FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 12518/05 Tatyana Viktorovna DANILINA against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9 April 2013 as a Committee composed of:

Elisabeth Steiner , President, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska , Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos , judges, and André Wampach , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 20 February 2005,

Having regard to the comments submitted by the Russian Government,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Ms Tatyana Viktorovna Danilina , is a Russian national, who was born in 1967 and lives in Tula .

2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented initially by Mrs V. Milinchuk and subsequently by Mr G. Matyushkin , the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. In December 1996, the applicant, acting on behalf and in the interests of her underage son Mr M., sued a person who had purchased her former husband ’ s flat, in which her son had the right to live. She sought a declaration of nullity of the sale.

5. Between 30 January 1997 and 29 March 2005 at least thirty-nine hearings were fixed and then postponed for various reasons. As the applicant ’ s former husband had died in the meantime, proceedings were also stayed to give heirs time to come forward.

6. On 20 June 2005 the Proletarskiy District Court delivered judgment, by which the applicant ’ s claim was dismissed, but on 15 November 2005 the Tula Regional Court annulled the judgment on appeal and remitted the matter for a new examination.

7. On 19 July 2006 the applicant ’ s son came of age and joined the proceedings in his personal capacity, while the applicant remained his representative under an authority form.

8. On 5 September 2006 the Proletarskiy District Court issued a new judgment, finding for Mr M.

COMPLAINTS

9. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about excessive length of proceedings. Further, she complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that her son was unlawfully deprived of property.

THE LAW

10. The applicant contended that the length of the civil proceedings initiated by her on behalf of her son Mr M. was in violation of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

11. On 26 March 2007 the Court communicates to the respondent Government the complaint relating to the failure of the State to ensure the determination of the civil right within a “reasonable time”.

12. In their submissions the Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded, and, thus, inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 of the Convention. Further they stressed that the length of proceedings complaint concerned the rights of her son and that the applicant acted as his representative. The applicant disagreed with the Government ’ s contention and insisted on her claims.

13. While the Russian Government did not raise any objection as to the Court ’ s competence ratione personae , t he Court must consider this issue ex officio (see Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, § 27, ECHR 2009).

14. The Court reiterates that to be able to lodge a petition by virtue of Article 34 of the Convention, a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals must be able to claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. In order to claim to be a victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure ( see Sejdić and Finci , cited above, § 27 ).

15. However, i t has been the consistent approach of the Court that application of this criterion must not be inflexible and mechanical. In line with this approach it had previously accepted for examination applications lodged on behalf of minors by persons lacking formal power to represent them at the domestic level ( see S.D., D.P., and T v. the United Kingdom , no. 23715/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996, unpublished, Commission report of 11 April 1997, DR 89–A, p. 31 ), applications lodged jointly by spouses in respect of events predominantly concerning one of them (see Houtman and Meeus v. Belgium , no. 22945/07, §§ 27-31, 17 March 2009 ), and applications pursued or lodged by relatives on behalf of deceased persons (see respectively Loyen and Others v. France , no. 55926/00, § 25, 29 April 2003 and Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 112, ECHR 2009 ).

16. In all of the above cases the Court relied on valid and convincing reasons advanced by the persons bringing applications to justify deviation from the general principle.

17. The Court is also mindful that the position of children under Article 34 qualifies for careful consideration, as children must generally rely on other persons to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (see S.D., D.P., and T v. the United Kingdom , cited above).

18. In respect of the present case the Court notes that the proceedings on the domestic level concerned the right of the applicant ’ s son to reside in an apartment sold to a third party. These proceedings were initiated by the applicant acting on behalf and in interests of Mr M., who was a minor at the time. The applicant ’ s power to represent him was based on Article 64 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation permitting parents to act in the interests of underage children without any formal authorisation or transfer of powers.

19. At the same time the application form of 20 February 2005 indicated the applicant as the only applicant in the case and mentioned Mr M. only in respect of the alleged violations in the course of proceedings.

20. After 19 July 2006 when Mr M. came of age the applicant ceased to be his legal representative under the provisions of the Family Code and required a power of attorney to continue representing him in any other proceedings. No such power of attorney was submitted to the Court.

21. Under these circumstances it must be concluded that while it was Mr M., whose rights were directly at stake at the domestic level, the complaint before this Court was lodged in the name of the applicant herself. Nothing in the case materials indicates that the applicant ’ s son was ever willing to endorse the proceedings initiated by his mother before this Court, authorised her to represent his interests, or in fact was aware of the proceedings. While the Court is prepared to accept the applicant ’ s power to act on Mr M. ’ s behalf before 19 July 2006, after that date she had to have a power of attorney issued by him to remain his representative in the case.

22. There is no doubt that the applicant as a mother was justifiably concerned with the proceedings relating to her son ’ s housing rights. However, in the opinion of the Court this concern is not sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the applicant herself was a victim of the alleged violation and that she was directly affected by it (see , mutatis mutandis , Amuur v. France , 25 June 1996, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ III) .

23. Further, the Court observes that no reasons were advanced by the applicant in the present case to justify complaining in her own name about the proceedings concerning her son ’ s housing rights in which she had no stake of her own. Equally no such reasons were advanced for pursuing the application herself in absence of Mr M. ’ s authorisation after he came of age.

24. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the complaints under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning Mr M. ’ s housing rights and brought by the applicant in her own name must be rejected under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention .

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

André Wampach Elisabeth Steiner Deputy Registrar President