewitness statements to suggest that the soldiers had opened fire first . ” The prosecutor also mentioned in his decision that, according to the military reports the weapons found next to the bodies had been wet and muddy and it had thus not been possible to look for fingerprints on them.

36 . It also appears from the prosecutor ’ s decision that on the day after the killings a TV channel reported, based on information obtained from PKK sources, that the applicants ’ five children had not been PKK militants, but that they had gone to the area unarmed to meet with PKK members. Nevertheless , the prosecutor considered in his decision that the deceased had been PKK members who had been trying to “ undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey ” and that the soldiers had carr ied out their duties by killing them .

37 . On 28 March 2006 the two applicants lodged an objection against the prosecutor ’ s decision. In their objection they denied that their children had been PKK members. They alleged that their children had been unarmed at the time of the killings. In this connection they pointed to the failure to obtain swabs from the hands of the deceased. The two applicants also criticised the investigating authorities ’ failure to question the soldiers until thirteen months after the killings and the presence of the gendarme offic er when the prosecutor had been questioning the soldiers . They pointed out that the statements made by these soldiers were identical as a result of the psychological pressure exerted on them by the gendarme offic er present during their questioning .

38 . On 12 April 2006 the objection lodged by the two applicants was rejected by the Siirt Assize Court which considered that all the necessary steps had been taken in the investigation. The Assize Court considered that the right to life guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights was not absolute. If the resort to use of force becomes absolutely necessary in order to protect from unlawful violence, then there would be no deprivation of the right to life. On the basis of the investigation, the “terrorists” had been killed by the soldiers who had had to resort to the use of firearms in order to protect themselves from unlawful violence. There was no evidence to the contrary.

39 . No mention was made in the Assize Court ’ s decision about the applicants ’ complaints concerning the failure to obtain swabs from the hands of the deceased or the failure to question the soldiers until thirteen months after the killings and in the presence of the gendarme offic er.

40 . The decision of the Siirt Assize Court was communicated to the applicants on 28 April 2006.

41 . Following the communication of the application to the respondent Government, on 18 January 2011 the İzmir prosecutor took a statement from the applicant Ms Gülbahar Özer . The applicant repeated her allegations about the unlawful killing of her daughter Sibel Sartık .

42 . The Şırnak prosecutor, having regard to the statement taken from Ms Özer on 18 January 2011 by his counterpart in İzmir , took another decision not to prosecute anyone in connection with the killing. The prosecutor considered that there was no new evidence to lead to a different decision. The applicant ’ s objection against the prosecutor ’ s decision was rejected by the Siirt Assize Court on 10 February 2011.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE S 2, 13 AND 17 OF THE CONVENTION

43 . The applicant s complained that their children had been killed in breach of Article 2 of the Convention. In support of their allegation they argue d that , had the authorities carried out swab tests it would have become apparent that their children had been unarmed and had not opened fire on the soldiers. Furthermore, the fact that none of the soldiers had been killed or injured in the incident was another indication that the ir children had been unarmed.

44 . Under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention the applicants complain ed that the investigation into the killings had been ineffective.

45 . R elying on Article 17 of the Convention , the applicants complain ed that the killings had not been justified under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention because it had not been proved that their children had been PKK members or that they had opened fire on the soldiers.

46 . The Government contested th e applicants ’ argument s.

47 . The Court considers that the applicants ’ complaints relate to the deprivation of the right to life of their children and the effectiveness of the investigation into their killing. As such, the ir complaints can be examined solely from the standpoint of Article 2 of the Convention which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

A. Admissibility

48 . The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

49 . The applicant s argued that their children had been unarmed when they were killed by the soldiers. There was no evidence, such as a camera recording, to show that the soldiers had warned them to surrender but that their children had opened fire on the soldiers. Furthermore, the fact that not a single soldier had been injured during an alleged two-hour long armed operation, especially despite the allegation that it had been their children who had fired first, further proved that their children had been unarmed.

50 . The applicants argued that the initial examinations of the place of the incident and the bodies of their children had been conducted by the soldiers who killed their children, and not by a prosecutor . This, in the applicants ’ opinion, showed that the investigation had been flawed from its very early stages . They referred to their applications to the national authorities (see paragraphs 25, 27 and 37 above) , and submitted that they had complained about the prosecutor ’ s failure to go to the scene of the incident. They did not find it convincing that the prosecutor had been unable to go to a place where civilians had been killed and where not even a soldier had been injured.

51 . The applicants also criticised the failure to take swabs from the bodies of their children with a view to verifying whether or not they had traces of gunpowder residue.

52 . The Government submitted that the PKK was an internationally recognised terrorist organisation w hose objective was to overthrow the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey through armed struggle. There was no reason to doubt the accuracy of the assessment of the security forces that the applicant ’ s children had been members of the PKK.

53 . In light of the convincing and concrete evidence, it had been established that the applicants ’ children had been PKK members who had tried to use the heavy rain and darkness to reach the Cudi Mountain in order to join a PKK camp. The incident had begun soon after the soldiers ’ final assessment. The force used in the incident had been absolutely necessary for the legitimate aim of defence of others from unlawful violence. The planning of the operation had not disclose d a lack of care which might have rendered the use of force disproportionate to the aim pursued.

54 . The soldiers had acted with the aim of arresting the terrorist group and handing them over to the judicial authorities. However, members of the terrorist group had opened fire on them and the soldiers had had to protect themselves. The incident had lasted for a period of two hours and five terrorists had been recovered together with their weapons and other equipment.

55 . The authorities had carried out an effective investigation into the killing of the five terrorists and collected all the evidence. However, it had not been possible to take fingerprints from the rifles found next to the bodies because they had been too wet and muddy.

56 . In carrying out his investigation the prosecutor had not unduly relied on the information provided by the military. Although t he prosecutor had not been able to go to the area on the same day due to security risks , he had asked the soldiers to bring the bodies into the hospital. He had visited the place of the incident as soon as the necessary security measures had been taken by the soldiers.

57 . The Court notes that in their observations the Government made extensive submissions to the effect that the applicants ’ children had been terrorists and members of the PKK. The Court thus deems it appropriate to stress at the outset that it is not a criminal court entrusted with the task of examining whether or not the applicants ’ five children were members of the PKK , or assessing their criminal liability for membership or otherwise of any outlawed organisation . In the present case the Court is called upon to examine whether or not the applicants ’ children were killed in circumstances engaging the responsibility of the respon dent Government. The Court will carry out its examination with sole reference to whether or not the use of lethal force against the applicants ’ five children was absolutely necessary and proportiona te , as required by Article 2 of the Convention.

58 . T he Court reiterates that the text of Article 2 of the Convention read as a whole demonstrates that paragraph 2 does not primarily define instances where it is permitted to intentionally kill an individual, but describes situations where it is permitted to “use force” which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. The use of force, however, must be no more than “absolutely necessary” for the achievement of any of the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c). In this respect the use of the term “absolutely necessary” in Article 2 § 2 indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable when determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraph 2 of Articles 8-11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in the subparagraphs of the Article (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom , 27 September 1995, § § 148-149 , Series A no. 324 ).

59 . Turning to the circumstances of the present case, it is not disputed between the parties that the applicants ’ five children were killed by the soldiers of the respondent State. The Court will therefore examine whether the Government have discharged their burden of justifying the killing s . In doing so, it will have particular regard to the investigation carried out at the domestic level in order to establish whether that investigation was effective, in the sense that it was capable of leading to the determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances.

60 . In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its functions and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), no . 28883/95 , 4 April 2000). Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court ’ s task to substitute its own assessment of facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic authorities, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those authorities (see, mutatis mutandis , Klaas v. Germany , 22 September 1993, §§ 29-30, Series A no. 269).

61 . Turning to the circumstances of the present case, when notice of the present application was given to the Government, the facts as presented by the applicants led the Court to put a number of specific questions relating to the way in which the investigation was conducted. The Court notes that it did not receive any responses from the Government to some of its questions and that the replies it did receive are incapable of dispelling the very serious misgivings it has about this investigation.

62 . The Court notes at the outset that the initial and critical phases of the investigation were carried out by members of the military and without the supervision of the prosecutor. In this connection , the Court does not find it convincing that the prosecutor had been unable to go to the place of the incident on account of s afety concerns. It is noteworthy that the same s afety concerns did not stop the soldiers from ask ing a number of c ivilian villagers living in a nearby village to go to the area to help the m retrieve the bodies (see paragraph 16 above) . However the prosecutor, who seems to have accepted the soldiers ’ advice about the safety concerns without any hesitation, did not go to the area until some four months after the incident.

63 . The Court considers that allowing a unit of soldiers to take such an active part in the investigation into the killing of five persons by another unit of soldiers is not only so serious as to taint the independence of the entirety of the criminal proceedings (see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, §§ 339-341, ECHR 2007 ‑ II) , but also entailed the risk that crucial evidence implicating the soldiers in the killing would be destroyed or ignored (see Özcan and Others v. Turkey , no. 18893/05 , § 66, 20 April 2010) .

64 . The Court also finds it striking that the documents drawn up by the military about the killings were not handed over to the prosecu tor for a period of eleven days (see paragraph 24 above). Nevertheless, even in the absence of those documents the prosecutor was still able, presumably on the oral advice of the military, to conclude that the applicants ’ children had been PKK members and killed in a clash with the security forces (see paragraph 17 above). During the same eleven-day period no steps were taken by the prosecutor to investigate the killings.

65 . Indeed, the Court notes that even the applicants ’ serious allegations and their requests for a number of pertinent investigatory steps to be taken (see paragraph 25 above) did not seem to have spurred the prosecutor to take action in the subsequent days and months. The first step taken by the prosecutor , after he has examined the bodies on 20 January 2005, was to instigate a criminal investigation against the applicants ’ five dead children on 23 February 2005 for “ undermining the territorial integrity of Turkey” (see paragraph 26 above).

66 . A nother very crucial defect in the investigation was the failure to examine whether the weapons found next to the bodies of the applicants ’ children had the ir fingerprints on them. The only explanation for this is the one sentence which features in the report drawn up by the soldiers at the place of the incident on 20 January 2005, which reads that “as it was raining the weapons [found next to the bodies] were wet and mudd y and [the investigators] ha ve thus been unable to carry out fingerprint analysis on the weapons”. That sentence was relied on both by the prosecutor when closing his investigation (see paragraph 35 above) and by the Government in their observations (see paragraph 55 above). Despite the applicants ’ repeated requests (see paragraphs 25 and 37 ), the national authorities did not arrange any forensic examinations of the rifles with a view to establishing whether it was indeed impossible to lift any fingerprints from them and t he Court has not been provided with any explanation about th at failure.

67 . Similarly, there is no information in any of the documents in the investigation file to show that any attempt had been made to examine the bodies and the clothes the deceased had been wearing for gunpowder residues. Instead, it appears from the documents that a decision had been taken by the authorities to destroy some of the clothes the deceased had been wearing (see paragraph 19 above).

68 . The Court considers that a search for fingerprints and for gunpowder residue on the bodies and clothes should have been the logical starting point for the prosecutor in the investigation. In light of these two serious failures, the Court cannot find it established that the applicants ’ five children had handled those weapons and fired at the soldiers.

69 . Furthermore, the soldiers who had killed the applicants ’ five children were not questioned for a period of almost thirteen months after the operation (see paragraph 33 above). For the Court, such a lengthy delay to question the main suspect s in an investigation into multiple killings did not disclose the necessary diligence required by Article 2 of the Convention. As well as creating an appearance of collusion between the judicial authorities and the military, the failure to question the soldiers is conducive to leading the relatives of the deceased – as well as the public in general – to form the opinion that members of the security forces operate in a vacuum in which they are not accountable to the judicial authorities for their actions ( Bektaş and Özalp v. Turkey , no. 10036/03 , § 65 , 20 April 2010 ) .

70 . The Court observes that the soldiers who killed the applicants ’ children were also the only eyewitnesses to the events and their questioning should have been regarded as a priority. Nevertheless, there is no information in the documents in the investigation file to explain this length y delay. Furthermore, the respondent Government wh o have been invited by the Court to provide an explanation, did not deal with that request in their observations.

71 . When the prosecutor did finally take statements from the soldiers on 7 and 9 February 2006, only fifteen of the twenty-six soldiers who took part in the operation gave evidence (see paragraph 33 above) . A n army non-commissioned officer was also present in the room and took down their statements. The Court has not been provided with any information as to what exact “nature ” (see paragraph 33 above) of the investigation necessitated the presence of an army officer at the risk of damaging the “independence and impartiality” of the investigation. Moreover, h aving regard to the delay of thirteen months to summon the soldiers before the prosecutor, the Court is also not convinced that there could have been any “urgency” at that late stage of the investigation requiring for whatever reason the assistance of the army officer. The Court does share, on the other hand, the misgivings of the applicants who consider that the identical nature of the soldiers ’ statements is the result of the pressure that must have been exerted by the army officer on the soldiers during their questioning.

72 . T he Court must emphasise at this juncture that it d oes not share the Government ’ s opinion that the prosecutor had not unduly relied on the information provided by the military in conducting his investigation (see paragraph 56 above). A ccording to the documents summarised above, other than examining the bodies of the applicants ’ five children, the prosecutor did not take a ny meaningful step without the assistance or presence of members of the military.

73 . The prosecutor ’ s serious failures, coupled with the criminal investigation hastily introduced against the applicants ’ dead children before taking any investigatory steps into their killings first , illustrate that the prosecutor had concluded very early on in h is investigation that the applicants ’ children had been PKK members. The Court considers that that conclusion, coupled with the prosecutor ’ s deferential attitude to the soldiers, explain s the prosecutor ’ s blinkered approach throughout the investigation into the killings. Having regard to the entirety of the investigation, it cannot be said that the prosecutor did his utmost to find out what really happened on the day of the incident.

74 . In light of the serious defects in the investigation which are highlighted above and which are in breach of the obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out effective investigations, the Court considers that the investigation carried out at the domestic level was clearly inadequate and left many obvious questions unanswered. Moreover, by closing the investigation when they did, the authorities deprived the applicants of the opportunity to find out and be convinced as to how and why their children had been killed (see, mutatis mutandis , Beker v. Turkey , no. 27866/03, § § 51-54 , 24 March 2009 ) .

75 . In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that no meaningful investigation was conducted at the domestic level capable of establishing the true facts surrounding the killings. Consequently, it concludes that the Government have failed to show to the Court ’ s satisfaction that the resort to the use of fatal force against the applicants ’ five children had been absolutely necessary and proportiona te .

76 . It follows that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive and procedural aspects in respect of the killing of the applicants ’ five children.

II . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

77 . The applicants complain ed that the sadness caused to them by the killing of their children amount ed to ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

78 . The Court considers that this complaint may be declared admissible. However, h aving regard to its finding relating to Article 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 76 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there h as been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention .

III . APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

79 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

80 . Each of t he five applicant s claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and EUR 80,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They argued that they had endured unbearable pain on account of the arbitrary killing of their children and the failure of the authorities to punish the perpetrators.

81 . The applicant Ms Gülbahar Özer stated that her daughter Sibel Sartık had left behind three children. She and the applicant Mr Yusuf Özer added that they were brothers and sisters and the pain they had suffered from the killing of their own children had been exacerbated by the killings of their respective nieces.

82 . The applicant Mr Abdurrahman Çınar argued that his son Hamdullah Çınar had been working on building sites and had been providing financial help to his family.

83 . The Government considered that the claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage were excessive and unsubstantiated.

84 . Having regard to the applicants ’ failure to submit any evidence or other information in support of their claim for pecuniary damage, t he Court rejects th eir claim s .

85 . Having regard to the applicants ’ suffering on account of the killing of their children by the soldiers which, contrary to the Government ’ s submissions, do es not require substantiation, the Court awards each of the five applicant s EUR 65,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

86 . The applicant s also claimed a total of EUR 5,930 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This sum consisted of the fees of their lawyers , as well as for the expenses such as translation, posta ge , photocopying and stationery. In respect of their claim for the fees of their lawyers (EUR 5,256) the applicants submitted to the Court a time sheet showing the amount of time spent by their lawyers in representing them before the Court. They also submitted a bill from a translation agency for the amount of EUR 515. They claimed that their remaining expenses such as photocopying, fax and stationery amounted to EUR 159.

87 . The Government were of the opinion that the claim for costs and expenses w as not supported with documentary evidence.

88 . According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents submitted by the applicants in support of their claims for costs and expenses and the above criteria , the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum claimed by the applicants in full.

C. Default interest

89 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2 . Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in both its substantive and procedural aspects;

3 . Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention;

4 . Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant s , within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention , the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

( i ) EUR 65,000 ( sixty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to each of the five applicants, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 5,930 ( five thousand nine hundred and thirty euros) to the applicants jointly , plus any tax that may be chargeable to the m , in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5 . Dismisses the remainder of the applicant s ’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2013 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

             Stanley Naismith Guido Raimondi Registrar President

[1] An application lodged by the applicants Gülbahar Özer and Yusuf Özer against Turkey ( application no. 64406/09 ) concerning their inability to bury their children themselves, after a funeral and in a place of their choosing, is currently pending before the Court.