THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 35722/04 Nikolay Leonidovich MOISEYEV against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 27 June 2017 as a Committee composed of:

Luis López Guerra, President, Dmitry Dedov , Jolien Schukking , judges, and Fatoş Aracı , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 July 2004,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Nikolay Leonidovich Moiseyev , is a Russian national born in 1958 and living in Оkha , a town in the Sakhalin Region.

The Russian Government ("the Government") were represented initially by Ms V. Milinchuk , the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by her successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

A. Lawsuit about adverse personnel evaluation report

The applicant, now an entrepreneur, used to work as the governor of Remand Centre IZ ‑ 65/2 (“the Centre”) which belonged to the Prison Service of the Sakhalin Region (“the Service”). A month after retiring in November 2002, the applicant received a personnel evaluation report stating that “in his practical activity [he used to] commit infringements of penitentiary regulations, was responsible for incidents of personal indiscipline and elements of rudeness and haughtiness in personal contact with fellow servicemen”.

In May 2003 the applicant sued the Centre asking for a replacement of that evaluation with a laudatory testimonial from his past nomination for a service medal and 10,000 roubles (RUB) (280 euros (EUR)) for distress.

The Centre and the applicant reached a settlement (the Centre would concede the applicant ’ s demands if he withdrew the lawsuit) and applied to the Okha Town Court for a consent order ( утверждение мирового соглашения ) .

On 19 March 2004 the court made the consent order.

On 29 March 2004 the Service filed an appeal from the order.

On 12 May 2004 the applicant received a writ of execution of the consent order. The writ mentioned that on 30 March 2004 the order had come into force.

On 3 August 2004 a bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings.

On 18 October 2004 the bailiff terminated the enforcement proceedings because the Centre had complied with the order.

On 18 January 2005 the Sakhalin Regional Court allowed the Service ’ s appeal against the order. It found that the Service should have participated in the consent hearing as the supervisor of the Centre ’ s top staff, the author of the applicant ’ s evaluation, and a co-defendant. The regional court quashed the consent order and remanded the case to the town court for a new examination.

The applicant twice failed to appear, and on 13 April 2005 the town court discontinued the proceedings.

On the Centre ’ s request, on 3 June 2005 the town court reversed the enforcement ( произвёл поворот исполнения ) of the consent order and ordered the applicant to repay RUB 10,000 to the Centre.

On 20 September 2005 the regional court upheld that decision.

B. Other lawsuits

In 2003–2004 the applicant was involved in other civil proceedings concerning outstanding emoluments.

COMPLAINTS

Referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained, in sum and substance, that a favourable judicial ruling – the consent order – was quashed after it had become final and been executed.

Referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained about the way the authorities had conducted the proceedings concerning the outstanding emoluments.

THE LAW

A. Complaint about legal uncertainty

Referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the applicant complained, in sum and substance, that the favourable judicial ruling – the consent order – was quashed after it had become final and been executed. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As far as relevant, these Articles read:

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The Government argued that the applicant had not spelled out this complaint and that, at any rate, it was manifestly ill-founded.

The applicant maintained his complaint.

The Court reiterates, first, that it has jurisdiction to review, in the light of the entirety of the Convention ’ s requirements, the circumstances complained of by an applicant. In the performance of its task, the Court is free to attribute to the facts of the case, as established on the evidence before it, a characterisation in law different from that given by the applicant or, if need be, to view the facts in a different manner (see Kravchenko v. Russia , no. 34615/02, § 27, 2 April 2009).

The Court sees no need to answer the applicant ’ s further arguments, as the complaint is anyway inadmissible for another reason (see Van der Putten v. the Netherlands ( dec. ), no. 15909/13, § 28, 27 August 2013). Article 35 § 3 of the Convention reads:

“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that ...

...

(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”

The Court reiterates that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should be minimally severe to warrant consideration by an international court. The assessment of this minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, taking account of both the applicant ’ s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake. The applicant ’ s subjective feeling about the impact of the alleged violations has to be justifiable on objective grounds (see Korolev v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 25551/05, 1 July 2010).

The Court notes that the amount that the applicant had to give up as a result of the quashing of the judicial order was moderate – EUR 280 (compare with Burov v. Moldova ( dec. ), no. 38875/03, 14 June 2011; Bazelyuk v. Ukraine ( dec. ), no. 49275/08, 27 March 2012; and Kiousi v. Greece ( dec. ), no. 52036/09, 20 September 2011). The Court is conscious that the impact of a pecuniary loss must not be measured in abstract terms; even modest pecuniary damage may be significant in the light of the person ’ s specific condition and the economic situation of the country or region in which he lives (see Korolev , cited above). But there is nothing in the case file to suggest that the above sum was consequential for the applicant – a decorated high-ranking retiree of the Ministry of Justice currently involved in entrepreneurship. The Court also notes that the second part of the consent order – the amendment of the evaluation report – was not reversed.

As far as individual perceptions encompass not only the monetary aspect of a violation, but also the applicant ’ s general interest in pursuing the case or a fundamental question of principle (see Shefer v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 45175/04, §§ 21 and 23, 13 March 2012), the Court recalls that the applicant ’ s behaviour must be consistent with that importance (see Shefer , cited above, §§ 24–26). The Court hence cannot but note that the applicant failed to appear in the proceedings that followed the quashing which suggests that they were of marginal importance to him.

In addition, the Court notes that respect for human rights is not engaged and that the case has been duly examined by the domestic courts.

Accordingly, this complaint must be declared inadmissible and rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4.

B. Other complaints

Referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained about the way the authorities conducted the proceedings concerning the outstanding emoluments.

However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 July 2017 .

FatoÅŸ Aracı Luis López Guerra              Deputy Registrar President