THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 4883/08 Oleg Yuryevich GUSKOV against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 27 June 2017 as a Committee composed of:

Luis López Guerra, President, Dmitry Dedov , Jolien Schukking , judges , and Fatoş Aracı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 December 2007,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Oleg Yuryevich Guskov , is a Russian national who was born in 1959 and lives in St Petersburg.

The Russian Government (“the Gove rnment”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin , the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.

The applicant alleged that he had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before the appeal court in the civil proceedings to which he had been a party.

On 18 November 2013 the complaint concerning the alleged unfairness of the civil proceedings to which the applicant was a party was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible, pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In 2007 the applicant sued the Military Service Commission of St Petersburg, seeking the recalculation of his retirement pension.

On 25 October 2007 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed the applicant ’ s claim; the applicant was present during the proceedings. The applicant lodged an appeal.

On 16 November 2007 the applicant received a telegram stating that the appeal hearing would take place on 28 November 2007 at 10 a.m. in courtroom no. 214 of the St Petersburg City Court.

On 28 November 2007 the applicant arrived at the St Petersburg City Court in the morning. As soon as the doors of the court opened he went to courtroom no. 214, where he found a sheet of paper taped to the door informing court visitors of changes in the allocation of courtrooms. The applicant learned that the appeal hearing in his case would be held in courtroom no. 119. He went to courtroom no. 119 and stood in the queue to enter. Then, he decided to re-check the courtroom number and returned to courtroom no. 214. The “no.119” inscription near his name had been struck out and “no. 223” written instead. The applicant hurried to courtroom no. 223, only to learn that his appeal had already been dismissed in his absence.

The St Petersburg City Court dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal claim, stating that he had been duly informed of the hearing and that it had been possible to examine the case in his absence.

B. Relevant domestic law

Domestic provisions governing notification of litigants in civil proceedings are described in Gankin and Others v. Russia , (nos. 2430/06, 1454/08, 11670/10 and 12938/12, §§ 16-17, 31 May 2016).

COMPLAINT

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that his right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached on account of the failure to ensure his participation in the appeal hearing.

THE LAW

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not been able to attend the appeal hearing on 28 November 2007. Article 6 § 1 reads in the relevant part as follows :

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

The Government stated that applicant had been duly informed of the hearing and should have turned with his query about the courtroom to the appeal court ’ s registry, where he could have obtained exact information.

The applicant maintained his complaint.

The Court reiterates that the domestic courts are under an obligation to ascertain, on the basis of available evidence, whether the parties were duly served with the information about the forthcoming hearing, for litigants must be apprised of their respective hearing in such a way as to have an opportunity to attend it, should they decide to exercise the right to personal presence, as established under Russian law. It is on the basis of the domestic courts ’ reasoning that the Court will decide whether litigants were afforded an adequate opportunity to present their case effectively (see Gankin and Others, cited above, §§ 39-40 ). At the same time, unlike in criminal matters, the domestic courts cannot be held accountable for not tracking down absent parties to the civil proceedings (see Saura Bustamante v. Spain ( dec. ), no 43555/98, 29 August 2000, and Sevillano González v. Spain ( dec. ), no 41776/98, 2 February 1999), provided that such parties had knowledge of the civil action brought against them (see Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey , nos. 7942/05 and 24838/05 , § 77, 4 March 2014 ). Moreover, if a litigant has attended the first-instance trial in respect of his particular case, the importance of his attendance at subsequent appeal hearings is not so great (see Sarnatskaya v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 71676/01, 23 May 2006).

Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was duly informed of the time of the hearing and the court in which it would be held . The summons contained sufficient information about the date and hour of the hearing. As to the courtroom, it does not appear that the applicant was prevented from contacting the court registry in order to find out where the hearing would take place, it being incumbent on the interested party to display special diligence in the defence of his interests (see Teuschler v. Germany ( dec. ), no. 47636/99, 4 October 2001; Godlevskiy v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 14888/03, 9 December 2004).

The Court also notes that the applicant was present at the hearing before the first instance court and that he was able to introduce his arguments, submit evidence and challenge the arguments of the defendants. Furthermore, no evidence was produced or examined at the appeal hearing (see Godlevskiy v. Russia ( dec. ), cited above).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 July 2017 .

FatoÅŸ Aracı Luis López Guerra              Deputy Registrar President