FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 18160/12 Dan BURCICÄ‚ against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 12 November 2019 as a Committee composed of:

Faris Vehabović, President, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Carlo Ranzoni, judges, and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 March 2012,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Mr Dan Burcică, is a Romanian national who was born in 1967 and lives in Olteni. He was represented before the Court by Ms M.C. Prună, a lawyer practising in Bucharest.

2 . The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr V. Mocanu, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . The applicant and seven other individuals were the subject of a criminal investigation under suspicion of fraud, money-laundering and influence peddling. On 26 November 2010 he was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention by an interlocutory judgment of the Bucharest County Court (hereinafter “the County Court”).

5 . His detention was subsequently extended on a monthly basis by the County Court until 16 May 2011, when the applicant was indicted. After that date, the measure was extended approximately every two months until his conviction, on 1 June 2012, by the County Court, acting as a court of first instance.

6 . The applicant appealed against all the interlocutory judgments whereby the County Court had extended the measure, save the one rendered by the court on 2 May 2012.

7 . The County Court referred to Article 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP” – concerning the existence of sufficient reasons for ordering detention pending trial) and to Article 148 of the CCP (concerning the conditions to be met and the situations in which the detention of an accused may be ordered – see Bivolaru v. Romania , no. 28796/04, § 69, 28 February 2017) and gave the following reasons for his detention and the subsequent extensions of that detention:

(i) the suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question (the court relied on witness statements given both during the investigation phase and before the court, transcripts of intercepted conversations, photographs, records of search operations, and official documents from the Public Revenue Office and from banks);

(ii) the consequences of the alleged offence: the offences in question had been punishable by a sentence of more than four years ’ imprisonment, and significant material damage had allegedly been caused;

(iii) the danger to public order: general feelings among the general public of indignation, disapproval and social insecurity, as the applicant had been among the most influential members of the group of accused individuals;

(iv) the measure had been necessary for the proper administration of justice (and moreover, from 17 March 2011 the courts had also considered that the period of detention was reasonable, regard being had had to the fact that not all the evidence had been heard by the courts);

(v) the applicant ’ s influence: he had allegedly used his position in society as a religious pastor in order to exercise a negative influence over the other suspects in the commission of the acts under examination and to lead the criminal group;

(vi) the courts deciding on the extension of the measure had also considered that the initial reasons justifying the taking of the measure still existed and that there were no new elements that could allow the courts to conclude that the reasons for his arrest were no longer valid;

(vii) the passage of time had not changed the necessity of the measure, and the overall length of detention pending trial had remained reasonable (starting from September 2011);

(viii) no other less severe measure had been considered suitable.

8 . At each hearing, the applicant and his lawyers had had the opportunity to address the court. On 27 July 2011 the County Court heard the applicant concerning the accusations brought against him. On that occasion, he had partially admitted his guilt. Witnesses heard by the County Court throughout the proceedings had maintained the statements that they had given during the investigation.

COMPLAINT

9 . The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had lasted for an unjustifiably long time and that the domestic courts had not supported it with relevant and sufficient reasons.

THE LAW

10 . The applicant complained of the length of his pre-trial detention and the alleged lack of relevant reasoning for his continuous detention. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

11 . The Government argued that the domestic courts had established the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. The courts had also considered that the applicant ’ s release would constitute a threat to public order and that if left free he might try to influence witnesses. The courts had given relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions, taking into account the applicant ’ s specific situation and basing their findings on a detailed and individualised examination of the case. The courts had not relied on stereotypical reasoning, but a certain repetition in the wording of the respective reasoning for the various extensions of detention had been inevitable, given that they had verified at short and regular intervals the necessity for the measure.

12 . In the Government ’ s view, the length of the detention had been justified by the complexity of the case. They argued that the authorities had not remained passive but had rather undertaken all measures necessary to ensure the swift and proper administration of justice.

13 . The applicant argued that the authorities had failed to give any specific and relevant reasons for his detention. He had not had any possibility to influence witnesses, as the evidence in the file had consisted almost exclusively of documents. Moreover, the applicant contested the assertion that he had constituted a public danger. He also submitted that no new evidence had been brought to justify extending his detention. Overall, he considered that the period of pre-trial detention had not been justified in his case. He argued that, in fact, the practice of extended detention forced the courts to eventually give harsh prison sentences in order to justify the imposition of the preventive measure.

14 . The applicable general principles are set out in Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84-102, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).

15 . At the outset, the Court notes that the period of detention to be taken into consideration in the present case started on 26 November 2010, when the applicant was arrested (see paragraph 4 above), and ended on 1 June 2012, when he was convicted by the Bucharest County Court, acting as a court of first instance (see paragraph 5 in fine above; see also Buzadji , cited above, § 85). This period thus last ed one year, six months and six days.

16 . The Court furthermore notes that when deciding on the applicant ’ s pre - trial detention, the domestic courts relied on the relevant domestic law and applied it to the specific circumstances of the case, indicating which factual elements, in their opinion, justified the measure (see, mutatis mutandis , Stavarache v. Romania (dec.), no. 27090/07, § 28, 11 March 2014, and Ghiur ă u v. Romania (dec.), no. 3620/04, § 23, 6 January 2015). They firstly found that there were reasonable suspicions that the applicant had committed the offences (see paragraph 7 (i) above). The courts furthermore referred expressly to the severity of those offences and to the need to ensure the proper administration of justice (see paragraph 7 (ii) and (iv) above). They also found that the applicant represented a danger to public order in that he had been one of the leaders of the criminal group in question and had exerted his influence over the other participants (see paragraph 7 (iii) and (v) above).

17 . On this point, the Court reiterates that it has found that by reason of their particular gravity and public reaction to them, certain offences may give rise to a social disturbance capable of justifying pre-trial detention – at least for a time. In exceptional circumstances this factor may therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the Convention – in any event in so far as domestic law recognises the notion of disturbance to public order caused by an offence (see Letellier v. France , 26 June 1991, § 51, Series A no. 20). In the present case the Count cannot but note that Article 148 of the CCP, on which the County Court based its decisions, expressly recognises danger to public order as being among the reasons justifying detention pending trial (see paragraph 7 above, and Bivolaru v. Romania , no. 28796/04, § 69, 28 February 2017).

18 . Furthermore, the County Court examined the opportunity to extend the pre-trial detention at regular intervals (see paragraph 5 above) and took into account the evolution in the circumstances of the case (see paragraph 7 (vi) and (vii) above; see also, mutatis mutandis , Stavrache , § 28, and Ghiur ă u , § 23, decisions cited above).

19 . They also considered but rejected the possibility of imposing a less serious measure (see paragraph 7 (viii) above; see also Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03, § 140, 22 May 2012).

20 . Consequently, the Court concludes that the applicant ’ s detention was based on relevant and sufficient grounds.

21 . It remains to be ascertained whether the relevant national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (see S., V. and A. v. Denmark [GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, § 77, 22 October 2018). Regarding this point, it notes that the criminal proceedings were swift and that no periods of inactivity have been reported. The investigation ended less than six months after the applicant ’ s arrest, and the proceedings before the court of first instance lasted a little over twelve months (see paragraph 5 above; see also, mutatis mutandis , Ghiurău , decision cited above, § 24, and Iordache v. Romania (dec.) [Committee], no. 8144/10, § 32, 14 November 2017).

22 . Further to this point, the Court notes that the County Court was mindful of the implications that the length of the pre-trial detention had for the reasonableness of that measure (see paragraph 7 (iv) and (vii) above).

23 . The Court therefore concludes that the length of the applicant ’ s pre ‑ trial detention does not disclose any appearance of violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Stavarache , decision cited above, §§ 25-30, and Iordache , decision cited above, §§ 25-33, where the Court came to similar conclusions in relation to pre-trial detentions having lasted more than two years and two months and one year and si x months, respectively).

24 . Accordingly, the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 5 December 2019 .

Andrea Tamietti Faris Vehabović Deputy Registrar President