FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 35170/05 by J á n HRIVŇÁ K against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 14 December 2010 as a Committee composed of:

Ljiljana Mijović , President, Ledi Bianku , Nebojša Vučinić , judges, and Fatoş Aracı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 September 2005,

Having regard to the comments submitted by the Government of the Slovak Republic (“ the Government”) and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Ján Hrivňák, is a Slovak national who was born in 1954 and lives in Pača. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) we re r epresented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 25 January 1994 the applicant challenged before the Ko šice – okolie District Court the validity of his dismissal from job.

On 28 April 1996 the applicant extended his action in that he (i) claimed lost wages and (ii) also sued a second company.

On 22 June 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant ’ s right to a hearing without unjustified delay. It held that the case was not complex. The subject-matter called for particular diligence. The applicant had not contributed to the length of the proceedings. The District Court had remained entirely inactive between 14 December 1998 and 17 December 2004, that is for six years.

The Constitutional Court ordered the District Court to proceed with the case without further delay. It awarded the applicant 40,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) in just satisfaction. That award corresponded to the sum which the applicant had claimed. Finally, the Constitutional Court ordered the District Court to reimburse the applicant ’ s costs.

In a letter of 23 June 2005 the District Court asked the applicant whether he was still represented by an advocate and whether he maintained his request for the second company to join the proceedings as a defendant.

On 11 April 2006 the District Court informed the applicant that his former employer had ceased to exist in accordance with a judicial decision which had become final on 19 December 2004. The company had been deleted from the companies ’ register on 4 August 2005. It had no legal successor. The applicant was asked whether he still wished to sue the different company.

On 15 May 2006 the District Court discontinued the proceedings to the extent that they concerned the action against the company which had ceased to exist without having a successor.

In a different decision of 15 May 2006 the District Court accepted that the second company sued by the applicant should join the proceedings as a defendant.

On 3 July 2008 the District Court dismissed the action. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the judgment.

B. Relevant d omestic l aw

Section 20 (6) of The Constitutional Court Act 1993 ( Act no . 38 /1993 Coll., as amended) reads:

A petition for institution of the proceedings shall be binding on the Constitutional Court except for the cases expressly stipulated in this Act.

Section 50 (3) reads:

Should a petitioner claim just satisfaction, he or she shall indicate the amount claimed and the reasons for his or her claim.

C. Constitutional Court ’ s practice

The Constitutional Court held in its findings (see III. ÚS 166/02 and IV. ÚS 55/04) that it is bound by the motion to initiate proceedings before it. The statutory requirement of the binding character applies in particular to the summary of the complaint in which a petitioner formulates his or her claim. The Constitutional Court shall decide exclusively on the claim submitted to it.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention tha t the proceedings had lasted too long.

THE LAW

The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time since the amount of just satis faction awarded to him by the Constitutional Court corresponded to what the applicant had claimed. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court was bound by the applicant ’ s claim for just satisfaction and referred to the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law confirming the binding nature of the claims before it. As to the course of the proceedings following the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment, the Government submitte d that the applicant was required to have recourse again to the Constitutional Court under Article 127 of the Constitution.

The applicant disagreed and argued that the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment had not been observed by the District Court.

The Court reiterates that the applicant ’ s status as a victim depends on wh ether the redress afforded to him at the domestic level was adequate and sufficient having regard to Article 41 of the Convention. While there is no requirement under the existing case-law that the domestic authorities should award the same sum by way of compensation as the Court would be likely to award under Article 41 of the Convention, the level of just satisfaction granted at national level must nevertheless not be manifestly inadequate in the particular circumstances of the case (see the principles established under the Court ’ s case-law in Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 65 ‑ 107, ECHR 2006-V or Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-V).

The Court notes that the proceedings at the time of the Constitutional Court ’ s decision had lasted eleven years and four months at one level of jurisdiction. It further notes that the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant ’ s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded the applicant the sum claimed before it. It also ordered the District Court to proceed without undue delay and to reimburse the applicant ’ s legal costs.

Having regard to the fact that the just satisfaction granted to the applicant corresponded to the sum which he had claimed in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and in particular to the binding character of the applicant ’ s claim before the Constitutional Court, the Court finds no reason for disagreeing with the Government ’ s objection that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in respect of the period examined by the Constitutional Court (see Šidlová v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99, § 53, 26 September 2006, with further reference and Beňačková v Slovakia (dec.) no. 57987/00, 4 November 2003).

The Court further reiterates that in certain situations applicants who have already sought redress before the competent domestic authority in respect of their complaint under Article 6 § 1 about excessive length of proceedings may be required to have recourse again to that remedy irrespective of whether or not they have filed an application under Article 34 of the Convention in the meantime. Such is the case, for example, when an applicant considers excessively long the period which had lapsed after the first finding of the competent domestic authority (see, mutatis mutandis , Musci v. Italy [GC], no . 64699/01, § 141, ECHR 2006-V (extracts) and, in particular, when the first decision of the domestic auth ority is consistent with Convention principles (see Becová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 3788/06, 18 September 2007 , with further references ; Lazić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 55507/07, 22 April 2010 ).

Turning to the facts of the present case , in the light of the above, the Cour t considers that the applicant should have again sought redress before the Constitutional Court as regards his allegation that the proceedings had continued to be delayed even after the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment.

It follows that the applicant ’ s complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention as being manifestly ill ‑ founded and for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

FatoÅŸ Aracı Ljiljana Mijović              Deputy Registrar President