FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 30472/17 Zatie Yuseinova YUSEINOVA and O thers against Bulgaria

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 4 June 2019 as a Committee composed of:

Ganna Yudkivska, President, Síofra O ’ Leary, Lado Chanturia, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 April 2017,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having regard to the written submissions received from the European Roma Rights Centre, which had been granted leave by the President of Section to intervene as a third party in accordance with Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of Court,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. They were represented before the Court initially by Ms M. Ilieva, who had been working at the time for the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (“the BHC”). After the communication of the application to the Bulgarian Government (“the Government”), Ms Ilieva no longer corresponded with the Court in the context with this application, having left the organisation in the course of the proceedings. Thereafter, the first, second and third applicants issued Ms A. Kachaunova, from the BHC, with an authority to represent them before the Court (see paragraph 16 below).

2. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimitrova, from the Ministry of Justice.

A. The circumstances of the case

1. Background

3. The six applicants are members of six different families, comprising altogether 21 persons, Bulgarian nationals who are of Roma ethnicity. They all live in the same neighbourhood “Hadzhi Dimitar” in the city of Plovdiv, in several solid brick houses, all of which are situated and registered at No. 4 and No. 6, Pavel Bobekov Street. The applicants built their houses unlawfully on municipal land at different times between 1991 and 2005. The houses are connected to water and electricity supplies. All six applicants have their address registration at those houses and four of them have been paying local taxes. The municipal authorities have been knowingly tolerating the applicants living there throughout the years.

4. The houses described above are the applicants ’ only dwelling. Three of the applicants are unemployed, as are most of the members of their families, who include a total of six children, some of them only a few months old at the time of the application. The applicants and their families live under the poverty threshold for the country.

2. Orders for demolition of the houses

5. On 12 February 2015 the municipal authorities informed the applicants that the mayor of the Plovdiv “North” district had issued orders on 30 January 2015 for the demolition of their houses. The indicated grounds for demolition were that the houses had been built unlawfully, in particular, without a permit, in breach of sections 148(1) and 137(3) of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001 (“the Act”), and without a right to build on a third party ’ s estate, in breach of section 182(1) of the Act. Because of the above, they had to be demolished in accordance with section 223(1)(8) of the Act. The mayor ’ s orders gave the applicants thirty days for voluntary compliance, specifying that failure to do so would result in the municipality pursuing demolition of the houses fourteen days after the expiry of the thirty-day period.

6. The applicants did not comply with the mayor ’ s orders.

7. The fourth and fifth applicants did not bring judicial review proceedings in respect of the mayor ’ s demolition orders at all.

3. Judicial challenges to the demolition orders

(a) At first instance

8. The first, second and third applicants, and the husband of the sixth applicant (who died in December 2016), brought judicial review proceedings challenging the demolition orders. These plaintiffs claimed in particular that demolishing the houses would make the members of their families homeless and expose them all to precarious living conditions. The demolition orders were in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, as the authorities had not examined the proportionality of such a measure nor had they provided them with alternative shelter in advance of the demolition.

9. Having declared the challenges admissible and examined them on the merits, the Plovdiv Administrative Court (“the PAC”) rejected them all, respectively on 8 February 2016, 13 May 2016, 26 November 2015 and 12 November 2015. The PAC found in particular that the houses had been built unlawfully and, in view of the explicit complaints of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention, it held that the relevant administrative body (the mayor) had carried out a balancing exercise between the plaintiffs ’ right to home and the provisions of the relevant law.

10. The third applicant and the spouse of the sixth applicant did not appeal against the first instance administrative court decisions in their cases.

(b) At cassation instance

11. Following a cassation appeal by the first applicant, in a final decision of 20 December 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court (“the SAC”) upheld the lower court ’ s findings.

12. In the case of the second applicant, on 14 August 2017 the SAC quashed the PAC ’ s decision and returned the case to it for a new examination. On 4 December 2017 the PAC delivered a new decision upholding the mayor ’ s order finding it had not been in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Following a cassation appeal, the SAC quashed both the lower court ’ s conclusions and the mayor ’ s order for demolition in a final decision of 3 October 2018. The SAC referred explicitly to the Court ’ s judgment in the case of Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria (no. 46577/15, judgment of 21 April 2016), finding that the mayor ’ s order for demolition of the second applicant ’ s house had been in violation of his right to home under Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, the order had not applied the principle of proportionality as derived from the Convention and the applicable domestic legislation.

4. Enforcement attempts

13. In the meantime, the mayor, referring to the demolition orders issued on 30 January 2015, informed all six applicants on 4 April 2017 that their houses would be demolished on 26 April 2017.

14. None of the applicants challenged the enforcement attempts domestically.

5. Requests for interim measures

15. On 24 April 2017 (in respect of all applicants), 12 September 2017 (in respect of the third applicant) and 16 April 2018 (in respect of the first applicant), respectively, the applicants asked the Court to indicate to the Government, as an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that they should not proceed with the demolition. On the basis of information provided, the Court did not grant the first request. In view of exceptional circumstances, the Court granted the second and third requests temporarily. Following the provision of information showing that there was no imminent risk to the life or health of the applicants or their family members living with them, the Court lifted the interim measures granted in connection with the second and third requests, respectively on 29 September 2017 and 20 April 2018.

6. Further developments

16. On 16 April 2018, in the context of the interim measure made on her behalf (see paragraph 15 above), the first applicant submitted an authority form in respect of Ms A. Kachaunova, authorising the lawyer to represent her before the Court. On 3 July 2018 the second and the third applicants transmitted to the Court authority forms signed by them for Ms A. Kachaunova to act on their behalf before the Court.

17. On 18 April 2018 Ms A. Kachaunova informed the Court that the local authorities had met with the first applicant on 17 April 2018 and had handed over to her a typed-up letter, addressed to the Court ’ s Registry, to the effect that all six applicants withdraw their applications before the Court. Allegedly, the mayor had told the first applicant that if she wanted his help with obtaining a municipal dwelling, she had to reach out to all applicants and secure their signatures on that typed-up letter. The first applicant had refused to sign the letter and was extremely worried as a result of the mayor ’ s actions, and feared retribution from him.

18. On 23 April 2018 the first, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants submitted to the Court personally, without the assistance of a representative, a letter stating that they wished to withdraw their application in the present case. The letter contained the same text and formatting (although a different date) as the typed-up letter submitted by Ms A. Kachaunova on 18 April 2018 to the Court (see the paragraph immediately above). The first applicant, Ms Z. Yuseynova, also enclosed a separate declaration, signed by herself, to the effect that she had not been coerced by the authorities into withdrawing her application.

19. On 10 January 2019 Ms A. Kachaunova informed the Court of the developments in the second applicant ’ s situation (see paragraph 12 above) and stated that, in the circumstances, he did not maintain his application before the Court anymore. Ms Kachaunova specified that the third applicant continued to maintain his application before the Court.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

20. The statutory provisions and case-law of the administrative courts concerning orders for demolition of buildings constructed without a permit, as well as legal challenges to such orders and to their enforcement have been set out in paragraphs 25–40 of the Court ’ s judgment in the case of Ivanova and Cherkezov , cited above.

COMPLAINTS

21. The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that, if they were evicted and their homes demolished, there would be a violation of their right to respect for their family life and home, unless the authorities found a permanent adequate alternative solution to accommodate them without delay by keeping the members of each family together. The applicants complained of a separate breach of Article 8 as a result of the deficiencies in the domestic procedure for deciding on eviction and demolition, and enforcing such decisions, which they claimed lacked a proper proportionality analysis.

22. The applicants also alleged that their collective forced eviction and the demolition of their homes would constitute an act of racial discrimination against them, being of Roma ethnic origin, given that other Bulgarian non-Roma families would not be treated similarly. They alleged a related breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.

23. Finally, Ms A. Kachaunova submitted that the authorities pressurised the applicants in April 2018, by promising them that their situation as regards accommodation would be reviewed quicker if they withdrew their applications before the Court. As a result of this pressure the first, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants had withdrawn their application and the situation had resulted in a breach of Article 34 of the Convention.

THE LAW

A. Preliminary issue

24. The Court reiterates that the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court on representation of applicants before the Court read as follows:

Rule 36

“1. Persons, non-governmental organisations or groups of individuals may initially present applications under Article 34 of the Convention themselves or through a representative. ...

4. (a) The representative of the applicant shall be an advocate authorised to practise in any of the Contracting Parties and resident in the territory of one of them, or any other person approved by the President of the Chamber.”

Rule 45 § 3

“1. Any application made under Articles 33 or 34 of the Convention shall be submitted in writing and shall be signed by the applicant or by the applicant ’ s representative. ...

3. Where applicants are represented in accordance with Rule 36, a power of attorney or written authority to act shall be supplied by their representative or representatives.”

25. The Court has earlier held that where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 of the Rules of Court requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727/08, 20 January 2009, and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 102, ECHR 2014).

26. In the present case, as regards the situation of Ms A. Kachaunova, the Court observes that she was authorised to act as a legal representative before it by the first, second and third applicants only (see paragraphs 1 and 16 above). In the absence of any indication whether and, if so, why it would have been impossible for the fourth, fifth and sixth applicants or fo r Ms A. Kachaunova to respect this very simple yet crucial procedural requirement to submit a power of attorney in her regard, the Court concludes that Ms A. Kachaunova is entitled to represent in the present proceedings only the first, second and third applicants, who have provided her with the requisite authority. Consequently, the Court will only examine the complaints made by her in relation to the first, second and third applicants.

B. Complaint under Article 34 of the Convention

27. Ms A. Kachaunova submitted a complaint about undue pressure by the authorities on the first, second and third applicants in connection with their application before the Court. She relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which provides:

“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The applicants

28. Ms A. Kachaunova emphasised that she had alerted the Court in April 2018, a few days before the first applicant informed the Court that she withdraws her application, that the local authorities might use undue pressure vis-à-vis the applicants to convince them to do so. The authorities had in effect put pressure on the applicants thereafter by direct coercion, thus committing a flagrant act of intimidation. Specifically, the mayor had told the first applicant that she needed to ensure the signature to the withdrawal of the application by the rest of the applicants in exchange for faster handling of their requests for municipal housing. He had then announced before the media that the applicants had withdrawn their applications before the Court, following a conversation they had had with the administration. This alone could amount to a violation of Article 34 of the Convention, which provided for the authorities ’ obligation not to hinder the exercise of the right to individual application.

(b) The Government

29. The Government pointed out that the authorities had not pressured the applicants into withdrawing their applications. They had remained free to exercise their will throughout the proceedings. Thus, while the first applicant had opted for withdrawing her application, the second and third applicants had chosen not to do so and have freely communicated with the Court thereafter. It was true that on 17 April 2018 the first applicant, Ms Yuseinova, had visited the municipality and that negotiations had started for postponing the removal of the house and for her applying for municipal housing (as evidenced by a record of the municipality). It was also true that the local authorities had consulted the Government Agents ’ Office on the procedure before the Court and the different options for reaching a friendly settlement. However, the accusations that pressure had been put on Ms Yuseinova, members of her family, or any other of the applicants, were highly speculative and appeared to be a misguided effort to hinder any attempt at a reasonable solution of the situation. They also appeared to be part of the firm position taken by the applicants ’ representatives to avoid any cooperation with the local authorities and to make no effort to consider the options offered by them in order to solve domestically the housing situation of the applicants.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

30. The Court first notes that the complaint under Article 34 was formulated at the time of submitting the applicants ’ observations in reply to those of the Government. The Court reiterates that the obligation in Article 34 not to interfere with an individual ’ s effective exercise of the right to submit and pursue a complaint before it confers upon an applicant a right of a procedural nature distinguishable from the substantive Convention rights. The timing of this complaint does not therefore give rise to any issue of admissibility (see, among other authorities, Al-Moayad v. Germany (dec.), no. 35865/03, § 117, 20 February 2007).

31. The Court then observes that not every enquiry by the authorities about an application pending before the Court can be regarded as “intimidation” (see Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC] , no. 30078/06, § 161, ECHR 2012 (extracts) ). For example, the Court has found that the authorities ’ contacts with an applicant for the purpose of securing a friendly-settlement agreement do not amount to hindrance of the exercise of his right of individual application, provided that steps taken by a State in the context of settlement negotiations with an applicant do not involve any form of pressure, intimidation or coercion (see Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia , no. 41833/04, §§ 168-174, 27 January 2011). In other cases concerning questioning by the local authorities of an applicant about the circumstances underlying his application, the Court was also unable to find, in the absence of evidence of pressure or intimidation, that the applicant was hindered in the exercise of his right of individual application (see Manoussos v. the Czech Republic and Germany (dec.), no. 46468/99, 9 July 2002, and Matyar v. Turkey , no. 23423/94, §§ 158-159, 21 February 2002).

32. The Court finds that the elements submitted in the present case do not allow it to conclude that the authorities have intimidated or harassed the first, second or third applicants in circumstances which were calculated to induce them to withdraw their application or otherwise interfere with the exercise of their right of individual application. The information available to the Court suggests that the contacts which the authorities had with these applicants were carried out for the purpose of exploring possible solutions with a view to finding alternative accommodation for them (see paragraphs 17, 28 and 29 above). The first applicant decided to withdraw her application, while the other two, namely the second and the third, did not on that occasion. Furthermore, despite the passage of time since the withdrawal decision by the first applicant and the potential for new developments to the applicants ’ detriment, had coercion been applied to them with a view to withdrawing their application before the Court, there is no indication of negative consequences having occurred in respect of the first, second or third applicants. None of them have written back to the Court subsequently to convey a change of position, to provide additional or new information, or to complain further in connection with this application (see, similarly, Baduashvili v. Georgia (dec.), no. 18720/08, 6 November 2018).

33. Accordingly, the Court finds that there are no reasons to pursue examination of the complaint about the Government ’ s breach of their obligation under Article 34 not to hinder the right of individual application of the first, second or third applicants.

C. Complaints under Article 8 of the Convention

34. In respect of their complaints concerning the demolition of their home and their eviction, all applicants relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The applicants

35. Ms A. Kachaunova emphasised the third applicant ’ s wish to maintain his application before the Court.

36. In respect of the illegal constructions subject to the demolition orders, the authorities had failed to ensure a coherent political decision for coping with the illegal building. The Roma people have grown to view the part of the city concerned as a place where they could live undisturbed and the local authorities were responsible for this to a large extent. In particular, during the last ten years, there had been no attempt to address the applicants and to find a sustainable solution to the emerging humanitarian crisis. For the above reasons, while the measures towards demolition were lawful, they were not proportionate as they put an excessive burden on the applicants alone, while the authorities were also responsible for the situation.

(b) The Government

37. The Government pointed out in particular that the third applicant had omitted to challenge the mayor ’ s order for demolition before the SAC. The applicant ’ s house was demolished on 12 October 2017. Before the demolition, on 14 July 2017, he and his family had been offered accommodation in municipal housing. They had chosen to live instead together with the applicant ’ s sister-in-law.

38. The Government also emphasised that, although as a rule the administrative courts did not examine the proportionality of demolition orders, domestic practice has developed whereby the courts have started examining the proportionality of orders for eviction of individuals from municipally-owned apartments (see реш. № 956 от 29.01.2016 г. на ВАС по адм.д. № 14093 /2014 г., III отд. ; реш. № 18 от 4.01.2016 г. на ВАС по адм.д. № 15769 /2014 г., III отд. ; реш. № 16122 от 4.12.2013 г. на ВАС по адм. д.№ 11655 /2013 г., III отд. ).

39. Furthermore, the application had to be struck out of the list of cases in respect of the first, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, given that they had informed the Court that they wished to withdraw their application.

40. Alternatively, the application had to be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, some of the applicants (see in the Facts part) have omitted to bring judicial review proceedings to challenge the demolition order or to appeal at second judicial instance, and all applicants have omitted to bring judicial proceedings to challenge the enforcement of those orders.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) The case of the first, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants

41. The fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, together with the first applicant, personally informed the Court on 23 April 2018 that they withdraw their application (see paragraph 18 above). The first applicant in particular also enclosed a declaration signed by her, certifying that she had not been pressured into withdrawing her application. Thereafter, the first applicant ’ s representative, Ms A. Kachaunova, did not oppose or contradict this statement of the first applicant; rather, she insisted that it had been made as a result of undue pressure by the authorities. The Court has already found as regards the first applicant (see paragraph 33 above) that there were no reasons to pursue examination of the complaint about the Government ’ s breach of their obligation under Article 34 not to hinder the right of individual application.

42. Accordingly, in the circumstances, the Court finds that the first, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants do not intend to pursue their application within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court finds no reason within the meaning of the final sentence of Article 37 § 1 which would require it to continue its examination of these applicants ’ complaints. It follows that, in so far as these four applicants are concerned, the application should be struck out of the Court ’ s list of cases as regards these applicants pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention.

43. The Court notes that should the circumstances in the future justify its continued examination of the application in respect of these four applicants, it can restore their application back on the list of cases pending before it, in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention.

(b) The case of the second applicant

44. As regards the second applicant, Ms A. Kachaunova informed the Court (see paragraph 19 above) that he did not intend to pursue his application because of the findings by the SAC in late 2018 in his favour (see paragraph 12 above). The Court finds no reason within the meaning of the final sentence of Article 37 § 1 which would require it to continue with its examination of the case. It follows that, as regards the second applicant, the application should be struck out of the Court ’ s list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention.

(c) The case of the third applicant

45. In respect of the third applicant, who is represented by Ms A. Kachaunova (see paragraph 16 above), the first point to be considered is whether he made his complaints within the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

46. The Court observes that the demolition order amounted to an interference with his rights under Article 8 even before it was enforced (see, similarly, Aydarov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), § 65, no. 33586/15, 2 October 2018). That order was issued on 30 January 2015 (see paragraph 5 above). The judicial challenge which the third applicant brought in respect of the order was dismissed at first instance on 26 November 2015 (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant would have exhausted domestic remedies by pursuing a cassation appeal in respect of the order, which is something he did not do (see paragraph 10 above). If he had considered that such an appeal was doomed to fail, he was expected to have made his application to the Court within six months of the first instance judgment, the obligation to exhaust having been displaced by the absence of an effective domestic remedy (see Aydarov and Others , § 73, cited above). However, he only applied to the Court on 25 April 2017, which is more than six months later.

47. It is true that, in principle, he could have also challenged the execution of the demolition order at a later stage. However, as he did not attempt a claim against the demolition order ’ s enforcement (see paragraph 14 above), there is no reason to take this remedy into account for the purpose of calculating the six-month time-limit (see Aydarov and Others , §§ 70-71, cited above).

48. The third applicant ’ s complaints under Article 8 have therefore been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

D. Complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention

49. In respect of their complaints that the measures against them had been discriminatory, the applicants relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The applicants

50. The applicants originally submitted that they had been victims of discriminatory acts because the authorities had failed to provide them with a long-term sustainable solution to their housing problem. With the exception of the third applicant they later informed the Court that they wished to withdraw the application.

(b) The Government

51. The Government emphasised that no claim about discriminatory treatment had ever been lodged by any of the applicants, or on their behalf, under the Protection Against Discrimination Act 2003 (“the PADA”) and the omission to do so rendered the complaint under Article 14 inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

(c) The third party

52. The European Roma Rights Centre submitted that forced evictions were one of the most visible manifestations of “antigypsyism”, this term being used to describe the specific forms of discrimination which the Roma community faces. There were at least nine cases pending before the Court which concerned forced evictions of Roma in different Council of Europe member States. This was not a coincidence. Rather, the difficult housing situation which many Roma face, compounded with the sub-standard living conditions and poverty typical for the majority of Roma people, made forced evictions an attractive tool for public bodies and officials motivated by antigypsyism. The organisation urged the Court to recognise that, particularly in Bulgaria, forced evictions were linked to political hate speech and racialised politics. Specifically, evictions frequently followed protests against the Roma, which had been prompted at the origin by political agendas of hostile political parties.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

53. For the same reason as indicated in paragraphs 42 and 44 above, the Court finds that it should strike out this complaint, pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention, in respect of all applicants but the third one.

54. As regards the complaint by the third applicant, the Court observes that, as pointed out by the Government, there is in Bulgaria a dedicated mechanism for dealing with such discrimination claims, in the form of proceedings under the PADA. Nothing suggests that this remedy would not have been effective in relation to the applicant ’ s grievance (see Aydarov and Others , cited above, § 83). Yet, the third applicant does not appear to have attempted such proceedings.

55. This complaint must therefore be rejected in respect of the third applicant under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides not to pursue the examination of the complaint raised under Article 34 of the Convention;

Decides to strike the complaints, under Article 8 and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, in respect of the first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants out of its list of cases;

Declares the complaints by the third applicant, under Article 8 and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 27 June 2019 .

Milan Blaško Ganna Yudkivska Deputy Registrar President

Appendix

No.

Firstname LASTNAME

Birth year

Nationality

Place of residence

Representative

Zatie Yuseinova YUSEINOVA

(the first applicant)

1963Bulgarian

Plovdiv

Ms M. Ilieva

(before communication)

Ms A.V. Kachaunova

(after communication)

Georgi Dimitrov ASENOV

(the second applicant)

1967Bulgarian

Plovdiv

Ms M. Ilieva

(before communication)

Ms A.V. Kachaunova

(after communication)

German Dimitrov ASENOV

(the third applicant)

1965Bulgarian

Plovdiv

Ms M. Ilieva

(before communication)

Ms A.V. Kachaunova

(after communication)

Yordan Dimitrov ASENOV

(the fourth applicant)

1977Bulgarian

Plovdiv

Ms M. Ilieva

(before communication of the application)

Emil Aleksiev KOCHEV

(the fifth applicant)

1972Bulgarian

Plovdiv

Ms M. Ilieva

(before communication of the application)

Danka Yordanova KOCHEVA

(the sixth applicant)

1959Bulgarian

Plovdiv

Ms M. Ilieva

(before communication of the application)