SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 63748/17 Jurijus GRIÅ KA and O thers against Lithuania

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 26 November 2019 as a Committee composed of:

Valeriu Griţco, President, Egidijus Kūris, Darian Pavli, judges,

and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 August 2017,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicants, Mr Jurijus Griška (“the first applicant”), Mr Valdemaras Griška (“the second applicant”) and Mr Zenon Baranovskij (“the third applicant”), are Lithuanian nationals who were born in 1970, 1965 and 1955, respectively, and live in Vilnius. They were represented before the Court by Ms E. Davidavičiūtė , a lawyer practising in Vilnius.

2 . The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms L. Urbaitė .

3 . In July 2005 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored the third applicant ’ s father ’ s property rights by awarding him 7.03 hectares of land in the Vilnius Region. In August 2005 he sold 4.28 hectares of that land jointly to the first and second applicants. The sale agreement was certified by a notary.

4 . In 2010 the third applicant ’ s father died and the third applicant became his sole heir.

5 . On 2 April 2013 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim against the applicants and the National Land Service (the institution that took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “ the NL S”), seeking to have the third applicant ’ s father ’ s property rights and the sale agreement between him and the first and second applicants annulled. The prosecutor submitted that 0.08 hectares of the above-mentioned land was covered by a forest which, being situated in a city, was considered to constitute a forest of national importance and could thus only be owned by the State (see Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania , nos. 70520/10 and 2 others , §§ 86 and 88-89, 12 June 2018).

6 . The prosecutor also requested the court to apply an interim measure and to restrict the first and second applicants ’ rights to the above-mentioned 0.08 hectares of their land, in order to prevent them from transferring that land to other persons. On 9 April 2013 the Vilnius District Court allowed that request and ordered the interim measure. The first and second applicants lodged an appeal, but the court found that their appeal did not comply with the relevant formal requirements, and gave the applicants ten days to amend it. The applicants did not do so, and on 11 July 2013 the court ruled that the appeal had not been lodged.

7 . The first and second applicants challenged the prosecutor ’ s claim (see paragraph 5 above), submitting that the property rights in question had been restored to the third applicant ’ s father by the public authorities, in line with the relevant legal instruments, and that there had been no indication that that land had been covered by forest. They therefore argued that they had acquired the land in good faith and in accordance with the law. They also submitted that the part of the plot allegedly covered by forest was very small (0.08 hectares) and insignificant as far as the public interest was concerned, whereas the annulment of their property rights would cause them serious harm and would thus be disproportionate.

8 . The third applicant submitted that he had no interest in the outcome of the proceedings and that he should thus not have the status of a defendant. He submitted that the land had belonged to his father, who had managed it on his own and had used the money received from its sale for his personal needs.

9 . T he NL S challenged the prosecutor ’ s claim, submitting that at the time when the decision to restore the third applicant ’ s father ’ s property rights had been adopted, the relevant public registers had not indicated the presence of forest on that land.

10 . While the above proceedings were ongoing, the first and second applicants lodged a request with administrative courts, asking them to issue them with permission to prepare a land plan for their 4.28-hectare plot. They submitted that the preparation of a land plan had started before the prosecutor had lodged his claim, but that after the issuance of the decision on interim measures (see paragraph 6 above) the planning procedure had been suspended. The applicants submitted that the 0.08 hectares covered by forest had not been demarcated from the rest of their plot, and that without the completion of a land plan they would therefore be unable to fully exercise their property rights to the 4.20 hectares that were not the subject of the prosecutor ’ s claim (see paragraph 5 above).

11 . On 25 June 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court refused the first and second applicants ’ request; following an appeal by the applicants, on 12 August 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld that decision. The courts held that the issuance of permission to prepare a land plan did not fall within their jurisdiction. They also observed that the decision on interim measures (see paragraph 6 above) had restricted the applicants ’ rights to transfer the 0.08 hectares of land but that it had not restricted their ability to carry out planning procedures in respect of the whole of their plot. Lastly, the courts noted that the applicants were essentially disputing the decision on interim measures but that they had neither appealed against that decision nor applied to the courts for the interim measure to be annulled or changed.

12 . On 12 November 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the prosecutor ’ s claim (see paragraph 5 above). The court observed that the Constitution and other legislation stipulated that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (ibid., §§ 86, 88-89 and 101 ‑ 02). It noted that the data in the Register of Forests confirmed the presence of forest on the plot of land given to the third applicant ’ s father at the time when the VCA had issued its decision to restore to him his property rights (see paragraph 3 above). Accordingly, that decision had not been in accordance with the law and it – together with the subsequent sale agreement – had to be annulled. The court annulled the VCA ’ s decision in its entirety; it also annulled the sale agreement in respect of the part concerning the 0.08 hectares that was covered by forest. The first and second applicants were ordered to return those 0.08 hectares to the State. The third applicant was ordered to pay each of the first and second applicants 230 euros (EUR), by way of refunding them the EUR 460 that they had paid to his late father for that part of the land.

13 . The NLS lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. It submitted that there were no grounds to annul the VCA ’ s decision (see paragraph 3 above) in its entirety, but only in respect of the part concerning the 0.08 hectares covered by forest. It also argued that the forest occupied only a small part of the plot and was of minor significance as regards the public interest, and that the court should therefore have assessed the individual circumstances of the case, rather than taking a formalistic approach.

14 . The applicants lodged a request with the Supreme Administrative Court, asking it to dismiss the appeal lodged by the NLS. The first and second applicants submitted that because of the interim measures ordered with respect to the 0.08 hectares (see paragraph 6 above), they had been unable to fully exercise their rights to the entire plot of 4.28 hectares, as the part covered by forest had not been demarcated from the remaining land and could not be so demarcated until the court ’ s decision on the merits became final. They submitted that they intended to sell the plot and that the lengthy court proceedings were causing them financial loss. They therefore wanted the proceedings to end as soon as possible and for that reason had not lodged an appeal. However, in case the court decided to examine the appeal lodged by the NLS, the three applicants stated that they supported the arguments presented therein.

15 . On 28 February 2017 the Supreme Administrative Court partly amended the lower court ’ s decision. It upheld the findings concerning the presence of forest on the plot and reiterated that, under domestic law, urban forests could only be owned by the State. However, it considered that there were no grounds to annul the VCA ’ s decision in its entirety, since by that decision the third applicant ’ s father had been given 7.03 hectares of land, whereas the dispute concerned only 0.08 hectares (see paragraphs 3 and 5 above). The Supreme Administrative Court therefore amended that part of the lower court ’ s decision and annulled the VCA ’ s decision only in respect of the 0.08 hectares covered by forest.

16 . The court further observed that the prosecutor, when lodging his claim with respect to the 0.08 hectares covered by forest, had not presented a land plan in which that part was demarcated from the rest of the first and second applicants ’ plot. In the court ’ s view, such an omission on the prosecutor ’ s part was an obstacle to solving the case and constituted grounds for remitting it for fresh examination. However, taking account of the fact that the proceedings had already lasted for more than three years, the court considered that a fresh examination of the case would breach the parties ’ right to speedy proceedings. It therefore ordered the NLS to prepare, within three months, a land plan demarcating the 0.08 hectares covered by forest from the rest of the first and second applicants ’ plot.

17 . On 27 March 2017 the NLS adopted the aforementioned land plan (see paragraph 16 above).

18 . On 25 January 2019 the NLS informed the third applicant that, after the courts had annulled his father ’ s property rights to 0.08 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It stated that there was no more vacant land in the area where the land formerly owned by his father was located and that the third applicant ’ s property rights could be restored either by (i) assigning a plot of land or forest land equal in value to the land held previously, or (ii) providing monetary compensation (ibid., § 92). The third applicant asked that his property rights be restored by means of awarding him monetary compensation. On 2 April 2019 the third applicant ’ s property rights to 0.08 hectares of land were restored by means of paying him monetary compensation of EUR 93, corresponding to the indexed value of that land.

19 . Article 145 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure lists interim measures that may be ordered by a court. They include:

“...

2) a prohibition on transferring immovable property;

...

6) a prohibition on taking part in certain transactions or undertaking certain actions;

...

12) an obligation to carry out actions that would prevent damage from arising or increasing;

13) any other measures provided for by law or ordered by a court, without which the execution of a court ’ s decision might become difficult or impossible.”

20 . Article 151 § 1 provides that decisions on interim measures may be appealed against before a higher court, save for exceptions explicitly provided in the Code.

21 . At the request of parties to a case, a court may change or annul a previously ordered interim measure (Articles 148 § 1 and 149 § 1).

22 . Article 48 § 1 provides that when a party withdraws from a case by virtue of the death of that party or in other instances provided by law, the court may replace that party with his or her legal successor, except for cases in which material rights cannot be transferred. The transfer of rights is possible at any stage of proceedings.

23 . For relevant domestic law and practice with regard to the restitution of property and the protection of urban forests, see Beinarovič and Others ( cited above , §§ 84-103).

COMPLAINTS

24 . The applicants complained of violations of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The first and second applicants complained of the restriction of their property rights relating to the entire plot of 4.28 hectares. The third applicant complained about the order for him to pay to the first and second applicants the EUR 460 that they had paid to his late father.

THE LAW

25 . The first and second applicants complained that although the forest occupied only a minor part of the plot (0.08 hectares), during the proceedings their rights to the entire plot of 4.28 hectares had been restricted because the forest had not been demarcated from the rest of the plot. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

26 . The Government submitted that the first and second applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies because they had failed to lodge an appeal, in accordance with the requirements laid down in domestic law, against the decision on interim measures (see paragraph 6 above).

27 . The first and second applicants did not comment on the Government ’ s submissions.

28 . The Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies that are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. Article 35 § 1 also requires that complaints intended to be made subsequently in Strasbourg should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law. Where an applicant has failed to comply with these requirements, his or her application should in principle be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 70-72, 25 March 2014, and the cases cited therein).

29 . In the present case, the first and second applicants did not complain about the annulment of their property rights to 0.08 hectares of land as such (compare Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania , nos. 70520/10 and 2 others , § 106, 12 June 2018). Rather, they complained of their inability to exercise their property rights to the 4.20 hectares that had not been the subject of the prosecutor ’ s claim (see paragraph 5 above).

30 . The applicants ’ property rights were restricted by the decision of the Vilnius District Court to order interim measures requested by the prosecutor (see paragraph 6 above). Under the domestic law, they had the right to appeal against that decision, as well as subsequently to lodge requests for the interim measure to be annulled or changed (see paragraphs 19 - 21 above). However, the applicants did not lodge an appeal in compliance with the requirements laid down by domestic law; as a result, the domestic court ruled that the appeal had not been lodged, and it was not examined (see paragraph 6 above). Furthermore, they did not lodge any other requests with courts with regard to the interim measure.

31 . In such circumstances, the Court considers that the first and second applicants did not do everything that could be reasonably expected of them to exhaust domestic remedies. Accordingly, their complaint must be declared inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

32 . The third applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the order for him to pay back to the first and second applicants the EUR 460 that they had paid to his late father had been unlawful and unjustified. He submitted that he had not been a party to the sale agreement and had not received any money from it.

33 . The Government firstly submitted that the third applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies because he had not appealed against the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and had even asked the Supreme Administrative Court to dismiss the appeal lodged by the NLS (see paragraph 14 above).

34 . They also submitted that, in any event, the interference with the third applicant ’ s rights had complied with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It had been in accordance with the law and had pursued a legitimate aim (see Beinarovič and Others , cited above, §§ 133-37). Furthermore, the third applicant ’ s property rights had been restored within approximately two years after the final court decision, and he had been provided with monetary compensation, in accordance with his stated choice (see paragraph 18 above).

35 . The third applicant did not comment on the Government ’ s submissions.

36 . The Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether the third applicant properly exhausted domestic remedies because his complaint is in any event inadmissible.

37 . The third applicant complained that he had not been a party to the sale agreement between his late father and the first and second applicants (see paragraph 3 above) and that he therefore should not have been ordered to pay back to the first and second applicants the money that his father had received from that agreement. In that connection, the Court observes that the domestic law provides that, in the event of the death of a party to a case, a court may, at any stage of proceedings, replace that party with his or her legal successor, except in cases in which material rights cannot be transferred (see paragraph 22 above). In view of the fact that the third applicant was his father ’ s sole heir (see paragraph 4 above), the Court is unable to find that including him in the proceedings in his late father ’ s stead was arbitrary or unjust (see, mutatis mutandis , Petkevičiūtė v. Lithuania [Committee], no. 57676/11, § 46, 27 February 2018).

38 . The Court further observes that after the domestic courts annulled the part of the sale agreement concerning 0.08 hectares, the third applicant became entitled to have his property rights to that amount of land restored. His property rights were restored approximately two years and one month later, by means of the payment of monetary compensation, in accordance with the applicant ’ s stated choice (see paragraph 18 above). The applicant did not allege that, when making that choice, he had not been aware of the amount of the compensation that would be awarded, and he did not lodge with the Court any complaints with regard to its amount or the length of the restitution proceedings (compare and contrast Bykova and Others v. Lithuania [Committee], no. 66042/10, § 42, 18 December 2018, and Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania (just satisfaction), nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, § 14, 25 June 2019) . In the absence of any such complaints, the Court has no grounds to find that the third applicant was not satisfied with the compensation awarded to him at the domestic level.

39 . In view of the above, the Court finds that the complaint lodged by the third applicant is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 19 December 2019 .

Hasan Bakırcı Valeriu Griţco Deputy Registrar President

Appendix

No.

Applicant ’ s Name

Birth date

Nationality

Place of residence

1Jurijus GRIÅ KA

10/03/1970

Lithuanian

Mažoji R i ešė, Vilniaus r.

2Valdemaras GRIÅ KA

28/07/1965

Lithuanian

Vilnius

3Zenon BARANOVSKIJ

01/01/1955

Lithuanian

Vilnius