THIRD SECTION

CASE OF UGURCHIYEV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

( Applications nos. 33731/14 and 4 others )

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

4 February 2020

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Ugurchiyev and Others v. Russia ,

The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section ), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Alena Poláčková, President, Dmitry Dedov, Gilberto Felici, judges, and Stephen Phillips , Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 14 January 2020 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in four applications against Russia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table. The application numbers and the applicants ’ personal details are also listed in the appended table.

2 . The applicants were represented by various NGOs, as indicated in the appended table. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3 . On 5 February and 16 May 2018 notice of the applications was given to the Government.

THE FACTS

4 . The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in Ingushetia, Dagestan and other regions of the Northern Caucasus. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by service personnel. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their relatives ’ whereabouts remain unknown.

5 . The applicants reported the abductions to law ‑ enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The perpetrators have not been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending or ongoing.

6 . Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or other witnesses to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities.

7 . The first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants are close relatives of Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, who was born in 1984. The six, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants are close relatives of Mr Umalat Bersanov, who was born in 1978.

8 . At about 6 p.m. on 23 August 2011 Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev and Mr Umalat Bersanov were abducted near the latter ’ s house in the Sunzhenskiy District of the Republic of Ingushetia by a group of about ten armed men in black and camouflage uniforms and balaclavas, who drove a white GAZelle minibus with tinted windows and a silver Lada-Priora model car. The registration number of the minibus contained digits 491 and that of the Lada-Priora started with the digit 2.

9 . On the day of the abduction, the applicants saw those vehicles on the premises of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) in Magas, Ingushetia.

10 . On 24 August 2011 the first applicant, his son and the sixth applicant applied to the authorities for assistance with the search for their abducted relatives.

11 . On 24 August 2011 the investigators examined the crime scene. Samples of a dark-red substance and some other items were collected.

12 . On 29 August 2011 the Sunzhenskiy District Investigative Committee of Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 11600046 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Russia (abduction).

13 . On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case.

14 . On 2 September 2011 the second applicant and one of her sons were questioned. They stated that Mr Ugurchiyev had been working with Mr Bersanov on a construction site. On the day of the incident he had gone to Mr Bersanov ’ s house to take the latter ’ s car. The witnesses further stated that one of the abductors had not been wearing a balaclava and had a Slavic appearance. The abductors had hit Mr Ugurchiyev on the head with a machine gun and he had fallen unconscious. The witnesses denied Mr Ugurchiyev ’ s involvement in illegal armed groups.

15 . On 4 September 2011 the sixth applicant was granted victim status and questioned. He stated that his son had been sentenced by the Sunzhenskiy District Court for drug dealing. His mobile telephone with the number 8-960-435-75-75 had been switched off since the incident. The rest of the applicant ’ s statements were similar to the account of events submitted by the applicants before the Court.

16 . On 9 September 2011 the eleventh applicant and one of Mr Bersanov ’ s brothers were questioned but provided no new information.

17 . On 13 September 2011 the first applicant was questioned. He stated that he had heard about his son ’ s abduction from I., who was a minor and whose parents had witnessed the abduction but had refused to give statements to the investigators. The first applicant further stated that in 2011 the Sunzhenskiy District Court had given his son a suspended sentence of a year ’ s imprisonment for participation in illegal armed groups. The rest of his statements were similar to the account of events submitted by the applicants to the Court.

18 . On 21 September 2011 the third applicant was questioned. Her statements were similar to those given by the other applicants.

19 . The investigators requested information from the law-enforcement authorities on Mr Ugurchiyev ’ s possible affiliation with illegal armed groups. On 22 September 2011 the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the investigators that until 13 July 2010, Mr Ugurchiyev had been a member of the illegal armed group “Jamaat” based in Ingushetia. As for Mr Bersanov, they said that he had been charged with various crimes, including drug dealing. They further stated that Mr Bersanov was suspected of disseminating the ideas of a radical religious movement, Wahhabism.

20 . On 22 September 2011 Mr Bersanov ’ s neighbours, Ms M.M. and Ms A.Kh., were questioned. The latter stated that she had seen a pair of spectacles and a pair of slippers left at the crime scene.

21 . On 23 September 2011 the sixth applicant asked the investigators whether they had been able to identify the owners of the vehicles used by the abductors. He also asked them to save the video recordings from the closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras located near the local police station and the FSB ’ s headquarters in Ingushetia.

22 . On 26 September 2011 the sixth applicant wrote to the authorities asking them to expedite the investigation into the abduction of his son.

23 . On 13 October 2013 the first applicant applied to the President of the Chechen Republic, for assistance with the search for his missing son. His request was forwarded to the Ingushetia prosecutor ’ s office.

24 . In October and November 2011 a number of officers from the traffic police were questioned. They stated that on the day of the incident, they had been on duty at the checkpoints “Angara 120”, “Volga 17” and “Kursk 1”, but that neither a GAZelle minibus with registration number 491 nor any vehicles without registration numbers had been stopped.

25 . On 14 and 25 February 2012 two owners of GAZelle minibuses with a registration number starting with 491 were questioned, but they provided no relevant information.

26 . On 29 February 2012 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The first applicant was informed of this.

27 . On 18 April 2012 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform him about any progress in the case. The investigators granted his request.

28 . On 12 May 2012 the investigators ’ superior criticised the investigators ’ inaction and resumed the proceedings.

29 . On 10 June 2012 the eleventh applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She reiterated her earlier statements. In addition, she informed the investigators that on 28 October 2011 Mr Bersanov ’ s brother had been found shot dead near the village of Galashki in Ingushetia.

30 . On the same day the sixth applicant was questioned but provided no new information.

31 . On 11 June 2012 one of Mr Bersanov ’ s sisters was questioned. She stated that she had heard rumours that members of the Ugurchiyev family were involved with illegal armed groups.

32 . On the same day the third applicant was granted victim status and questioned. Her statements were similar to the account of events described above.

33 . On 12 June 2012 the tenth applicant was questioned but provided no new information.

34 . Between 12 and 14 June 2012 the officers from the traffic police were questioned again. No new information was obtained.

35 . On 25 June 2012 the investigation was suspended. It was subsequently resumed and then suspended again on 28 October 2012.

36 . On 22 May 2013 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and allow him access to the investigation file.

37 . On 24 May 2013 the investigators granted the first applicant ’ s request to study the case file but refused to resume the proceedings.

38 . On 24 September 2013 the investigation was resumed. It was then suspended again on 24 October 2013.

39 . On 20 November 2013 the first applicant requested information on the progress in the proceedings. In reply he was provided with the decision of 24 October 2013 to suspend the proceedings. It appears that the investigation is still ongoing.

40 . On 21 May 2012 the first applicant complained to the Sunzhenskiy District Court of the investigators ’ inaction in respect of his information request of 18 April 2012. He subsequently withdrew his complaint.

41 . On 23 August 2013 the first applicant lodged yet another complaint with the Sunzhenskiy District Court against the investigators ’ refusal of 24 May 2013 to resume the proceedings.

42 . On 26 September 2013 the District Court terminated the proceedings as the investigation had been resumed on 24 September 2013.

43 . The applicants are the father and the mother of Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov, who was born in 1990.

44 . According to a statement of 21 December 2011 provided by the Ingushetia Federal Security Service, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov was suspected of being an active member of Sunzhenskaya, an illegal armed group specialised in attacks on representatives of the authorities (see paragraph 65 below).

45 . At about 10 p.m. on 4 August 2011 Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov was detained in Sheripova street, Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingushetia, during a passport check carried out by law-enforcement personnel in camouflage uniforms without insignia. He was forced into one of two GAZelle minibuses, one of which had a registration number containing the digits 903 or 904 and the region number 06. During the special operation, the entire neighbourhood was cordoned off by law-enforcement personnel.

46 . According to the applicants, the special operation was carried out not by the Sunzhenskiy district police – they had also been there but had left after being shown documents by the alleged abductors – but by some other law-enforcement agency.

47 . On 5 August 2011 the first applicant lodged a request with the head of the local police for assistance in the search for his missing son.

48 . On the same date the second applicant was interviewed. Her account of events was the same as that submitted to the Court.

49 . On 5 August 2011 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected.

50 . On 9 August 2011 the Sunzhenskiy district investigative department opened criminal case no. 11600041, under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction).

51 . On 10 August 2011 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. He stated that he had heard about his son ’ s abduction from his older son, Mr V.Zh. He reiterated the account of events described above and added that Mr Zhovbatyrov ’ s mobile phone had been disconnected since the incident.

52 . On 17 August 2011 the second applicant was questioned. Her statement was similar to that of the first applicant.

53 . On 9 September 2011 the Sunzhenskiy District Court authorised the investigators to request from the telecommunication service provider a list of all incoming and outgoing calls for Mr Zhovbatyrov ’ s mobile number for the period between 4 and 5 August 2011 and within a radius of 500 metres from the crime scene.

54 . On 21 September 2011 the applicants ’ neighbour, Ms Dz. L., was questioned. She stated that on the day of the incident she had been at home and had heard someone calling for help in the Ingush language. She had gone out and seen around fifteen armed men wearing balaclavas and camouflage uniforms who had been forcing a young man into a GAZelle minibus. The next day she had learnt that the young man had been her neighbours ’ son.

55 . On 22 September 2011 Mr Zhovbatyrov ’ s uncle, Mr Zh.I., was questioned. He stated that when leaving his house at around 9.20 p.m. on 4 August 2011, he had seen a white GAZelle minibus with the registration number 903 near the applicants ’ house. Later he had learnt that his nephew had been abducted.

56 . On 24, 25 and 26 October 2011 a number of officers from the traffic police were questioned. All of them stated that on the day of the incident, they had been manning the checkpoint “Angara 120”. They had not stopped either a GAZelle minibus with the registration number 903 or 904, or any other vehicles without registration numbers.

57 . On 31 October 2011 the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the investigators that, according to their operational information, Mr Zhovbatyrov was an active member of the Sunzhenskaya illegal armed group, under the command of M.B., which specialised in attacks on law ‑ enforcement officers and other representatives of the authorities.

58 . On 23 November 2011 the investigators transferred the case file to the investigation department of military unit no. 68799, as the investigators had established the involvement of FSB officers in the abduction of the applicant ’ s son. In particular, they had found that the two GAZelle minibuses with the registration numbers 903 and 904 had belonged to the Ingushetia FSB.

59 . On 29 November 2011 the investigators additionally questioned the second applicant and Mr Zh.I. No new information was obtained.

60 . On 2 December 2011 the investigators questioned Mr S.Yu., the head of the Ingushetia FSB. He confirmed that the two GAZelle minibuses with registration numbers R903TK06 and R904TK06 belonged to the Ingushetia FSB. He further stated that between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. on 4 August 2011 those vehicles had been used for unknown purposes and that he did not know who had been the commanding officer of the unit which had used the vehicles. In addition, Mr S.Yu. stated that vehicles were not allowed to leave the headquarters between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. He denied that on 4 August 2011 the FSB had carried out a special operation in Sunzhenskiy District in respect of members of illegal armed groups.

61 . On 5 December 2011 the Ingushetia FSB informed the investigators that on 4 August 2011 a counter-terrorism operation had been carried out around the settlements of Nesterovskaya and Nizhniy Alkun, a few kilometres from Ordzhonikidzevskaya.

62 . On 6 December 2011 Mr G.A., a head of department at the Ingushetia FSB, was questioned. He stated that officers on duty did not always register the departure of vehicles from the FSB ’ s headquarters, for which several duty officers had been subjected to disciplinary penalties. He stated that the fact that the departure of vehicles had not been indicated in the registration book did not mean that the vehicles had not left the FSB headquarters.

63 . According to information from the Ingushetia FSB, documents nos. 004261 and 004262 showed that the GAZelle minibuses had been on mission between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. on 4 August 2018. During that time, they had been driven 45 kilometres. Mr K. was indicated in the logbooks as the driver of both vehicles.

64 . On 15 December 2011 Mr K. was questioned and stated that on 4 August 2011, he had driven both vehicles alternately to Nazran; this had taken until 6 p.m. He had not been to Ordzhonikidzevskaya.

65 . On 21 December 2011 the Ingushetia FSB informed the investigators that Mr Zhovbatyrov was an active member of the Sunzhenskaya illegal armed group, specialised in attacks on law ‑ enforcement officers and other representatives of the authorities, as well as on businessmen refusing to allocate money for the jihad. On 4 August 2011 Mr Zhovbatyrov had left his house to join an illegal armed group under the command of Mr U. operating in the mountains of Sunzhenskiy District.

66 . On 22 December 2011 the investigators of military unit no. 68799 refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of Mr K. concerning the abduction of Mr Zhovbatyrov under Article 126 of the Criminal Code.

67 . On 23 December 2011 the criminal case was remitted to the Ingushetia Investigative Committee.

68 . On 9 January 2012 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 25 January 2012.

69 . On 2 March 2012 criminal case no. 11600041 was joined to two other criminal cases, nos. 11600061 and 116000050, on the abduction of two other people in the same region. The new case was registered as no. 11600050.

70 . On 15 March 2012 the first applicant requested information on the progress of the investigation and access to the case file. On 18 March 2012 his request was granted.

71 . On 25 May 2012 the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed and then suspended again on 20 July 2012 without any tangible results having been achieved.

72 . On 26 September 2012 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform him about the progress in the case and the results of any investigative measures taken. On 3 October 2012 she was provided with a summary note.

73 . On 10 November 2012 the investigators ’ superior overturned the decision to suspend the proceedings, and they were resumed. Subsequently, the investigation was suspended on 10 December 2012.

74 . On 30 December 2012 the second applicant was granted victim status.

75 . On 23 May 2013 the second applicant asked the investigators to allow her to study the case file and make copies of documents in the file. On 27 May 2013 her request was granted. Subsequently, the investigators of the Sunzhenskiy District investigative department informed her that the case file had been transferred to the Ingushetia department of the Investigative Committee for a supervisory review and that she would be able to study it after its return. Despite a number of unsuccessful requests submitted to the investigators, the applicant was not able to study the case file.

76 . On 12 February 2014 the first applicant asked the investigators to allow him to make copies of all the documents in the case file. His request was partially granted.

77 . On 12 August 2016 the investigation was resumed, suspended and then resumed again on 22 June 2018. It appears that the proceedings are still ongoing.

78 . On 11 December 2014 the second applicant complained to the Grozny Military Garrison Court under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the investigators ’ failure to take all possible steps to verify the involvement of the FSB in the abduction. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown.

79 . The applicant is the brother of Mr Omar Valibagandov, who was born in 1975.

80 . At around lunch time on 22 August 2013 Mr Omar Valibagandov left his relative ’ s flat in Makhachkala, Dagestan, to go to work. He then stopped answering his mobile phone. That night Mr Valibagandov, who had been shot in the thigh with a rubber bullet, was taken by ambulance to Izberbash hospital, handcuffed and under FSB surveillance.

81 . On 23 August 2013 a group of about twenty to twenty-five police officers waited at Izberbash hospital for the ambulance with Mr Valibagandov.

82 . In the hospital, during the removal of the bullet, Mr Valibagandov told the doctors that he had been abducted, beaten up and shot at by law ‑ enforcement officers. Shortly after the medical procedure, he was taken to a police car and driven off. He has been missing ever since.

83 . On 23 August 2013 a surgeon from Izberbash hospital informed the local police about Mr Valibagandov ’ s hospitalisation.

84 . On 23 August 2013 the police interviewed Mr Valibagandov, who allegedly gave them a statement he had written himself, the authenticity of which was subsequently questioned by the investigation into his disappearance (see paragraphs 111 , 114 , 118 - 120 , 122 , 124 and 129 below). According to the statement, earlier that day he had found an airgun on Izberbash beach and had shot himself accidentally with it. He had then gone to the hospital on his own. He had no complaints on account of the aforementioned incident. The statement contained neither the name of the interviewing police officer nor any other indication of who had carried out the interview.

85 . On the same day the applicant applied to the local police for assistance with the search of his missing brother.

86 . On 23 August 2013 police officers examined the beach and found a bullet cartridge. From the documents submitted to the Court, it follows that that item was not collected as evidence (see paragraph 105 below).

87 . On 26 August 2013 a police officer in charge of the inquiry into the incident involving Mr Valibagandov, in view of the latter ’ s explanations, refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence of a crime.

88 . On 30 August 2013 the head of Izberbash hospital informed the investigators that after Mr Valibagandov ’ s medical treatment at the hospital ’ s surgery department, he had been taken away by the police.

89 . On 4 September 2013 the applicant was interviewed. He stated that on 22 August 2013 his brother Omar Valibagandov had taken their relative ’ s car and had left the flat in Makhachkala to go to the office. He had planned to collect his salary arrears and to borrow money from the director of the company he worked for. At around 4.30 p.m. on the same day their relative, Mr G.R., had received a text message from Omar ’ s mobile phone number stating that Omar had had problems and would not be available for a couple of days, and telling him where the car could be found. Later the same day, the applicant and Mr G.R. had found the car at the location specified in the text message. They had subsequently collected a video recording from CCTV cameras at that location. The video footage had shown an unidentified man parking Mr G.R ’ s car, then another man arriving in a Lada vehicle and leaving Mr G.R ’ s car keys in its front-left wheel.

90 . On 25 October 2013 the Izberbash prosecutor overruled the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 26 August 2013 and ordered that an additional investigation be carried out.

91 . On 30 October 2013 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Investigative Committee and the Izberbash district prosecutor ’ s office. In his request, the applicant stated that his brother had been abducted by the FSB and the Izberbash police. He further requested that criminal proceedings be instituted in respect of those officers and that they be questioned about the abduction.

92 . On 7 November 2013 the Izberbash inter-district department of the Investigative Committee opened criminal case no. 305182 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction).

93 . On 10 November 2013 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. He stated that his brother had been working in a local company as a debt collector. He had had money issues with the director of the company, Mr P., who had owed his brother money for a sold car and a plot of land. He further stated that after Mr Valibagandov ’ s abduction, he and his other brother, Mr I.B., had talked to Mr A., an FSB officer, Dr R., a surgeon from Izberbash hospital, and the ambulance doctor. All of them had confirmed that Mr Valibagandov had been taken to Izberbash hospital by armed men in an FSB vehicle. He had been handcuffed and only in underwear. The applicant finally stated that Mr D.R., an officer accompanying Mr Valibagandov, had told him that after leaving the hospital, Mr Valibagandov had asked him to release him, which he had done.

94 . On 13 November 2013 the Izberbash Town Court, at the request of the investigators, ordered the mobile phone service provider to furnish the records of Mr Valibagandov ’ s mobile phone calls.

95 . On 14 November 2013 Dr R., the surgeon from Izberbash hospital, was questioned. He stated that on the night of 22 to 23 August 2013 he had been on duty. At around 7 a.m. on 23 August 2013 Mr D.R, a police officer, had entered the surgery with other men, one of whom had been in uniform. Officer D.R. had asked whether a wounded man had been brought to the hospital. Meanwhile, an ambulance from the Karabudakhkent district had arrived with a handcuffed man who had been wounded by gunshot. The ambulance doctor had told him that the man had been found at Achi train station, and the ambulance staff had immediately informed the police about the man. They had then taken the man to the surgery and, with the help of a medical assistant, Ms G.L., and a nurse had extracted a rubber bullet. During the medical treatment Mr Valibagandov had informed Dr R. that a group of men in balaclavas had beaten him up and had demanded something. After finishing the surgery, Dr R. had given the rubber bullet to the head of the hospital, along with the report on the surgery. When Dr R. had left the surgery unit, he had seen seven to eight police officers taking Mr Valibagandov away in one of the two police vehicles.

96 . On 19 November 2013 a nurse from Izberbash hospital was questioned. She provided no new information.

97 . On 25 November 2013 the Ministry of the Interior of Dagestan informed the investigators that police officers, Mr M.A. and Mr Kh.T., had gone to Izberbash hospital after receiving information on Mr Valibagandov ’ s hospitalisation. The letter further referred to the explanation Mr Valibagandov had given about the incident of 23 August 2008 (see paragraph 84 above).

98 . On 27 November 2013 Mr G.R. was questioned. His statements were similar to the account of the events described above.

99 . On 29 November 2013 the investigators examined Izberbash hospital ’ s registration log. According to the log, Mr Valibagandov had arrived at the hospital with multiple injuries on his body, including a gunshot wound.

100 . On 3 December 2013 FSB officer A. was questioned. He stated that a doctor from Izberbash hospital had told him that Izberbash police officers had taken Mr Valibagandov with them.

101 . On 5 December 2013 Mr D.R., the deputy head of Izberbash police, was questioned. He stated that upon arrival at the hospital, he had entered the surgery unit and seen Mr Valibagandov in bed. He had talked to him and ascertained that Mr Valibagandov had received his injuries accidentally. He had left after a group of police officers had arrived at the hospital.

102 . On 7 December 2013 Mr P., the director of the company, was questioned. He stated that Mr Valibagandov had wanted to borrow money to buy a car, but he had refused to lend it. Shortly afterwards, he had received a video message from Mr Ka., the head of an illegal armed group, threating to kill his son if he did not transfer the money to him. Mr P. had immediately informed Mr Valibagandov about the incident and had urged him to settle the issue, but to no avail. In early October 2013 he had received a text message from Mr Valibagandov ’ s mobile phone number threatening to retaliate.

103 . On 7 December 2013 Mr P. ’ s son and two employees of the company were questioned, but they provided no new information. On the same day Mr G.T., the deputy head of the company, was questioned. He stated that they had been threatened regularly by the local criminal groups. Before his abduction, Mr Valibagandov had informed him that the same criminal groups had threatened him as well.

104 . On 8 December 2013 Mr Valibagandov ’ s cousin and wife, and the applicant ’ s wife were questioned. None of them provided any new information.

105 . On 11 December 2013 two police officers, Mr P.Ya. and Mr Ma.A., were questioned. Officer P.Ya. stated that on the instructions of his superior, he had examined the crime scene and found a bullet cartridge. He had taken a photograph of the crime scene and a bullet cartridge, but had not collected it as evidence. Officer Ma.A. stated that on the day of the incident he had left for Izberbash hospital having received information about the hospitalisation of a wounded man. When he had arrived at the hospital, he had met officers D.R. and I.Kh. He had then gone to the X-ray unit, where Mr Valibagandov had been waiting for treatment. After the operation, Mr Valibagandov had left.

106 . On 11 December 2013 the head doctor of Izberbash hospital was questioned. He stated that on 30 August 2013 a police officer, Mr Sh.Sh., had requested information about Mr Valibagandov ’ s treatment at the hospital. In reply, he had provided a written explanation along with copies of the registration log as well as the rubber bullet extracted from Mr Valibagandov ’ s thigh.

107 . On 12 December 2013 one of the police officers, Mr Ma.A, was questioned again. He stated that he had seen Mr Valibagandov in the operating room without handcuffs. The rest of his statement did not provide any new information.

108 . On 12 December 2013 the investigators asked the head of the Izberbash police to provide CCTV footage of the police station for the period between 22 and 24 August 2013. In reply, the police stated that the recording for that period had been deleted owing to the expiry of the mandatory storage period.

109 . On 23 December 2013 the investigators questioned the applicant, who stated that he had both the CCTV recording of the location where Mr Valibagandov had parked the car (see paragraph 89 above) and Mr G.R. ’ s mobile phone. Subsequently, the investigators collected the recording and the mobile phone, and examined both.

110 . On 28 December 2013 Ms Sh.G., the ambulance doctor, was questioned. She stated that on 23 August 2018 ambulance unit no. 3 had received a call from a police officer, who had informed them about an injured man near a highway to Izberbash. When the ambulance crew had arrived at the place of the incident, three to four vehicles and around ten armed men had been waiting there. Some of the armed men had been wearing uniforms with the FSB insignia. One of them, who had introduced himself as the head of the FSB group, had ordered the ambulance crew to take the injured man, Mr Valibagandov, to Izberbash hospital. The ambulance crew had then taken Mr Valibagandov out of a white minibus and placed him in the ambulance. He had been handcuffed, wearing only underwear and had had a number of bruises and injuries on his arms and hips. The white minibus had escorted the ambulance to the hospital, where around fifteen to twenty police officers had already been waiting. Mr Valibagandov had been taken to the operating room, where an old man had approached him and had started speaking in a language Ms Sh.G. could not understand. That man had remained in the operating room. She further stated that Mr Valibagandov had told her that he had been abducted and tortured severely, but some “kind people” had helped him to get free. He had then asked if the people in uniforms were from the FSB, to which she had answered affirmatively. Subsequently, the ambulance crew had left Izberbash hospital. On their way to the ambulance headquarters the white minibus which had escorted them to the hospital had overtaken them. When the ambulance had been passing the place of the incident, the ambulance crew had seen four to five vehicles there, along with the white minibus and people in civilian clothing and camouflage uniforms.

111 . On 10 January 2014 the investigators seized Mr Valibagandov ’ s handwritten explanation of the account of events (see paragraph 84 above) for forensic examination.

112 . On 15 January 2014 the Izberbash Town Court granted a request by the investigators to collect as evidence the incoming call list for the ambulance telephone number.

113 . On 15 January 2014 the ambulance driver and a police officer were questioned but provided no new information.

114 . On 16 January 2014 the investigators received samples of the handwriting of police officers D.R., P.Ya., B.K., M.A. and Kh.T.

115 . On 20 January 2014 the investigators ordered a graphological examination of Mr Valibagandov ’ s handwritten explanation.

116 . On 8 February 2014 the investigators collected the video recording showing the threats being made to company director Mr P.

117 . According to information received from the Ministry of the Interior in Dagestan, Mr Valibagandov had been known as a person disseminating the ideas of a radical religious movement.

118 . A forensic examination carried out on 5 February 2014 concluded that Mr Valibagandov ’ s interview of 23 August 2013 had been carried out by Officer P.Ya. The handwriting of the text belonged neither to Mr Valibagandov nor to the police officers mentioned above (see paragraph 114 above).

119 . On 17 February 2014 Mr A.M., another police officer, was questioned. He stated that on 23 August 2013 he had met Mr Valibagandov in Izberbash hospital and questioned him about the incident. In reply, Mr Valibagandov had told him that he had injured himself with an air pistol and that he had no complaints. He had then proposed that Mr Valibagandov sign an explanation statement to that effect, which Mr Valibagandov had done in the police car and then left. Officer A.M. contended that he had forgotten to put his name and service rank on Mr Valibagandov ’ s statement.

120 . On 17 February 2014 the investigators decided to collect handwriting samples from Officer A.M. The forensic examination, carried out on 27 February 2014, found that A.M. ’ s handwriting and that on the explanation statement did not match.

121 . On 18 February 2014 the Izberbash Town Court granted a request by the investigators to collect the list of incoming calls from Officer D.R. ’ s mobile phone.

122 . On 20, 23 and 24 February 2014 police officers Kh.T, D.R., M.A, A.M. and P.Ya refused to undergo a polygraph test to verify their statements given to the investigation.

123 . On 23 February 2014 Dr P. and Officer D.R. were cross-examined. They gave conflicting statements concerning the officer ’ s arrival at the hospital. The doctor reiterated that Officer D.R. had arrived at the hospital and waited until Mr Valibagandov had been brought in by the ambulance crew, whereas the officer contested that account of the event.

124 . On 24 February 2014 Officer P.Ya. was questioned. He stated that when he had been given the file on Mr Valibagandov ’ s hospitalisation along with his explanation statement, the field on the statement where information on the interviewer should have been filled in had been left blank. Therefore, he had filled in the form himself, but had not put his name as the interviewer, since he personally had not carried out that interview (see paragraph 84 above).

125 . On 26 February 2014 Mr Sh.R., a police officer from the Makhachkala police, was questioned. He stated that on 25 August 2014 he had received the file on Mr Valibagandov ’ s hospitalisation and his subsequent disappearance. The file included a rubber bullet extracted from Mr Valibagandov ’ s thigh. He had then sent all the materials, including the rubber bullet, to Izberbash police station by regular post.

126 . On 4 March 2014 Officer D.R. was additionally questioned. His statements concerned the phone numbers he had contacted on 23 August 2013. Those numbers had belonged to his fellow colleagues from the Izberbash police, officers Kh.T, G.A., M.Sh, and O.N.

127 . On 5 March 2014 all of the aforementioned officers and Officer G.M., also from the Izberbash police, were questioned. They all stated that they did not remember whether they had talked to Officer D.R. on the day of the abduction. All of the officers refused to undergo a psychophysiological examination.

128 . On 7 March 2014 the investigators examined the rubber bullet. No new information was revealed.

129 . On 25 March 2014 the investigators ordered a comparative forensic examination of Mr Valibagandov ’ s signature on the statement of 23 August 2013 and in his passport. The forensic examination report, provided on the next day, did not contain any conclusive findings on the possible match of the signatures.

130 . On 26 March 2014 an expert examined the CCTV footage of the car park on 23 August 2013, which the applicant had provided to the investigators, but was unable to identify either the cars or the individuals on it (see paragraph 109 above).

131 . On 2 April 2014 the investigators examined the crime scene – the surgery unit of Izberbash hospital. No evidence was collected.

132 . On the same date the investigators decided to collect the footage of the CCTV cameras in Izberbash hospital. However, given that the mandatory storage period for the recordings had expired, they were unable to obtain any information.

133 . On 4 April 2014 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the perpetrators. The applicant was informed.

134 . On 27 May 2014 the applicant ’ s representative asked the investigators to grant him access to the case file and allow him to make copies of some documents. On 30 May 2014 that request was refused on the grounds that the investigation was still pending.

135 . On 21 July 2014 the decision to suspend the investigation was overruled by the Izberbash district prosecutor as unlawful and premature, as the investigators had failed to take a number of basic steps, such as establishing the circumstances in which Mr Valigabandov had been wounded.

136 . On 5 August 2014 the investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of police officers P.Ya. and A.M. due to the absence of corpus delicti in their actions.

137 . On 1 September 2014 the investigation was suspended again. The applicant was informed.

138 . On 10 October 2014 the applicant ’ s representative wrote to the investigators, seeking information on the progress of the case and asking to make copies of some documents. In reply, the investigators informed the applicant ’ s representative that the proceedings had been suspended and he could obtain copies of the documents sought from the Dagestan department of the Investigative Committee.

139 . On 18 November and then on 17 December 2014 the applicant ’ s representative lodged a complaint with the Izberbash district prosecutor ’ s office about the investigators ’ inaction. He received no reply to either complaint.

140 . On 17 November 2015 the investigators ’ superior overruled the decision of 1 September 2014 to suspend the proceedings.

141 . On 7 December 2015 the investigators granted a request by the applicant ’ s representative that information on the mobile telephone numbers used near the crime scene be obtained in order to identify possible witnesses.

142 . On 24 December 2015 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 14 May 2016. The applicant was informed.

143 . On 10 June 2016 Dr R. from Izberbash hospital and police officer M.A. were cross-examined. They each reiterated their earlier statements.

144 . On 14 June 2016 the investigation was suspended again. The applicant was informed.

145 . On 25 May 2018 the Dagestan prosecutor ’ s office overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings. It appears that the criminal proceedings are still ongoing.

(a) First set of proceedings

146 . On an unspecified date in June or July 2014, the applicant brought proceedings before the Izberbash Town Court challenging the investigators ’ decision of 30 May 2014 to suspend the investigation (see paragraph 133 above).

147 . On 23 July 2014 the court dismissed the complaint as unsubstantiated.

(b) Second set of proceedings

148 . On an unspecified date in February or March 2015 the applicant brought proceedings before the Izberbash Town Court challenging the investigators ’ inaction in respect of his request of 17 December 2014 (see paragraph 139 above).

149 . On 27 March 2015 the court granted the applicant ’ s complaint and ordered the investigators to examine his request.

(c) Third set of proceedings

150 . On an unspecified date in 2015 the applicant lodged yet another complaint with the Izberbash Town Court, challenging the investigators ’ refusal to allow him to make copies of all documents in the case file.

151 . On 17 July 2015 the court dismissed the complaint and upheld the investigators ’ refusal. The applicant appealed against that decision.

152 . On 6 October 2015 the Supreme Court of Dagestan upheld the decision on appeal.

(d) Fourth set of proceedings

153 . On an unspecified date in 2015, the applicant ’ s representative brought proceedings before the Izberbash Town Court challenging the investigators ’ decision of 1 September 2014 to suspend the proceedings (see paragraph 137 above).

154 . On 18 November 2015 the court dismissed the complaint, as the investigation had been resumed on 17 November 2015. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Dagestan.

(e) Fifth set of proceedings

155 . On an unspecified date in 2015, the applicant brought proceedings before the Izberbash Town Court challenging the investigators ’ decision of 24 December 2015 to suspend the proceedings (see paragraph 142 above).

156 . On 16 May 2016 the court dismissed the complaint, as the investigation had been resumed on 14 May 2016.

157 . The applicant is the mother of Mr Rustam Aushev, who was born in 1988.

158 . On 17 February 2012 Mr Rustam Aushev left home to go to Belgium to visit his sister. He was to take a train from Nazran, Ingushetia, to Mineralnye Vody train station in the Stavropol Region, another train from that station in the direction of Brest, Belorussia, and then proceed to Europe.

159 . Between 1 and 7 p.m. he was at Mineralnye Vody train station, where a group of four to five men approached him, showed him their service identity cards and then forced him into their white GAZelle minibus. Mr Rustam Aushev has been missing ever since. On that day one of the abductors had introduced himself to a security guard at the train station as Officer V. from the FSB, and had shown him his service identity card (see below).

160 . The abduction was recorded on a CCTV camera at the train station.

161 . Shortly before the abduction on 17 February 2012, a law ‑ enforcement officer had asked the ticket office in Nazran, Ingushetia, to inform him of anyone who had purchased a ticket from Mineralnye Vody to Brest, Belorussia.

162 . Mr Rustam Aushev was taken from Mineralnye Vody train station in the Stavropol Region to the FSB unit in Magas. According to the applicant ’ s submission, her son ’ s passage was registered in the log of the regional border checkpoint.

163 . On 19 February 2012 Mr Aushev ’ s cousin, Mr Ak.Akh. complained of Rustam Aushev ’ s disappearance to the Mineralnye Vody police, asking them to assist him with the search for his missing relative.

164 . On the same day, Mr Ak.Akh. was interviewed by the police. He stated that the applicant had called him on 18 February 2012 and had told him that her son Rustam had left for Brest via Mineralnye Vody and that she had lost contact with him. He had then gone to the Mineralnye Vody police and reported the incident. The police had told him to go to the transport police. Later, he had learnt from his relatives that Mr Aushev had not arrived in Brest. Subsequently, he had gone to Mineralnye Vody train station and had learnt from the station personnel that Mr Aushev had asked another passenger, Mr K.M., to look after his luggage while he stepped outside. He had then left the waiting hall and had never returned. Afterwards, Mr Ak.Akh. had studied CCTV recordings of the train station premises and had seen four men forcing Mr Aushev into a white GAZelle minibus with tinted windows. Its number plate had been covered with mud. Mr Ak.Akh. provided Mr Aushev ’ s mobile phone number to the investigators.

165 . On the same day the police also interviewed the applicant, who stated that she been in contact with her son Rustam Aushev until he had reached Mineralnye Vody. During his last call, Mr Aushev had told her that he had met a young man, Mr K.M., and had left his luggage with him while he had stepped out to pray and make a phone call.

166 . On the same day, 19 February 2012, Mr K.I., a security guard at Mineralnye Vody train station, was interviewed. He stated that on the day of the incident a man of Slavic appearance had come to the train station checkpoint and had shown an FSB identity card in the name of V. He had asked to be allowed to park in the off-limit zone. As FSB officer V. had been from another region, Ingushetia, the witness had told him to obtain permission from the local FSB. After talking to the local FSB by telephone, Officer V. had returned to the GAZelle minibus.

167 . On 20 February 2012 investigators examined the crime scene. During the examination, they studied the CCTV recording showing four men getting into a white GAZelle minibus with tinted windows, and then leaving the station ’ s police parking area. The recording did not reveal the abduction of Mr Aushev. A copy of the recording was collected.

168 . On 20 February 2012 Mr Aushev ’ s wife, Ms Al. A., wrote to the Ingushetia Prosecutor, the Human Rights Defender of Ingushetia and various non-governmental organisations, asking them to help her find her missing husband.

169 . On the same day Ms Al.A. was interviewed but did not provide any new information.

170 . On 21 February 2012 Mr Ak.Akh. was interviewed again. He reiterated his earlier statements, adding that at some point in 2007 Mr Aushev had been detained by the FSB for unknown reasons, but released on the same day.

171 . On the same day Mr Aushev ’ s brother, Mr Au.Akh., was interviewed. His statements were similar to those of Mr Ak.Akh..

172 . On the same day Mr K.I. was interviewed again and reiterated his earlier statements (see paragraph 166 above).

173 . On 22 February 2012 another FSB officer, Mr G.I., was interviewed. He confirmed the account of events as given by Mr K.I.

174 . On 22 February 2012 the investigation file was transferred to the Stavropol Region inter-district department of the Investigative Committee.

175 . On 27 February 2012 Mr Au.Akh. wrote to the Nazran district prosecutor asking for assistance in the search for his missing brother.

176 . On 29 February 2012 Mr Ak.Akh. asked the investigators to inform him about the progress of the investigation and to provide a copy of the CCTV footage. In reply, he was informed that a copy would be available only upon completion of the investigation.

177 . On 6 March 2012 the investigators ordered an expert examination of the CCTV camera recordings, seeking to identify Mr Aushev. On 7 March 2012 the experts replied that it was impossible to do so because of the poor quality of the recording.

178 . On 6 March 2012 Mr Au.Akh received a telegram from Mr K., an investigator at the Ingushetia FSB, informing him that his brother, Rustam Aushev, had been arrested by the FSB and taken to the FSB headquarters in Ingushetia. The case file and the video recordings had been sent there as well. Rustam Aushev ’ s crossing of the checkpoint at the regional border had been recorded in their registration log. Mr Aushev had been charged with banditry and membership of illegal armed groups under Articles 209 and 210 of the Criminal Code of Russia.

179 . Between 8 and 21 March 2012 the investigation file was transferred back and forth between t he Mineralovodskiy transport investigative department of the southern transport investigative committee ( Минераловодский следственный отдел Южного следственного управления на транспорте Следственного К омитета Российской Федерации ) and the Stavropol Region inter-district department of the Investigative Committee.

180 . On 13 March 2012 Mr Aushev ’ s legal counsel wrote to the NGO the Memorial Human Rights Centre asking for assistance with meeting Mr Aushev. He stated that after being informed of the abduction by Mr Aushev ’ s brother, he had gone to the FSB headquarters in Ingushetia. An officer at the reception desk had told him that he could not meet Mr Aushev as the latter had not been there.

181 . On 16 March 2012 Mr B.S., one of two police officers from the checkpoint at Mineralnye Vody train station was interviewed. He stated that on the day of the incident he had been on duty at the station. He had seen a white GAZelle minibus parked near the checkpoint. When he had approached it, a man in it had shown him from the window a special permit. As the vehicle ’ s windows had been tinted, it had been impossible to see who was inside the car. He had noticed the digit 15 on its number plate. Later on, he had learned from a security guard at the train station that FSB officers had been in that vehicle.

182 . On the same day the second police officer, K.A., was interviewed. He reiterated the information provided by officer B.S.

183 . On 16 March 2012 Mr Ak.Akh. was interviewed again. He reiterated his previous statements. When subsequently questioned on 11 April 2012, he reiterated his submission.

184 . On 27 March 2012 the lawyer of Rustam Aushev ’ s wife complained to the transport prosecutor of the investigators ’ inaction and asked him to institute criminal proceedings.

185 . On 2 April 2012 the Mineralovodskiy transport investigative committee opened criminal case no. 1250126 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction).

186 . Between 2 and 9 April 2012 the investigators made a composite sketch of the man who had introduced himself at the checkpoint as FSB officer V.

187 . On 9 April 2012 Mr A.Ye., a security guard from the train station, was questioned. He stated that he could identify the FSB officer V., who was a lieutenant of the FSB.

188 . On 10 April 2012 Mr K.I. was questioned again. He reiterated his earlier statements (see paragraphs 166 and 172 above).

189 . On the same day Mr K.A. and Mr B.S., police officers from the station checkpoint, were questioned. Their statements were similar to those of 16 March 2012 (see paragraphs 181 and 182 above).

190 . On the same day the investigators again questioned Mr Au.Akh. In addition to his earlier statements, he stated that in 2007 Rustam Aushev and he had been taken to the FSB on suspicion of involvement in illegal armed groups. They had been released after a short detention, whereas men who had been detained as active members of illegal armed groups had been killed by the FSB officers.

191 . On 11 April 2012 Rustam Aushev ’ s wife, Ms Al.A., was granted victim status and questioned. She stated that the day after the incident, she had gone to the ticket office at Nazran station, where her husband had bought his train tickets. The cashier, Ms Al.Am, had told her that on the day of her husband ’ s disappearance, a man of Slavic appearance had asked the cashiers if anyone had bought a ticket to Brest.

192 . On 12 April 2012 Mr M.A., an officer of the Mineralovodskiy transport police, was questioned. He stated that he had received information from the train station security guards that at around 6.30 p.m. on 17 February 2012 Mr K.M. had gone to the checkpoint at Mineralnye Vody train station and informed the officer on duty that he had arrived from Nazran with Mr Aushev and that the latter had left his luggage with him and had gone to pray. Since Mr Aushev had not returned, Mr K.M. had decided to leave Mr Aushev ’ s luggage at the checkpoint. He further stated that he had informed the headquarters of the Mineralovodskiy transport police and had left the luggage with the personnel on duty.

193 . On 19 April 2012 the investigators applied to the Mineralovodskiy Town Court for permission to obtain from the mobile phone service provider a list of incoming and outgoing calls for Mr Aushev ’ s phone, as well as for the phones of Mr Ak.Akh., Mr Au.Akh. and Ms Al.A., for the period between February and April 2012. The investigators also applied for permission to conduct surveillance. On the same date the court rejected the investigators ’ request in respect of Mr Ak.Akh. and Mr Au.Akh and granted their request in respect of Mr Aushev. There is no information about the court ’ s ruling in respect of Ms Al.A.

194 . On 23 April 2012 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation of the criminal case and pointed out a number of defects in the proceedings, which needed to be remedied.

195 . On 27 April 2012 the investigators questioned the applicant, but she provided no new information.

196 . On the same day the investigators received operational information that Mr Au.Akh, Mr Aushev ’ s brother, was a member of an illegal armed group.

197 . On 4 May 2012 the investigators collected the list of incoming and outgoing calls for Mr Aushev ’ s mobile phone.

198 . On 20 June 2012 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the CCTV recording to identify Mr Aushev on it (see paragraph 203 below).

199 . On 26 June 2012 the investigators applied to the Mineralnye Vody Town Court for permission to obtain from the service provider a list of all the telephone calls and text messages sent and received on the premises of Mineralnye Vody train station on the day of the abduction. On the same date the court granted the investigators ’ request.

200 . It appears that on 29 June 2012 Mr Au.Akh was arrested along with three other men during a special counter-terrorist operation.

201 . On 22 August 2012 Mr G.I., an FSB officer, was questioned. He reiterated his statements of 22 February 2012 (see paragraph 173 above).

202 . On 31 July 2012 the Ingushetia FSB replied to the investigators that Mr Aushev had not left the country as he had not had a passport. They also stated that Mr Aushev was a member of an illegal armed group headed by his brother, Mr Au.Akh. Lastly, they stated that there was no officer V. in the Ingushetia FSB.

203 . On 15 August 2012 the experts informed the investigators that they had been unable to identify Mr Aushev on the CCTV recordings owing to the poor quality of the video footage.

204 . On 2 November 2012 the investigation was suspended, resumed and then suspended again on 29 December 2012.

205 . On 23 July 2013 the investigators ’ superior overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings.

206 . On 15 August 2013 the Mineralnye Vody inter-district prosecutor criticised the investigation of the criminal case and pointed out a number of defects in the proceedings, which needed to be remedied.

207 . On 23 August 2013 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the CCTV recordings of Mineralnye Vody train station from different locations to identify Mr Aushev and the alleged abductors. However, the experts were unable to carry out the examination owing to the poor quality of the recording.

208 . On 28 August 2013 Ms K.V., another security guard from the train station, was questioned. He provided no new information.

209 . On the same date a cashier from Nazran train station ticket office was questioned. She stated that she had spoken with a young woman who had arrived at the ticket office with a man and who had asked whether Mr Aushev had arrived at Mineralnye Vody train station. According to the witness, nobody else had asked her that question.

210 . On 29 August 2013 Mr O.D., an inspector from the State Courier Service was questioned. He stated that at 5 p.m. on the day of the abduction a GAZelle minibus with registration number O177OO had left their car park. The driver had been Mr T.S., who had been on leave.

211 . On the same date Mr Au.Akh and Mr D.Z. were questioned again. They stated that Mr Aushev was a bomb-maker for an illegal armed group.

212 . On 2 September 2013 the investigators questioned Mr K.M., who had looked after Mr Aushev ’ s luggage at the train station. His statements were similar to those of police officer M.A. (see paragraph 192 above).

213 . On 9 September 2013 the investigation was suspended.

214 . On 28 November 2013 the investigators ’ superior overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings.

215 . On 18 December 2013 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation of the criminal case and pointed out a number of defects in the proceedings that needed to be remedied. In particular, the prosecutor pointed out the procedural drawbacks while obtaining the applicant ’ s DNA samples (see paragraph 209 above).

216 . On 24 December 2013 the investigators examined the CCTV footage from Mineralnye Vody train station. The recording confirmed the account of events as described in the applicant ’ s submission before the Court.

217 . On 9 and 10 January 2014 the investigators applied to the Mineralnye Vody Town Court for authorisation to tap the telephones of the applicant, Ms Al.A. and Mr Ak.Akh. and to obtain the call list for Mr Aushev ’ s mobile number from the service provider. The court rejected the investigators ’ request for telephone surveillance as unsubstantiated, but granted the request in respect of Mr Aushev ’ s phone. Subsequently, the investigators obtained the list of calls and requested information on the owners of certain phone numbers which had contacted Mr Aushev the most.

218 . On 27 January 2014 the investigators ordered yet another forensic examination of the CCTV recordings from Mineralnye Vody train station.

219 . On 28 January 2014 the investigators again questioned Mr A.Ye., a security guard from Mineralnye Vody train station. He stated that the name of the FSB officer was Mr V.A.

220 . On 31 January 2014 the FSB confirmed to the investigators that Mr V.A. had worked at the FSB from 1994 to 2007, but had since left.

221 . On 6 February 2014 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 18 March 2014.

222 . On 18 April 2014 the investigators examined the CCTV recordings with an expert, who stated that it was impossible to identify individuals on the video owing to the poor quality of the recording.

223 . On 18 April 2014 the investigators conducted a photo identification of Mr V.A. by Mr A.Ye., who identified him as the FSB officer he had met at the train station (see paragraphs 166 and 187 above).

224 . On the same date the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators.

225 . On 6 June 2014 the investigators ’ superior overruled the decision to suspend the investigation and ordered that basic steps be taken.

226 . On 31 July and on 30 October 2014 the supervising prosecutor pointed out a number of defects in the investigation, including the investigators ’ failure to comply with the orders given on 6 June 2014.

227 . On 18 November 2014 the investigation was resumed. It was again suspended on 18 December 2014 and then resumed again on 9 April 2015.

228 . On 25 April 2015 Mr V.A. was questioned at the place of his residence in Kazan, the Republic of Tatarstan. He stated that on the day of the incident he had been in Kazan, and that his relatives and a neighbour could confirm it. He refused to take a lie-detector test and to be further questioned by the investigators.

229 . On 30 April 2015 the Mineralnye Vody Town Court granted a request lodged by the investigators for authorisation to carry out a search of Mr V.A. ’ s flat.

230 . On 12 May 2015 the investigation was suspended. On the same date, the investigators ’ superior overruled that decision.

231 . On 14 May 2015 the investigators again questioned Mr V.A. He stated that he had worked in the FSB from 1994 to 2007 and had carried out operations in respect of illegal bomb makers. He had never been to Mineralnye Vody and on 17 February 2012, as it had been his wife ’ s birthday, and he had been at home.

232 . On the same date, the investigators carried out a cross-examination of Mr V.A. and Mr A.Ye. Both reiterated their earlier statements.

233 . On the same date Mr V.A. ’ s neighbour, Mr Sh.A., was questioned. He stated that on 17 February 2012 he had been at V.A. ’ s flat to celebrate his wife ’ s birthday.

234 . On 26 May 2015 the supervising prosecutor pointed out a number of defects in the investigation, which needed to be remedied. In particular, the prosecutor ordered the investigators to cross-examine Mr Sh.A. and Mr A.Ye. and question Mr V.A. ’ s wife.

235 . On 12 June 2015 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 9 November 2015.

236 . On 1 December 2015 the investigators questioned Mr V.A. ’ s wife, Ms V.V. She stated that six people had been at her birthday celebration on 17 February 2012, but did not specify whether Mr Sh.A. had been among them. She refused to take a polygraph test.

237 . On 8 December 2015 the investigators questioned Ms V.V. ’ s parents, both of whom stated that on 17 February 2012 they had been at the birthday dinner and Mr Sh.A. had not been among the guests. They stated that Mr V.A. had been in Kazan on that day.

238 . On 8 December 2015 Ms N.E., Ms V.V. ’ s friend who had been at the birthday dinner on 17 February 2012, was questioned. Her statement was similar to that of Ms V.V.

239 . On 9 December 2015 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators.

240 . On 13 April 2016 the investigators ’ superior overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings. On 4 May 2016 the investigation was resumed.

241 . On 6 May 2016 the investigators yet again examined the CCTV recording from the train station. No new information was revealed.

242 . On 12 May 2016 the investigators decided to transfer the criminal case to the southern investigative department of the Investigative Committee ( Южное следственное управление на транспорте Следственного комитета Российской Федерации ) for further investigation.

243 . On 4 June 2016 the investigation was suspended. It was subsequently resumed and suspended several times without attaining any tangible results. The last suspension took place on 5 July 2017. It appears that the investigation is still pending.

(a) First set of proceedings

244 . On 2 December 2015 the Ms Al.A. ’ s lawyer complained of the investigators ’ inaction to the Mineralnye Vody Town Court and requested permission to study the case file.

245 . On 21 January 2016 the court dismissed the complaint, stating that Ms Al.A. could study the case file only upon completion of the investigation. Ms Al.A. ’ s representative appealed against the court ’ s decision. The outcome of the appeal is unknown.

(b) Second set of proceedings

246 . On an unspecified date in 2016 Ms Al.A. ’ s representative lodged another complaint about the inaction of the investigators.

247 . On 22 July 2016 the Mineralnye Vody Town Court rejected the complaint on procedural grounds.

248 . On 9 December 2016 the Stavropol Regional Court quashed the above decision and remitted the complaint for a fresh examination.

249 . On 23 October 2017 the Town Court dismissed the complaint as unsubstantiated.

250 . For a summary of the relevant domestic law and international and domestic reports, see Makayeva v. Russia (no. 37287/09, §§ 67-77, 18 September 2014); Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia (nos. 2944/06, and 4 others, §§ 80-84, 18 December 2012); and Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia (no. 40464/02, §§ 67-69, 10 May 2007).

THE LAW

251 . Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

252 . The Government submitted that the applicants had lodged their applications with the Court with unjustifiable delay and had therefore failed to comply with the six-month time-limit. In particular, they pointed out that in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14) the proceedings had been suspended between October 2012 and September 2013 and that during that period, the applicants had only once applied to the court complaining of the investigators ’ inaction. They had lodged their application with the Court about two years and eight months after the alleged abduction, even though they must have become aware of the obvious ineffectiveness of the pending investigations into the abduction long before initiating proceedings before the Court.

253 . In Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) the investigation had been suspended and resumed several times between December 2012 and August 2016, and no investigative steps had been taken during that period. In addition, the applicants had not contacted the investigators between December 2012 and December 2014, when they had complained to the Grozny Military Garrison Court about the investigators ’ inaction. Thus, they had been inactive for almost two years and had lodged their application with the Court three years and five months after the alleged abduction of their relative.

254 . In Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) there had been a significant lull in the investigation – from September 2014 to November 2015. Despite the applicant ’ s active stance before the domestic courts, almost all of his complaints had been dismissed. He should therefore have lodged his complaint with the Court long before 16 November 2016.

255 . As for Ausheva (no. 56941/17), the Government submitted that the investigation had been suspended for about eight months and the applicant had been inactive during that period. In addition, she had lodged her application with the Court five years after the alleged abduction.

256 . The applicants in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14) submitted that they had complied with the six-month time ‑ limit. They had taken all possible steps within a reasonable time to initiate the search for their missing relatives and assist the authorities in the proceedings. They further submitted that there had been no excessive or unexplained delays in submitting their application to the Court, and that they had lodged their complaints as soon as they had become convinced that the investigation into the abduction had been ineffective. Finally, referring to Varnava and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, ECHR 2009), they submitted that they had applied to the Court within two years and eight months of the incident, which was in compliance with the Court ’ s case-law.

257 . The applicants in Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) argued that they had applied to the Court as soon as they had realised that the investigation had been unreasonably lengthy and had become aware of the inaction of the Grozny Military Garrison Court in respect of their complaint lodged on 11 December 2014 (see paragraph 78 above). Thus, they had complied with the six-month time-limit.

258 . The applicants in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) argued that, unlike the applicants in Doshuyeva and Yusupov v. Russia (dec.) (no. 58055/10, 31 May 2016), they had been in regular contact with the authorities. Moreover, they had successfully challenged the investigators ’ inaction before the Town Court and thus could expect that the investigation would comply with the court ’ s rulings.

259 . The applicant in Ausheva (no. 56941/17) submitted that she had brought the case before the Court less than five and a half years after her son ’ s abduction. She and her family members had taken an active stance in the proceedings by challenging the investigators ’ inaction in the domestic courts.

260 . A summary of the principles concerning compliance with the six ‑ month rule in disappearance cases may be found in Sultygov and Others v. Russia ( no s . 42575/07 and 11 others , §§ 369 ‑ 74 , 9 October 2014 ).

261 . Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that in each application at hand the applicants lodged their complaints less than ten years after the incidents and the initiation of the related investigations (see Varnava and Others , cited above, § 166).

262 . The Court further notes that the applicants informed the authorities about the abductions of their relatives shortly after the incidents (see paragraphs 10 , 47 , 85 and 182 above).

263 . In each of the applications the authorities opened a criminal investigation into the abduction, which was repeatedly suspended, and then resumed following criticism by the supervising authorities. In each case, the investigation was still ongoing when the application was lodged with the Court (see paragraphs 38 , 77 , 144 and 243 above).

264 . The Court observes that there were lulls in the criminal proceedings. In Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14), Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) and Aushev (no. 56941/17), the lulls did not exceed two years. The most significant lull occurred in the case of Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15), in which the proceedings remained suspended between 10 December 2012 and 12 August 2016 (see paragraphs 73 and 77 above). However, during that period the applicants remained active. More specifically, they consistently requested permission to access the case file (see paragraphs 75 - 77 above).

265 . In assessing the circumstances, the Court takes into account that all of the applications were lodged within a few years of the incidents and that the authorities became aware of the abductions without undue delay. It also notes the applicants ’ efforts to have the dormant proceedings resumed and their overall active stance in the proceedings. Therefore, it concludes that the applicants acted diligently and maintained contact with the investigators.

266 . Given that the investigations were complex and concerned very serious allegations, the Court concludes that it was reasonable for the applicants to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 142, ECHR 2012). The lulls in the investigations cannot therefore be interpreted as failure by the applicants to comply with the six-month requirement (contrast Doshuyeva and Yusupov , cited above, §§ 41-47, where the applicants did not contact the investigating authorities for about eight years and three months, while the investigation was seemingly dormant).

267 . In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the applicants have complied with the six-month rule.

268 . The Government did not contest the facts underlying each application.

269 . The applicants submitted that it was “beyond reasonable doubt” that the men who had taken their relatives had been State agents. In support of that assertion, they referred to the following facts.

270 . The applicants in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14) argued that their relatives had been apprehended by State agents and had subsequently disappeared. Those facts had been confirmed to the investigators by several witnesses.

271 . In Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) the applicants submitted that FSB vehicles had been used in the abduction. Furthermore, the abduction had taken place at night on the same day as a passport check had been carried out (see paragraph 45 above).

272 . The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) submitted that his brother had been taken to hospital under the surveillance of FSB officers. During his entire stay at the hospital, officers and other uniformed men had been waiting for him and had taken him away as soon as the treatment had been finished. Those facts had been corroborated by statements received by the investigators from the medical personnel and some of the police officers.

273 . The applicant in Ausheva (no. 56941/17) submitted that the Government had not challenged the account of the events which she had submitted to the Court. The investigation had pursued only one theory: that her son ’ s abduction had been carried out by the FSB. The witness statements obtained by the investigation, as well as the CCTV recordings from the place of the abduction, had demonstrated that her son had been detained by State agents. He had been missing ever since.

274 . For a summary of general principles, see Khava Aziyeva and Others (no. 30237/10, §§ 62-65, 23 April 2015, with further references).

275 . The Court notes that in reply to its request for a copy of the entire investigation files opened into the abductions of the applicants ’ relatives, the Government submitted copies of relevant documents, although in Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) the case file was not furnished in full. However, regard being had to the material in its possession, the Court considers that it is not precluded by the lack of certain documents from examining the issues raised in the application.

276 . The Court ’ s task is to decide, bearing in mind the parties ’ submissions, whether the circumstances of the cases at hand warrant the conclusion that State agents were responsible for the abductions of the applicants ’ relatives.

277 . The Court notes that even though in each case the abductors used civilian vehicles – unlike in numerous other cases concerning abductions by State agents perpetrated several years prior to the events in question (see, for example, Giriyeva and Others v. Russia , no. 17879/08, 21 June 2011; Kosumova and Others v. Russia , no. 27441/07, 7 June 2011; Malika Alikhadzhiyeva v. Russia , no. 37193/08, 24 May 2011; Matayeva and Dadayeva v. Russia , no. 49076/06, 19 April 2011; and Nasukhanovy v. Russia , no. 1572/07, 10 February 2011) – the material before it demonstrates the validity of the applicants ’ allegations concerning State agents ’ involvement in their relatives ’ abductions for the following reasons.

278 . First, it should be taken into account that the abductions took place in the Northern Caucasus, after the large-scale counterterrorism operation in Chechnya had ended, but in a period when isolated incidents of enforced disappearances continued to occur (see, among many examples, Alikhanovy v. Russia , no. 17054/06, 28 August 2018; Tsakoyevy v. Russia , no. 16397/07, 2 October 2018; Turluyeva v. Russia , no. 63638/09, 20 June 2013; Khava Aziyeva and Others , cited above; Makayeva , cited above; Askhabova v. Russia , no. 54765/09, 18 April 2013; and Nakani and Others v. Russia [Committee], nos. 10229/10 and 4 others, 8 October 2019).

279 . Secondly, it is not disputed by the parties that prior to the abductions, the disappeared men in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14), Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) and Aushev (no. 56941/17) were the subjects of focused attention by the law-enforcement agencies (see paragraphs, 19 , 44 and 202 above).

280 . Thirdly, the particularities of each case as highlighted by the applicants suggested that State agents had been the perpetrators of those abductions. Thus, in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14) the abductors of Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev and Mr Umalat Bersanov acted in broad daylight. They arrived as a group of about ten armed men in black and camouflage uniforms and balaclavas, driving a GAZelle minibus with tinted windows that was seen near the Ingushetia FSB later on the day of the incident. The aforementioned facts, which the Government did not refute, support the applicants ’ version of the abduction by the federal forces (see paragraph 8 above).

281 . In Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) the abduction of the applicants ’ son took place in a cordoned-off area during a passport check by the law-enforcement authorities. The abductors arrived in vehicles which, it was established subsequently, belonged to the Ingushetia FSB (see paragraphs 45 and 58 above).

282 . In Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) it appears that several law ‑ enforcement agencies were involved in the incident. First, the police informed the ambulance service that Mr Valibagandov had been wounded. Secondly, FSB officers escorted the ambulance to a hospital and waited there until he underwent surgery. Mr Valibagandov was then taken away from the hospital by police officers (see paragraphs 95 and 110 above).

283 . Lastly, in Ausheva (no. 56941/17) the perpetrators acted in broad daylight and openly, without fear of attracting the attention of law ‑ enforcement agencies whose officers were present at the train station. When asking for permission to park their vehicle in an area of the station that was off limits, one of the perpetrators introduced himself as an FSB officer. The perpetrators showed a station security guard a special permit used by law-enforcement authorities, and the CCTV footage depicted a group of four or five individuals forcing the applicant ’ s son into that vehicle without any fear of attracting the attention of the police on duty at the station (see paragraphs 159 , 160 , 181 and 216 above).

284 . The copies of documents from the investigation files show that in each case the investigators took no meaningful steps to check whether the abductions could have been perpetrated by other culprits, other than State agents, or for other reasons, such as a blood feud, ransom, drugs or hostility. The reluctance of the police to actively investigate the matter, along with the applicants ’ consistent allegations that State agents were involved in the incidents, provide the Court with grounds for concluding that the applicants have all made out prima facie cases that their relatives were abducted by State agents.

285 . Given the lack of any explanation or alternative version for the events in question by the Government, the Court finds that the applicants ’ relatives Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, Mr Umalat Bersanov, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov, Mr Omar Valibagandov and Mr Rustam Aushev were arrested by State service personnel.

286 . There has been no reliable news of the applicants ’ relatives since their arrest and subsequent disappearance. The Government have not submitted any explanation as to what happened to them afterwards.

287 . The Court finds that, in a situation where a person is detained by unidentified State agents without any subsequent acknowledgment of the detention and is then missing for several years, that situation can be regarded as life-threatening. The absence of the applicants ’ relatives or of any news of them for a number of years supports this assumption.

288 . Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence available permits it to establish to the requisite standard of proof that Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, Mr Umalat Bersanov, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov, Mr Omar Valibagandov and Mr Rustam Aushev must be presumed dead following their unacknowledged detention by State agents.

289 . The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that their relatives had been abducted by State agents and that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the incidents. The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) also complained that the authorities had failed to protect his brother ’ s life in violation of the positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention. The aforementioned Article reads as follows:

“1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

290 . The Government neither commented on nor disputed the complaints.

291 . The applicants argued that their relatives had been abducted by State agents and that the ensuing investigations had been ineffective.

292 . In particular, in Ugurchiyev and Others (application no. 33731/14) the applicants alleged that their relatives had been abducted and killed by State agents and that the investigation had been ineffective.

293 . In Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15), the applicants referred to numerous suspensions in the investigation, the investigators ’ failure to take such important steps as interviewing the police officers from Sunzhenskiy District police station who had checked the abductors ’ documents, and examining vehicles used during the incident (see paragraph 46 above). The applicants also submitted that they had been denied access to the entire contents of the case file.

294 . The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) submitted that the criminal case had been opened belatedly. He further submitted that the State knew or should have foreseen that his brother ’ s life had been at risk. In particular, his brother had been escorted to the hospital by the police or the FSB. The investigators had failed to take a number of basic steps, such as obtaining the CCTV footage from the police station and the hospital or identifying the person who had called the ambulance.

295 . The applicant in Ausheva (no. 56941/17) drew the Court ’ s attention to the fact that the last time Mr Aushev had been seen alive had been when he had been in the hands of FSB officers who had forced him into their vehicle at Mineralnye Vody train station. She further pointed out that the belated opening of the criminal case – almost one and a half months after the incident – had undermined the efficiency of the investigation. Furthermore, the investigation had been transferred back and forth among several investigative bodies, which had further undermined its effectiveness.

296 . The applicants ’ complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. They are not inadmissible on any other grounds and must therefore be declared admissible.

(a) Alleged violation of the right to life in respect of Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, Mr Umalat Bersanov, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov and Mr Rustam Aushev

297 . The Court has already found that the applicants ’ relatives must be presumed dead following unacknowledged detention by State servicemen (see paragraph 288 above). In the absence of any plausible justification put forward by the Government, the Court finds that their deaths can be attributed to the State and that there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, Mr Umalat Bersanov, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov and Mr Rustam Aushev .

(b) Positive obligation to protect Mr Omar Valibagandov ’ s life

298 . Turning to the allegations in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) concerning the State ’ s positive obligation, the Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention may imply a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (see Osman v. the United Kingdom , 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII). For the Court to find a violation of the positive obligation to protect life, it must be established that the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of identified individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom , no. 46477/99, § 55, ECHR 2002 ‑ II; Medova v. Russia , no. 25385/04, § 96, 15 January 2009; and Tsechoyev v. Russia , no. 39358/05, § 136, 15 March 2011).

299 . In the instant case it appears that several law-enforcement agencies were well aware of the incident concerning Mr Omar Valibagandov. Moreover, law-enforcement officers accompanied Mr Valibagandov from the moment he had been shot until he left the hospital (see paragraph 282 above). The Court has already found that negligence displayed by the investigating or supervising authorities in the face of real and imminent threats to an identified individual ’ s life emanating from State agents, such as police officers, who were acting clearly outside their legal duties, might entail a violation of the positive obligation to protect life (see Turluyeva , cited above, § 100 , and Makayeva , cited above, § 104 ). Turning to the present case, the Court confirms that the fact that the suspected perpetrators were law-enforcement officers does not relieve the competent investigating authorities of this obligation.

300 . Accordingly, the Court cannot but conclude that, by failing to act rapidly and decisively, the authorities involved did not take the operational measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid risking the missing man ’ s life.

301 . In such circumstances, the Court finds that there has been a breach of the positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention in respect of Mr Omar Valibagandov.

(c) Effectiveness of the investigations

(i) General principles

302 . For a summary of the general principles, see Khava Aziyeva and Others (cited above, §§ 77-81 with further references).

(ii) Application of those principles to the present case

303 . In the present case, each of the abductions was investigated. The Court must assess whether those investigations met the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.

304 . The examination of the material submitted by the parties leads the Court to the conclusion that the investigations carried out into the abductions were ineffective for the following reasons.

(1) Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14)

305 . The Court notes that the investigation in the case appears to have been perfunctory and lacking thoroughness owing to the investigators ’ failure to take a number of crucial investigative steps. In particular, they failed to collect the CCTV footage from the local police station and from the Ingushetia FSB, which had been requested by the applicants (see paragraph 21 above). Furthermore, they took no steps to obtain and examine the registration logs from the road checkpoints in the Sunzhenskiy District or to request and examine data from Mr Bersanov ’ s mobile telephone (see paragraphs 15 and 24 above). Such failures seriously undermined the effectiveness of the investigation.

306 . As regards the overall conduct of the proceedings, the Court notes that they were frequently interrupted by premature and ill-founded decisions to suspend the investigation (see paragraphs 26 , 35 and 38 above).

(2) Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15)

307 . The Court observes that the investigators failed to examine the crime scene. This failure resulted in the inevitable loss of perishable evidence, such as the perpetrators ’ fingerprints, boot prints or tracks.

308 . Furthermore, the Court notes that although the investigators established that the abductors ’ vehicles had belonged to the FSB and had been used on the day of the incident, they failed to identify which unit of the FSB had used them and under whose command (see paragraphs 58 and 60 above). The steps taken by the investigators to this end were perfunctory (see paragraphs 64 and 66 above).

309 . The material in the Court ’ s possession does not show that the investigators, despite the domestic court ’ s authorisation, obtained data from Mr Zhovbatyrov ’ s mobile telephone line (see paragraph 53 above), or that they obtained a DNA sample from his relatives for comparison with the database of unidentified remains. The investigation file as submitted to the Court shows that after December 2011 the investigators took no tangible steps and limited themselves to suspending and resuming the proceedings (see paragraphs 67 and 77 above).

(3) Valibagandov (no. 6594/15)

310 . The documents submitted show that the investigation explored only one theory concerning the perpetrators of the abduction, namely that they had been State agents. However, the investigators failed to take tangible steps to identify the service personnel who could have been involved in the incident (see paragraphs 95 , 101 and 110 above). Similarly, they failed to take any steps to elucidate the discrepancies between the statements of the implicated police officers and the conclusions of the expert examination of the document allegedly written by the applicant ’ s brother (see paragraphs 119 , 120 and 124 above).

311 . The Court cannot overlook the fact that the investigators failed to take steps to promptly examine evidence and preserve it. In particular, they failed to obtain CCTV recordings from the local police station and Izberbash hospital owing to the expiry of the storage period. The Court also observes that it took the investigators about nine months to examine the hospital and its premises from which Mr Valibagandov had been abducted (see paragraphs 131 and 132 above). That examination was perfunctory and did not result in the collection of any evidence. Lastly, the investigators failed to collect the bullet cartridge from the crime scene, which could have been crucial evidence (see paragraphs 86 and 105 above).

312 . Furthermore, from the material in the Court ’ s possession, it does not appear that the investigators obtained a DNA sample from Valibagandov ’ s relatives for comparison with the database of unidentified remains.

313 . Finally, the Court observes that between 2014 and 2018, the investigation was suspended and resumed at least eight times (see paragraphs 133 , 135 , 138 , 140 , 142 , 144 and 145 above). As the Court has previously held, premature suspensions in a situation in which vital steps had not been taken undermined the investigators ’ ability to identify and prosecute the perpetrators (see Ögur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21954/93, § 88, ECHR 1999-III, and Khava Aziyeva and Others , cited above, § 86).

(4) Ausheva (no. 56941/17)

314 . The Court observes at the outset that in the instant case, as in Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15), the investigators failed to examine the crime scene. This failure resulted in the inevitable loss of perishable evidence, such as the perpetrators ’ fingerprints, boot prints or tire tracks. In addition, they neither examined the vehicle allegedly used by the abductors, nor questioned its driver (see paragraph 210 above).

315 . Furthermore, the authorities did not follow up on the information that Mr Aushev had been arrested by FSB officers and taken to their headquarters in Ingushetia, or that his passage had been recorded at the border checkpoints (see paragraphs 178 and 180 above). Nor did the investigators collect and examine the logs from the border checkpoints.

316 . The Court further observes that the investigation file was transferred between two investigative bodies on several occasions due to jurisdiction issues, which led to the loss of precious time (see paragraphs 179 and 242 above). Although the investigators took steps to verify whether FSB officer V.A. had been involved in the abduction, they failed to take comprehensive steps to verify his alibi and limited themselves to questioning his close relatives. No steps were taken to clarify the discrepancies between the statements of Mr V.A. ’ s neighbour and his relatives (see paragraphs 233 and 236 - 238 above).

317 . Lastly, the Court observes that the investigators examined the same video recording from the CCTV cameras on multiple occasions without achieving any tangible results (see paragraphs 167 , 177 , 198 , 203 , 216 , 218 , 222 and 241 above), which demonstrates the perfunctory nature of the investigative steps.

(5) Conclusion

318 . In the light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the authorities failed to carry out effective criminal investigations into the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, Mr Umalat Bersanov, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov, Mr Omar Valibagandov and Mr Rustam Aushev, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect.

319 . The applicants in all cases relied on Article 3 of the Convention, submitting that as a result of their relatives ’ disappearance and the State ’ s failure to investigate it properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

320 . The Government did not comment on the applicants ’ submissions.

321 . The applicants maintained their complaints.

322 . The applicants in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 33731/14) argued that as a result of their relatives ’ abduction and the ineffectiveness of the ensuing investigation, they had suffered severe distress and anxiety.

323 . The applicants in Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) pointed out that as the parents of Mr Zhovbatyrov, they were in a state of fear, distress and anxiety as to the fate of their son, exacerbated by the lack of an effective investigation into his disappearance.

324 . The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67879/16) submitted that he had suffered mental anguish and distress as a result of not knowing his brother ’ s whereabouts and the indifferent manner in which the authorities had carried out the investigation.

325 . The applicant in Aushev (no. 56941/17) submitted that she had received cursory and contradictory replies from the investigators about the fate of her son. In the majority of cases her requests and enquiries had been forwarded to various authorities without achieving any tangible results, which had caused her emotional distress.

(a) Admissibility

326 . The Court notes that the applicants ’ complaints under Article 3 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

(b) Merits

327 . The Court notes the lack of any comments from the Government on the applicants ’ complaint.

328 . The Court has found on many occasions that in a situation of enforced disappearance, the close relatives of the victim may themselves be victims of treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The essence of such a violation does not mainly lie in the fact of the “disappearance” of the family member, but rather concerns the authorities ’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention ( see Orhan v. Turkey , no. 25656/94, § 358, 18 June 2002, and Imakayeva v. Russia , no. 7615/02, § 164, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIII (extracts)).

329 . The Court reiterates its findings regarding the State ’ s responsibility for the abduction of the applicants ’ relatives and the failure to carry out a meaningful investigation into their fate. It finds that the applicants, who are close relatives of the disappeared men, must be considered victims of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the distress and anguish which they have suffered, and continue to suffer, as a result of their inability to discover the fate of their missing family members who have disappeared and because of the manner in which their complaints have been dealt with by the domestic authorities.

330 . The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicants in all cases.

331 . The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67879/16) submitted that his brother Omar Valibagandov had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the abductors. He referred to the numerous bruises his brother had sustained, as well as the gunshot wound to his thigh.

332 . The Government did not comment.

(a) Admissibility

333 . The Court notes that the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

(b) Merits

(i) General principles

334 . For a summary of the general principles concerning the substantive and procedural aspects of Article 3 of the Convention, see Suleymanov v. Russia (no. 32501/11, §§ 125-29, 22 January 2013) .

(ii) Application of those principles to the present case

(1) The alleged ill-treatment

335 . According to the applicant, Mr Omar Valibagandov was abducted, beaten and shot at by law-enforcement officers. He was then taken, handcuffed and wearing only his underwear, to a hospital under the surveillance of the law-enforcement officers (see paragraphs 82 , 95 and 110 above).

336 . In the present case no assessment of evidence was carried out by the domestic courts. Therefore, it is for the Court to assess the facts of the case as presented by the parties. It notes at the outset, among the pieces of evidence furnished by the parties, the statements given by the ambulance doctor, Ms Sh.G., the surgeon from Izberbash hospital, Dr R., as well as the entries from the registration log of Izberbash hospital (see paragraphs 82 , 95 , 99 and 110 above). Those pieces of evidence consistently confirm the allegation that Mr Valibagandov had been subjected to ill-treatment which had left numerous traces on his body. Furthermore, the wound from the rubber bullet extracted from Mr Valibagandov ’ s thigh at the hospital must have caused him intense physical pain.

337 . The Court reiterates that the assessment of the level of severity of the ill-treatment depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and/or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Tekin v. Turkey , 9 June 1998, § 52, Reports 1998-IV). Keeping in mind these criteria, the Court finds that the ill-treatment to which Mr Valibagandov was subjected between 22 and 23 August 2013 amounted to torture.

338 . Accordingly, there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.

(2) Investigation of the alleged ill-treatment

339 . As to the applicant ’ s complaint about the failure to properly investigate the alleged ill-treatment of Omar Valibagandov , the Court has examined the substance of his complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 318 above).

340 . Therefore, the Court does not deem it necessary to make a separate finding under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the alleged deficiencies of the investigation into the ill-treatment (see Tsakoyevy , cited above, § 135).

341 . The applicants submitted that their relatives had been detained in violation of the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

...

2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

342 . The Government did not submit any comments under this head.

343 . The applicants reiterated their complaints.

344 . The Court notes that the applicants ’ complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that the complaints are not inadmissible on any other grounds and must therefore be declared admissible.

345 . The Court has found on a number of occasions that unacknowledged detention is a complete negation of the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention and discloses a particularly grave violation of its provisions (see Çiçek v. Turkey , no. 25704/94, § 164, 27 February 2001, and Luluyev and Others v. Russia , no. 69480/01, § 122, ECHR 2006-XIII (extracts)). The Court confirms that since it has been established that Mr Akroman Ugurchiyev, Mr Umalat Bersanov, Mr Vakha Zhovbatyrov, Mr Omar Valibagandov and Mr Rustam Aushev were detained by State agents, apparently in the absence of any legal grounds or acknowledgement of such detention, this constitutes a particularly grave violation of the right to liberty and security of persons enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention in respect of them.

346 . The applicants complained that they had been deprived of effective remedies in respect of their complaints under Article 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, they alleged that they had had no effective remedies for their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

347 . The Government did not contest the applicants ’ submissions.

348 . The applicant reiterated the complaint.

349 . The Court notes that the applicants complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

350 . The Court observes that the applicants ’ complaints under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2 of the Convention concern the same issues as those examined above under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. Having regard to its conclusion under Article 2 (see paragraph 319 above), the Court considers it unnecessary to examine those issues separately under Article 13 of the Convention (see Gaysanova v. Russia , no. 62235/09, § 142, 12 May 2016; Fanziyeva v. Russia , no. 41675/08, § 85, 18 June 2015; Perevedentsevy v. Russia , no. 39583/05, § 126, 24 April 2014; and Shumkova v. Russia , no. 9296/06, § 123, 14 February 2012).

351 . The Court considers that the applicants did not have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy for their grievances under Article 3, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention ( Ortsuyeva and Others v. Russia , nos. 3340/08 and 24689/10, § 106, 22 November 2016).

352 . As for the complaint under Article 3 in conjunction with Article 13 lodged by the applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67879/16), having regard to its findings under the procedural aspects of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 318 and 340 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.

353 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

354 . The applicants in all of the cases claimed compensation for loss of financial support by the breadwinners.

355 . The applicants in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 3371/14) and in Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) based their calculations on the UK Ogden Actuary Tables, using domestic subsistence levels and inflation rates.

356 . The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) left the issue to the Court ’ s discretion.

357 . The applicant in Ausheva (no. 56941/17) based her calculations on the amount of an average salary and on life expectancy in Russia.

358 . In the cases of Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 3371/14 ), Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) and Ausheva (no. 56941/17), the Government argued that the applicants ’ calculations were not supported by the relevant documents. Furthermore, the applicants could have applied for State benefits for the loss of a breadwinner but had failed to do so.

359 . In the case of Valibagandov (no. 67897/16) the Government left the issue to the Court ’ s discretion.

360 . The amounts claimed by the applicants under this head are indicated in the appended table.

361 . The Government did not submit any comments on the claims made by the applicants in Ugurchiyev and Others (no. 3371/14), Zhovbatyrov and Dorsigova (no. 6594/15) and Ausheva (no. 56941/17) .

362 . As for the claim made by the applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67897/16), the Government left the issue to the Court ’ s discretion.

363 . All of the applicants claimed compensation for costs and expenses. The amounts are indicated in the appended table. All of them asked for the awards to be transferred into the bank accounts of their representatives. The applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67879/16) requested that the award be converted into pounds sterling (GBP).

364 . The Government submitted that the applicants ’ claims were groundless, and that the legal research and preparation had not been necessary to the extent claimed, as the applications were based on the well ‑ established case-law of the Court.

365 . The Court reiterates that there must be a clear causal connection between the damages claimed by the applicants and the violation of the Convention, and that this may, where appropriate, include compensation for loss of earnings. The Court further finds that loss of earnings applies to close relatives of disappeared persons, including spouses, elderly parents and minor children (see, among other authorities, Imakayeva , cited above, § 213).

366 . Wherever the Court finds a violation of the Convention, it may accept that the applicants have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation, and make a financial award.

367 . As to costs and expenses, the Court has to establish whether they were actually incurred and whether they were necessary and reasonable as to quantum (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom , 27 September 1995, § 220, Series A no. 324).

368 . Having regard to the conclusions and principles set out above and the parties ’ submissions, the Court awards the applicants the amounts set out in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them on those amounts. The awards in respect of costs and expenses in respect of all cases are to be paid into the representatives ’ bank accounts, as indicated by the applicants.

369 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

370 . The applicants in Valibagandov (no. 67897/17) and Ausheva (no. 56941/17) asked the Court to indicate that there was an obligation on the respondent Government to identify and prosecute those responsible for the abduction of their relatives, and that an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage should be coupled with a decision by the Court that a fresh investigation should follow the entry into force of the Court ’ s judgment. The applicants also asked the Court to indicate that, irrespective of the outcome of the investigation, the respondent Government should undertake all possible measures to locate the bodies of their abducted relatives and return them to the family members, and should provide the applicants with access to the entire investigation files. Moreover, in both cases the applicants submitted a list of the investigative measures which should be taken by the authorities.

371 . The Government did not comment on this part of the applicants ’ submission.

372 . Article 46 of the Convention provides as far as relevant:

“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”

373 . Mindful of its findings in Aslakhanova and Others (cited above, §§ 220-38) concerning the systemic problem of ineffective investigations into disappearances in the region at the material time, along with its findings in a number of similar cases in which it decided, with reference to its established principles, that it was most appropriate to leave it to the respondent Government to choose the means to be used in the domestic legal order with a view to discharging their legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Mutsolgova and Others v. Russia , no. 2952/06, § 168, 1 April 2010, and Sultygov and Others , cited above, § 504), the Court does not see any exceptional circumstances which would lead it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement (except the award of costs and expenses to the applicant in Valibagandov (no. 67879/16) ). The awards in respect of costs and expenses are to be paid into the representatives ’ bank accounts as indicated by the applicants ;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 February 2020 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

             Stephen Phillips Alena Poláčková Registrar President

APPENDIX

No.

Application no.

Lodged on

Applicants

Date of Birth

Place of Residence

Nationality

Kinship to the abducted person

Represented by

Pecuniary damage

Non-pecuniary damage

Costs and expenses

1

33731/14

24/04/2014

1. Mr Salman UGURCHIYEV

06/10/1956

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

2. Ms Firdos BOGATYREVA

22/08/1955

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

3. Ms Zalina AZIKOVA

29/10/1984

Nartan

Russian

4. Mr Abdulla UGURCHIYEV

03/07/2009

Nartan

Russian

5. Ms Rabiya UGURCHIYEVA

22/01/2012

Nartan

Russian

6. Mr Bashir BERSANOV

08/08/1942

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

7. Ms Roza ESMURZIYEVA

05/07/1954

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

8. Ms Alla AMIRKHANOVA

21/08/1980

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

9. Mr Umar BERSANOV

14/03/2008

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

10. Mr Salakhaddin BERSANOV

12/01/2010

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

11. Mr Suleyman BERSANOV

26/03/2004

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

Father of Mr Akroman UGURCHIYEV

Mother of Mr Akroman UGURCHIYEV

Wife of Mr Akroman UGURCHIYEV

Son of Mr Akroman UGURCHIYEV

Daughter of Mr Akroman UGURCHIYEV

Father of Mr Umalat BERSANOV

Mother of Mr Umalat BERSANOV

Wife of Mr Umalat BERSANOV

Son of Mr Umalat BERSANOV

Son of Mr Umalat BERSANOV

Son of Mr Umalat BERSANOV

STICHTING RUSSIAN JUSTICE INITIATIVE/

ASTREYA

Sought by the applicants

940,225 Russian roubles ((RUB) 12,570 euros (EUR)) to the first applicant

RUB 995,922 (EUR 13,320) to the second applicant

RUB 1,010,968 (EUR 13,520) each to the third, fourth and fifth applicants

RUB 573,069 (EUR 7,660) to the sixth applicant

RUB 792,019 (EUR 10,590) each to the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants

In the amount to be determined by the Court

EUR 2,352

Awarded by the Court

EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros) to the first applicant

EUR 6,500 (six thousand five hundred euros) to the second applicant

EUR 6,500 (six thousand five hundred euros) each to the third , fourth and fifth applicants

EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros) to the sixth applicant

EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) each to the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants

EUR 80,000 (eighty thousand euros) to the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants jointly,

EUR 80,000 (eighty thousand euros) to the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants jointly

EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros)

2

6594/15

28/01/2015

1. Mr Dzhabrail ZHOVBATYROV

15/05/1963

Dattykh

Russian

2. Ms Dolatkhan DORSIGOVA

27/03/1956

Ordzhonikidzevskaya

Russian

Father of Mr Vakha ZHOVBATYROV

Mother of Mr Vakha ZHOVBATYROV

STICHTING RUSSIAN JUSTICE INITIATIVE/

ASTREYA

Sought by the applicants

RUB 2,261,828 (EUR 30,205) to the first applicant

RUB 2,004,390 (EUR 26,768) to the second applicant

In the amount to be determined by the Court

EUR 4,660

Awarded by the Court

EUR 13,000 (thirteen thousand euros) to the first applicant

EUR 13,000 (thirteen thousand euros) to the second applicant

EUR 80,000 (eighty thousand euros) to the applicants jointly

EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros)

3

67897/16

16/11/2016

Mr Islam VALIBAGANDOV

24/03/1984

Izberbach

Russian

Brother of Mr Omar VALIBAGANDOV

MEMORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE

Sought by the applicants

In the amount to be determined by the Court

In the amount to be determined by the Court

GBP 12,095

RUB 54,719

EUR 24,320

Awarded by the Court

n/a

EUR 80,000 (eighty thousand euros)

EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros)

Converted into the GBP

4

56941/17

22/07/2017

Ms Pyatimat AUSHEVA

31/12/1957

Nazran

Russian

Mother of Mr Rustam AUSHEV

MEMORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE

Sought by the applicants

EUR 16,560

In the amount to be determined by the Court

EUR 3,600

Awarded by the Court

EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros)

EUR 80,000 (eighty thousand euros)

EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros)