FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 17670/18 Gundars DAVIDOVS against Latvia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 12 November 2019 as a Committee composed of:

André Potocki, President, Mārtiņš Mits, Lәtif Hüseynov, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 April 2018,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Mr Gundars Davidovs, is a Latvian national who was born in 1969 and lives in Burtnieki municipality.

2 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

1. The applicant ’ s detention

3 . At the time of the events in question the applicant was held in detention on remand in Valmiera Prison. On 7 January 2016 he was informed that on 14 January 2016 there would be a court hearing concerning his appeal against a decision delivered by an investigating judge.

4 . On 12 January 2016 an investigator requested that the applicant be transferred to a short-term detention cell at Valmiera police station for the period of 13-15 January 2016 for the purposes of investigative activities.

5 . On 13 January 2016 at about 3 p.m. the applicant was brought to Valmiera police station and was placed in a short-term detention cell. Because the applicant was “shocked” by conditions there (a dismantled ventilation system, foul air, lack of oxygen, lack of light, dirty walls and ceilings, an absence of table and bench) he lodged a request to be taken back to the prison. He argued that those conditions would prevent him from preparing for the court hearing the following day. On 21 January 2016 the applicant received a written response stating that the investigator had had a right to request his transfer to a short-term detention cell for the purposes of investigative activities.

6 . On the evening of 13 January 2016, after the applicant complained of suffering from strong headaches, emergency medical assistance was called. The medical documentation concerning that visit states that the applicant ’ s condition was satisfactory, he was fully conscious, and his behaviour was calm. The anamnesis part of the applicant ’ s medical record refers to a concussion that he had suffered three years previously. The applicant was diagnosed with a headache and was given medication against it.

7 . On 14 January 2016 the applicant was taken to the above-mentioned hearing, after which he was returned to the cell. Later that day the investigator wished to question the applicant as a witness in respect of another set of criminal proceedings. The applicant declined to testify or to sign the record of the attempted questioning.

8 . In the afternoon of 15 January 2016 the applicant was brought back to Valmiera Prison.

2. The administrative proceedings

9 . The applicant lodged a complaint about the conditions of his detention with the administrative courts, seeking damages. He alleged, in particular, that: he had had less than 3 sq. m of personal cell space; there had been no ventilation and the cell had had a foul smell; there had been no natural light, as the window had been obscured by frosted glass blocks; the artificial light had been insufficient; the toilet had not been partitioned (and, moreover, it had been a squat toilet); the walls and ceiling had been mouldy and covered with indecent texts and swear words; and over the period of his stay he had been allowed to have only one walk lasting thirty minutes. The applicant also emphasised his vulnerability, as he had been treated in a psychiatric hospital eight times for a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct ( adaptācijas traucējumi ar jauktiem emociju un uzvedības traucējumiem ). He had also suffered from tuberculosis, which had increased the importance of fresh air. Lastly, he argued that his transfer to the short-term detention cell had been unnecessary and had been poorly timed because it had hampered his ability to prepare for the upcoming court hearing.

10 . On 21 December 2016 the Administrative District Court found that the detention conditions had exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. It established that the cell had measured 7.99 sq. m, including sanitary facilities (a squat toilet and a sink) that had, however, been properly separated from the rest of the cell. The applicant had shared the cell with one other inmate. The windows had been filled in with semi ‑ transparent glass cubes. The ventilation system had been undergoing repair. Accordingly, the court concluded that the cell had had neither natural nor artificial ventilation. The only airflow had been provided by two holes leading to the hallway. The squat toilet (as opposed to a proper water closet) had not blocked the smell of sewage from reaching the cell. The lighting had been insufficient and the applicant ’ s personal space had amounted to less than 4 sq. m.

11 . However, with respect to the applicant ’ s claim for damages, the court took into account the fact that there had been no intention to humiliate the applicant or to cause him any suffering, the infringement had lasted for only a short period of time, and the level of suffering could not be characterised as grave. Accordingly, it concluded that an acknowledgement of the violation, coupled with a written apology from the State police, would afford the applicant a sufficient redress. Both parties appealed.

12 . On 25 August 2017 the Administrative Regional Court dismissed the applicant ’ s complaint. Firstly, the appeal court noted that the cell where the applicant had spent about forty-eight hours had had no artificial ventilation, as the ventilation system had been under reconstruction and that, according to the applicant, the 20 cm by 20 cm hole leading to the hallway could not have been regarded as affording natural ventilation. However, the absence of ventilation in itself would not have necessarily constituted a violation of the applicant ’ s rights, as the entirety of the circumstances had to be assessed. While the conditions the applicant had been subjected to could have caused him certain inconvenience, as they had not been comfortable, it could not be said that such conditions amounted to a substantial breach of his rights.

13 . The negative treatment had not been directed specifically at the applicant. The other detainees had also had to suffer the consequences of the reconstruction works, which had been objectively necessary. There was also no evidence of intentional harm, torture, humiliation or intimidation. On the contrary, the State police had reacted to the applicant ’ s requests and had behaved in accordance with the situation. Furthermore, it could not be established that the applicant ’ s placement in the short-term detention cell had caused him any harm, including with respect to his physical or mental health. There were no circumstances to distinguish the present case from other similar situations.

14 . With respect to the applicant ’ s argument that he had previously had health problems and that his being placed in such conditions could have aggravated his situation, the appeal court noted that there was no evidence that at the time the applicant had been placed in the cell he had been suffering from tuberculosis or any psychiatric disorders. There was also no evidence that over the course of his stay he had manifested symptoms of any of those diseases or, more generally, that his placement in the cell could have affected his health. The applicant ’ s state of health had already been assessed when his detention on remand had been ordered. Furthermore, on 13 January 2016, on the basis of a request lodged by the applicant, medical emergency aid had been summoned, but the applicant had not pointed to any concerns with respect to his mental health. The medical staff had not noted any such issues either. They had described him as being fully conscious, the general condition of his health as satisfactory, and his behaviour as calm.

15 . With respect to the applicant ’ s personal space, the appeal court found that the cell (designed for two inmates) had measured 7.99 sq. m, including the sanitary facilities, which could not have exceeded 1.99 sq. m. Accordingly, it could not be established that the minimum standard of 3 sq. m, as established by Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13 , 20 October 2016, had not been complied with. Besides, the applicant had spent only a short period of time (approximately forty-eight hours) in that cell. Overall, the appeal court concluded that the conditions that had been established in the proceedings – the limited ventilation; the squat toilet; the cell measuring 7.99 sq. m for two persons; the dirty walls covered with indecent texts; the soot-covered ( nokvēpinātie ) ceilings; and the lack of natural light – had not reached the minimum level of severity required under Article 3 of the Convention owing to the brevity of the applicant ’ s stay.

16 . On 19 October 2017 the Supreme Court declined to institute cassation proceedings.

COMPLAINT

17 . The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the conditions of his detention in the short-term detention facility where he had been held from 13 until 15 January 2016 had exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. He submitted that there had been neither natural nor artificial airflow, no artificial light and no cell equipment (such as a table and a bench); he furthermore submitted that the personal living space had been below 3 sq. m per person, the squat toilet had emitted a smell of sewage, and the walls and the ceiling had been dirty. His situation had been aggravated by his mental illness and had prevented him from preparing for the court hearing of 14 January 2016.

THE LAW

18 . The applicant complained of the conditions of his detention in Valmiera police station between 13 and 15 January 2016. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

19 . The Court has consistently held that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among many other authorities, Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13 , § 97, 20 October 2016). In the context of deprivation of liberty, to fall under Article 3, the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering and humiliation connected with detention (see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 204, ECHR 2012 ). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant. The length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions has also to be considered (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia , nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 141-42, 10 January 2012 ).

20 . In relation to multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons when cells measure in the range of 3 to 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate, the Court has held that violations of Article 3 would be found if the space factor were to be coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in particular, access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of room temperature, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see Muršić , cited above, § 139). However, the Court has also noted that different questions might arise in the context of spaces designed to be used for very short periods of time, such as police stations (ibid., §§ 50 and 92). In relation to such spaces, aside from the specific deficiencies with respect to the material conditions, violation of Article 3 has also been found on the nature of police stations per se when they have been used to accommodate people for prolonged periods of time (see S.Z. v. Greece , no. 66702/13, § 40, 21 June 2018, and the references cited therein).

21 . With respect to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant was held in the short-term detention facility at the police station ‑ a facility designed to accommodate people for a short time only (contrast MurÅ¡ić , cited above, §§ 13-21). O ver the approximately forty ‑ eight-hour period while the applicant was held there he had a personal space measuring between 3 and 4 sq. m. Over that time period the applicant was allowed one thirty-minute walk. He was also taken out of his cell in order to assist with certain investigative activities and to participate in a court hearing, thereby reducing the time applicant actually spent in this cell.

22 . The domestic courts established that the cell the applicant was held in had had no natural ventilation and that the artificial ventilation system had been under reconstruction. While the Court commends the domestic authorities for taking steps with a view to improving the overall detention conditions, it does also keep in mind that it is incumbent on the States to organise their prison systems in such a way as to ensure respect for the human dignity of detainees, regardless of financial or logistical difficulties (see Mamedova v. Russia , no. 7064/05, § 63, 1 June 2006). In that respect the Court notes that the reconstruction of the ventilation system was carried out over the winter months, there was at least one opening in the wall connecting the cell with the hallway (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above), and the sanitary facilities were properly separated from the rest of the cell. The information in the case file does not allow the Court to conclude that the absence of ventilation excessively aggravated the conditions of the applicant ’ s detention (contrast Peers v. Greece , no. 28524/95, §§ 72-75, ECHR 2001 ‑ III, where the absence of the ventilation was coupled with, among other factors, unbearable heat and non-partitioned toilet).

23 . The Court accepts the applicant ’ s contention that his medical history – particularly the fact that he had in the past suffered from tuberculosis and adjustment disorder – was a factor to be taken into account when assessing his detention conditions. The Court has held that suffering that flows from naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental, may in itself be covered by Article 3 when it is (or risks being) exacerbated by conditions of detention for which the authorities can be held responsible . Detainees with mental disorders are more vulnerable than ordinary detainees, and certain requirements of prison life pose a greater risk that their health will suffer (see Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, §§ 144 ‑ 45, 31 January 2019 ). In that respect the Court takes into account, firstly, the fact that the applicant was examined by emergency medical ‑ assistance doctors, who did not establish any indications of mental health issues or risks to the applicant ’ s health, and, secondly, that the question of the applicant ’ s health was thoroughly analysed by the appeal court. Having assessed the information before it, the appeal court could not establish that the applicant ’ s health had in any manner been affected by his detention at the police station or that any negative medical symptoms had manifested themselves during his stay there (see paragraphs 13 - 14 above). The Court has no grounds to conclude otherwise.

24 . While the Court pays heed to the applicant ’ s complaint that his transfer to the police station had been unnecessary and poorly timed in view of his upcoming court hearing, it cannot conclude that it was arbitrary or contrary to the purpose of his placement in a short-term detention facility (contrast Haghilo v. Cyprus , no. 47920/12, § 168, 26 March 2019, and S.Z. v. Greece , cited above, §§ 40-42, where violations of Article 3 were found partly on the basis of the fact that the applicants had been held for a significant amount of time in police stations designed to accommodate people for a short time only). As to the court hearing, the Court has already acknowledged that such situations are associated with increased mental tension for detainees (see, for example, Moisejevs v. Latvia , no. 64846/01, § 79, 15 June 2006). In the present case, however, the applicant has not provided the Court with any further information allowing it to assess this circumstance in the context of the detention conditions. In particular, the Court has not even been informed of the subject matter of the decision that was being reviewed or of whether the applicant was represented, thereby preventing it from considering such aspects as the stakes involved or the preparation required.

25 . With respect to the other material conditions complained of, the Court takes into account the facts established by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 10 , 12 and 15 above), as some of the applicant ’ s allegations contradict his own earlier assertions, are not compatible with the facts established in the case or were not even raised before the domestic courts. The Court agrees with the domestic courts ’ finding that the conditions in the short-term detention cell would not have been suited for a longer period of stay. However, having regard to the brevity of the applicant ’ s stay in the short-term detention facility at the police station (approximately forty-eight hours, including the periods spent outside of the cell), the Court is of the view that the conditions of the applicant ’ s detention did not reach the threshold of severity required to characterise his treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (compare Vladimir Belyayev v. Russia , no. 9967/06 , §§ 33-36, 17 October 2013 and Kurkowski v. Poland , no. 36228/06 , §§ 66-67, 9 April 2013 ).

26 . It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 5 December 2019 .

Milan Blaško André Potocki Deputy Section Registrar President