FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 36077/14 Nino BEVC against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 28 April 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Armen Harutyunyan, President, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Pauliine Koskelo, judges, and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 May 2014,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the notice given to the Slovenian Government of their right to intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court), and the fact that they did not avail themselves of this possibility,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Mr Nino Bevc, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1983. He was represented before the Court by Mr T. Hotko, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.

2 . The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Å . Sta ž nik.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . On 17 May 2012 the State Attorney ’ s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime ( Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta – hereinafter: the “State Attorney ’ s Office”) opened an investigation in respect of several persons in connection with a suspected conspiracy regarding the concluding of usurious contracts.

5 . On 2 June 2015 the investigation was extended to several other individuals, including the applicant. In the order extending the investigation it was alleged, in particular, that during the period between 2007 and the end of 2011 the applicant and the other suspects had organised a system by which they had given some 161 loans to a number of persons “in a difficult financial situation and without the possibility of obtaining money from regular financial institutions” under contracts stipulating highly disproportionate conditions and benefits in their favour. In consequence, they had obtained a pecuniary gain in the amount of at least 15 million Croatian kunas (HRK – approximately 2 million Euros (EUR)). As regards the legal classification of the offence, the State Attorney ’ s Office referred to Articles 233 § 2 (making of usurious contract) and 333 § 1 (conspiracy) of the Criminal Code ( Kazneni zakon , Official Gazette no. 110/1997, with further amendments – hereinafter: the “1997 Criminal Code”). In connection with the investigation, the applicant was arrested and detained.

6 . On 1 January 2013 the new Criminal Code ( Kazneni zakon , Official Gazette no. 125/2011, with further amendments – hereinafter: the “2011 Criminal Code”) came into force. In so far as relevant for the present case, Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code amended the manner of proscribing usurious contracts (see paragraphs 29 and 32 below).

7 . On 22 May 2013 the applicant was released fro m pre-trial detention. However, on the same day, the State Attorney ’ s Office – citing Artic le 98 §§ 1, 2(3)(7) and 5, in conjunction with Article 123 § 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Zakon o kaznenom postupku , Official Gazette no. 152/2008, with further amendments (see paragraph 33 below) – ordered, as preventive measures, that the applicant ’ s passport and identity card be confiscated and that he be required to report regularly to a police officer. The State Attorney ’ s Office found that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence (as classified under Art icles 233 § 2 and 333 § 1 of the 1997 Criminal Code ; see paragraph 5 above) that was the subject of the pending investigation. It was also noted that there was a risk that he might abscond, as he had no permanent residence in or other stable connection with Croatia. Thus, although it was possible to order his pre-trial detention, it was expected that the applicant ’ s presence could be ensured by applying the above-mentioned preventive measures as a less restrictive means. The State Attorney ’ s Office also indicated that under Article 98 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the measures could continue until any judgment delivered in respect of the case became final (see paragraph 34 below).

8 . On 22 July 2013 the State Attorney ’ s Office extended the application of the preventive measures in respect of the applicant, citing the reasoning of its previous decision (see paragraph 7 above).

9 . The applicant challenged the State Attorney ’ s Office ’ s decision on the extension of the preventive measures before an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court ( Županijski sud u Zagrebu – “the County Court”). He argued that it lacked the relevant reasoning required under Article 98 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

10 . In the meantime, the applicant lodged several requests with the State Attorney ’ s Office asking, inter alia , that a number of witnesses – the alleged victims – be questioned during the investigation, in particular in relation to their personal circumstances when taking out the loans in question. The State Attorney ’ s Office refused the applicant ’ s requests on the grounds that the questioning of further witnesses was not needed and that the personal circumstances of the alleged victims were not relevant from the perspective of the offence under Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code, which was more lenient in comparison with Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code. The standpoint of the State Attorney ’ s Office was upheld by the investigating judge of the County Court.

11 . On 20 September 2013 the State Attorney ’ s Office extended the application of the preventive measures in respect of the applicant, citing its previous reasoning (see paragraph 7 above).

12 . On 24 September 2013 the investigating judge dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the State Attorney ’ s decision of 22 July 2013 as unfounded (see paragraphs 8-9 above). She considered that the decision was in compliance with Article 98 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was otherwise justified.

13 . The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court ( Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske ), arguing, in particular, that the above-mentioned crimi nal offence under Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code was no longer punishable under the 2011 Criminal Code and that his travel documents had therefore been unlawfully confiscated.

14 . On 27 September 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the investigating judge against the State Attorney ’ s decision of 20 September 2013 extending the application of the preventive measures (see paragraph 11 above). He argued that his travel documents had been unlawfully confiscation, as the criminal offence under Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code was no longer punishable under the 2011 Criminal Code.

15 . On 20 November 2013 the State Attorney ’ s Office extended the application of the preventive measures against the applicant, citing its previous reasoning (see paragraph 7 above).

16 . On 9 December 2013 the Constitutional Court ruled on the applicant ’ s constitutional complaint against the investigating judge ’ s decision of 24 September 2013, dismissing the applicant ’ s appeal against the order to apply preventive measures (see paragraph 13 above) inadmissible on the grounds that it was not a decision susceptible to a constitutional complaint.

17 . On 14 January 2014, after the completion of the investigation, the State Attorney ’ s Office indicted the applicant and eighteen other individuals in the County Court on charges of conspiracy in concluding usurious contracts. In the indictment it was alleged, in particular, that during the period between the beginning of 2007 and May 2012 the accused had organised a system for giving loans to “interested persons [under contracts stipulating] disproportionate benefits [for themselves] and abusing [those persons ’ ] difficult personal and financial situation” and that they had thereby given loans to at least 600 persons and obtained pecuniary gain in the amount of more than 90 million Croatian kunas (approximately EUR 12 million). As regards the legal classification of the offence, the State Attorney ’ s Office relied on Articles 233 §§ 1 and 2 and 333 § 1 of the 1997 Criminal Code, and requested the County Court that the accused be punished under Article 233 § 1 of the 1997 Criminal Code. The State Attorney ’ s Office also asked the County Court to extend the application of the preventive measures of the confiscation of the applicant ’ s travel documents.

18 . On 24 January 2014, after hearing the applicant and his lawyer, a three-judge panel of the County Court allowed the State Attorney ’ s request and ordered the further application of the preventive measure of the confiscation of the applicant ’ s travel documents. It also ordered, as a further preventive measure, the applicant to report to a judge of that court once per month. The County Court found that the extension of the preventive measures was justified under Article 98 §§ 1, 2(3) and (7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, the court found that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence for which he had been indicted. The court stressed that according to the factual and legal basis of the indictment, the applicant had given loans to other persons by abusing their difficult situation and imposing very strict conditions of repayment, which amounted to the offence of concluding usurious contracts under both Article 233 of the 1997 Criminal Code and Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code. As to the applicant ’ s arguments that that had not been established, the court noted that that was a matter to be examined and determined in the criminal proceedings. The court also found that the application of the preventive measures had been justified, given that the applicant had no stable connection with Croatia and that there was thus a risk that he might abscond.

19 . On 21 March 2014 the investigating judge found that it was no longer appropriate to rule on the applicant ’ s appeal of 27 September 2013 against the State Attorney ’ s decision of 20 September 2013 extending the application of the preventive measures (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above). She noted that the applicant had been indicted and that the extension of the preventive measures was thus now under the jurisdiction of a three judge panel of the County Court, which had in the meantime extended the application of the measures in question.

20 . In the meantime, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court, challenging the County Court ’ s decision of 24 January 2014 (see paragraph 18 above) ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ). On 9 April 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the County Court ’ s decision. It stressed that at that stage of the proceedings it was sufficient to establish the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed, while the actual scope of the alleged criminal responsibility was to be examined and determined in the criminal proceedings. Moreover, the Supreme Court considered that the reasons justifying the application of the preventive measures in question were still valid and that the extension of those measures was justified.

21 . On 10 June 2014, after hearing the applicant and his lawyer, the three-judge panel of the County Court extended the application of the preventive measure of the confiscation of the applicant ’ s travel documents and obliging him to report to a judge of that court once per month. The court reiterated its previous reasoning as regards the justification for the extension of the preventive measures in question (see paragraph 18 above).

22 . Meanwhile, the applicant challenged the validity of the State Attorney ’ s indictment (see paragraph 17 above) before the County Court. He argued, in particular, that as regards the charges against him – in particular Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code – there was no legal continuity between the relevant offences under the 1997 and 2011 Criminal Codes. In that connection, he argued that none of the witnesses – the alleged victims – had given evidence as regards the allegedly difficult respective personal situations that had led them to conclude the loan contracts and that during the investigation the State Attorney ’ s Office had deemed that to be irrelevant for the purposes of the cha rges against him (see paragraph 10 above). The applicant also referred to the legal opinions that he had obtained from two university professors of criminal law, P.N. and L.C, affirming that there was no continuity between Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code and Article 242 § 1 of the 2011 Criminal Code and calling into question the factual findings of the prosecution.

23 . On 12 June 2014 a three-judge panel of the County Court confirmed the indictment and sent the case for trial. It stressed that, contrary to the applicant ’ s assertion, a great number of victims had testified to their difficult personal situation and the circumstances in which they had taken out the loans. Thus, although not all the victims had been questioned, that was sufficient to establish the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence for which he was charged. Moreover, the court pointed out that courts were not bound by a prosecutor ’ s legal classification of the facts of a case and that it was therefore not necessary at that stage of the proceedings to engage further with the applicant ’ s arguments relating to the legal continuity of the relevant offences under the 1997 and 2011 Criminal Codes. Accordingly, the court likewise considered that it did not have to follow the legal opinions submitted by the applicant.

24 . On 23 July 2014, after an appeal by the applicant against the County Court ’ s decision of 10 June 2014 (see paragraph 21 above), the Supreme Court found that the extension of the preventive measures had been lawful and justified. It stressed, in particular, that there were sufficient elements to allow it to conclude that there existed a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question. It also noted that courts were not bound by a prosecutor ’ s classification of the facts of a case. Thus, it did not consider that the legal opinions provided by the applicant were capable of calling into question the lawfulness of the preventive measures against him.

25 . On 3 October 2014 the County Court extended the application of the preventive measure of the confiscation of the applicant ’ s travel documents and the duty to report to a judge of that court once per month, reiterating the reasoning of its previous decisions (see paragraphs 18 and 21 above).

26 . According to the available information, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.

27 . The relevant provisions of the 1997 Criminal Code read as follows:

Usurious contract

Article 233

“(1) Whoever , by taking advantage of the distress, difficult financial conditions, insufficient experience, light-mindedness or diminished capacity to judge of another person, receives from such a person or contracts with such a person pecuniary gain for him- or herself or for another that is obviously disproportionate to the consideration he or she has given, provide or bound him- or herself to give or provide, shall be punished by imprisonment for between one and three years.

(2) The same punishment as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be applicable to anyone who engages in giving loans by contracting thereby exorbitant pecuniary gain.”

28 . Article 333 of the 1997 Criminal Code proscribed conspiracy in committing criminal offences.

29 . The relevant provision of the 2011 Criminal Code provides:

Usurious contract

Article 242

“(1) Whoever , by taking advantage of the distress, insufficient experience, light ‑ mindedness, diminished capacity for judgment or seriously feeble will of another person, receives from such a person or contracts with such a person pecuniary gain for him- or herself or for another that is obviously disproportionate to the consideration that he or she has given, provided or bound him- or herself to give or provide, shall be punished by imprisonment for up to three years.

(2) If the perpetrator is engaged in an activity under paragraph 1 of this Article, he or she shall be punished by imprisonment for between one and eight years.”

30 . Under Article 328 of the 2011 Criminal Code it is an offence to conspire with others to commit criminal offences.

31 . Article 3 of the 2011 Criminal Code prescribes the principle of applying the more lenient law and the temporal application of criminal legislation. According to that principle, t he law applicable at the moment of the commission of the offence must be applied. If the law has changed after the commission of the offence and before the adoption of the final judgment, the law most lenient towards the perpetrator must be applied. However, if the title or description of the offence has changed, the court must examine whether there is legal continuity, so as to consider the facts of the case under the constituent element of a relevant offence under the new law, and if it finds that there is such continuity, it must apply the law that is more lenient towards the perpetrator. The 2011 Criminal Code also makes it clear that there is no criminal offence if there is no legal continuity.

32 . As regards the relationship between Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code and Article 233 of the 1997 Criminal Code, the annotated final draft of the 2011 Criminal Code explained the following:

“In comparison with Article 233 of the 1997 Criminal Code, in paragraph 1 [of Article 242] the words “difficult financial conditions” are left out as they are already implied in the term “distress”, while [the term] “seriously feeble will” was added (drawing inspiration from paragraph 291(1) of the German Criminal Code) [and concerns] situations of psychopathological addictions ...

It is proposed to delete paragraph 2 of Article 233 of the 1997 Criminal Code because the giving of loans by contracting exorbitant pecuniary gain amounts to a usurious contract only if there is abuse of one of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 [of Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code] (see, to that effect, the definition of a usurious contract under section 329 of the Civil Obligations Act). If there is no such abuse, the sanctions of minor-offences law and civil law are sufficient: the unauthorised giving of loans is a minor offence under section 184(4)-(5) of the Banking Act ... and in the event of charging interest [at a level] above the permitted interest rates, the maximum permitted interest rate is applicable (section 26(4) of the Civil Obligations Act). The provision [of Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code] is also inconsistent, since it proscribes only the giving of loans, while usurious contracts may have other procedures, such as the letting of flats or contracts of employment.

By contrast with paragraph 2 [of Article 233 of the 1997 Criminal Code], paragraph 2 [of Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code] specifies an aggravated form of the offence concerning engagement in usurious activities within the meaning of paragraph 1 [of that Article] ..., in which case the criminal activity becomes particularly grave and thus requires a harsher penalty.”

33 . Article 98 of the Criminal Code provides for the possibility of applying one or more preventive measure instead of pre-trial detention, provided that the general conditions for ordering pre-trial detention under Article 123 are met. That includes the existence of a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed and that, inter alia , there is a risk of the applicant absconding. Under Article 98 § 2(3) and (7), preventive measures can involve obliging a defendant to report periodically to a certain person or State body and the temporary confiscation of a passport or other document necessary for crossing the State border.

34 . Before the lodging of an indictment, preventive measures are ordered and extended by the State Attorney ’ s Office and its decisions may be challenged before an investigating judge. After the submission of the indictment in the relevant court, preventive measures are ordered and extended by that court and an appeal may be lodged with a higher court (Article 98 §§ 5 and 7). The application of preventive measures can last until the judgment in question becomes final, but the necessity of their use must be reviewed periodically during the proceedings (Article 98 § 6).

35 . The Code of Criminal Procedure also contains the principle according to which the relevant court is not bound by the legal classification of an offence by the prosecutor (see, in particular, Articles 357 § 2 and 449 § 2).

COMPLAINT

36 . The applicant complained, under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, that he had been unlawfully restricted in his freedom of movement and prevented from leaving the territory of Croatia.

THE LAW

37 . Complaining of unlawful restriction on his freedom of movement, the applicant relied on Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country ...

3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of public order, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

...”

38 . The Government argued that the applicant had abused his right of individual application and that his case should be struck out from the list of cases. In this connection, they pointed out that when submitting his application to the Court the applicant had failed to mention that he had been indicted in the relevant court. However, the indictment made it clear that there was a continuous legal basis in the Criminal Code for the charges against him and that the application and extension of the preventive measures had been lawful. The Government also considered that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies as regards the first application of the preventive measures on 22 May 2013 and their extension on 22 July 2013. In particular, as regards the first application of the preventive measures he had failed to lodge an appeal with the relevant court, and in his appeal against the extension of the preventive measures on 22 July 2013 he had not raised the issue of a lack of legal basis for the charges against him.

39 . As regards the merits of the applicant ’ s complaint, the Government accepted that the confiscation of the applicant ’ s travel documents amounted to a restriction on his freedom of movement and his right to leave the territory of Croatia. With respect to the existence of a legal basis for such a restriction, the Government pointed out that the application and extension of the preventive measures had been based on the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had been applied in relation to the criminal offence of concluding usurious contracts under the Criminal Code. In that connection, the Government stressed that the order for the opening of the investigation in respect of the applicant had indicated that the applicant and other suspects had contracted loans with other persons who had been in a difficult financial situation and without the possibility of obtaining money from regular financial institutions. Thus, although that order had been issued while usurious contracts were still proscribed under the 1997 Criminal Code, it essentially referred to the same offence as that proscribed under Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code, and the investigation had accordingly been conducted in order to elucidate the elements of that offence. Furthermore, the indictment lodged after the completion of the investigation had referred to the accused ’ s abuse of the difficult personal and financial situation of others, which demonstrated that as regards the charges against the applicant there was a continuous legal basis under the 1997 and 2011 Criminal Codes. In that respect, the Government pointed out that what was relevant for that assessment was not the legal classification given by the prosecutor to the charges against the applicant but their factual basis. The Government also disagreed with the analysis undertaken for the applicant by the two law professors, finding it factually inaccurate.

40 . In sum, the Government submitted that the application and extension of the preventive measures in relation to the charges against the applicant had been lawful, that they pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the prevention of crime, and that it was proportionate given the necessity to secure the applicant ’ s presence in the proceedings and the very serious circumstances of the charges against him.

41 . The applicant argued that when submitting his application to the Court he had not enclosed a copy of the indictment because at that moment he had still not received it. In any event, in his view, the factual basis for the indictment was the same as that cited in the order for the opening of the investigation, which he had duly provided to the Court. In that connection, the applicant pointed out that the critical question of the lawfulness of the preventive measures against him depended on the existence of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence. That assessment depended on the factual basis of the charges and not on their legal classification. However, in his view, there had been nothing in the factual basis of the order for the opening of the investigation to suggest that he had committed the offence of concluding a usurious contract, as proscribed under Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Code. Nor had the investigation been conducted in order to elucidate the elements of that offence. In that respect, the applicant pointed to the decisions of the State Attorney ’ s Office, upheld by the investigating judge, holding it irrelevant for some of the victims in relation to be questioned about their personal circumstances at the moment of the conclusion of the respective loan contracts. The applicant also found the Government ’ s arguments as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies irrelevant, stressing that his complaints before the Court concerned only the narrow period of the restriction on his freedom of movement between 22 July and 20 September 2013.

42 . The applicant furthermore contended that at no point during the investigation had the State Attorney ’ s Office class ified the charges under Article 233 § 1 of the 1997 Criminal Code or under Article 242 § 1 of the 2011 Criminal Code. In any event, in his view, there was nothing to suggest that he had abused the difficult personal situation of others or acted in a manner proscribed under those provisions. Thus, for instance, the Swiss authorities had refused to comply with a request for mutual legal assistance sent by the Croatian authorities concerning one of his co-accused.

43 . The applicant also argued that, even assuming that the charges against him had legal continuity in the 2011 Criminal Code, then that Code would be more lenient and would have to be applied and not the 1997 Criminal Code, to which the State Attorney ’ s Office had referred in the indictment. In that connection, the applicant also referred to the legal opinions of the two law professors and to the domestic case-law, which both confirmed that there was no continuity of the offence under Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code. In sum, the applicant argued that the offence he had been charged with was no longer a criminal offence after the coming into force of the 2011 Criminal Code, which had decriminalised it. Thus, the restriction on his freedom of movement by the preventive measure of the confiscation of his travel documents had been unlawful.

44 . The Court finds that it is not necessary to address all the Government ’ s arguments, as the applicant ’ s complaint is inadmissible for the following reasons.

45 . At the outset, the Court notes that the applicant, in his submission in reply to the Government ’ s arguments in the course of the present proceedings, explicitly and unequivocally limited the scope of his complaint only to the restriction on his freedom of movement in the period between 22 July and 20 September 2013 (see paragraph 41 in fine above). The Court therefore finds that the scope of the case before it concerns only the complaint as formulated by the applicant in his submission (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC] , nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12 , §§ 126-133, 20 March 2018). It is with this consideration in mind that the Court will examine the specific circumstances of the present case, taking into account all the relevant facts of the case before it to the extent that they are capable of elucidating the applicant ’ s specific complaint.

46 . T here seems to be no dispute between the parties that the confiscation of the applicant ’ s passport and his identity card by the application of the preventive measures in the criminal proceedings against him amounted to an interference with his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise (see, for instance, Pfeifer v. Bulgaria , no. 24733/04, §§ 51-52, 17 February 2011; Prescher v. Bulgaria , no. 6767/04, §§ 44-45, 7 June 2011; and Miażdżyk v. Poland , no. 23592/07, § 29, 24 January 2012). In order to comply with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, such interference must be “in accordance with the law”, pursue one or more of the legitimate aims contemplated in paragraph 3 of the same Article and be “necessary in a democratic society”.

47 . The Court notes that the central tenet of the applicant ’ s complaint is that the interference in question was unlawful. He argues, in particular, that the offence he was charged with was no longer a criminal offence after the coming into force of the 2011 Criminal Code and that it was therefore not possible to apply the preventive measures restricting his freedom of movement in the criminal proceedings concerning that offence. On the other hand, the Government argue that there was a legal continuity between the relevant offences under the 1997 Criminal Code (which was in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence and the opening of the investigation in the applicant ’ s case) and the 2011 Criminal Code (which was in force at the relevant time when the preventive measures were applied) and that the application of the preventive measures in the criminal proceedings against the applicant was therefore lawful.

48 . For its part, the Court notes that the procedural provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which are not in dispute between the parties, provide for the possibility, as a preventive measure, of confiscating travel documents in so far as, inter alia , there is a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed (see paragraph 33 above). Thus, as argued by the parties, the lawfulness of the application of the preventive measures is closely linked to the existence of an offence under the domestic law at the material time (see, mutatis mutandis , Dzhaksybergenov v. Ukraine , no. 12343/10 , §§ 57-62, 10 February 2011; see also Khachatryan and Others v. Armenia , no. 23978/06 , § 139, 27 November 2012, concerning Article 5 of the Convention).

49 . As regards the requirement of lawfulness under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court refers to its settled case-law, as set out, for instance, in De Tommaso v. Italy ([GC], no. 43395/09, §§ 106-108, 23 February 2017). Moreover, in so far as the expression “in accordance with law” in this context relates to the statutes setting out the definition of an offence, the Court finds it relevant to refer to the general principles of lawfulness under Article 7 of the Convention (see, for instance, Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC] , no. 59552/08, § 50, ECHR 2015; see also Mihalache v. Romania [GC], no. 54012/10, § 112, 8 July 2019, concerning the general concept of lawfulness under the Convention).

50 . In this connection, the Court reiterates that the requalification of the charges in the event of a succession of criminal laws in time does not in itself contravene the Convention. Indeed, the Court is not concerned with the formal classifications or names given to criminal offences under the domestic law. It would suffice to determine that the impugned act constituted, in its substance, a criminal offence under the national law at the relevant time, irrespective of the different names by which that offence was referred to at various times (see Maksimov v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 38228/05, 1 February 2007, and Braco Begović v. Croatia [CTE] (dec.), no. 52204/14, § 52).

51 . In the present case, the Court notes that the investigation against the applicant was opened in connection with a suspicion that he had participated in an organised system by which a number of disadvantageous loans were given to persons who were “in a difficult financial situation and without the possibility of obtaining money from regular financial institutions” (see paragraph 5 above). There is no doubt that such allegations amounted in substance to an offence of making usurio us contracts both under Article 233 of the 1997 Criminal Code and Article 242 of the 2011 Criminal Codes (see paragraphs 27, 29 and 32 above).

52 . The fact that the State Attorney ’ s Office, after initially classifying the conduct in question under (at the time applicable) Article 233 § 2 of the 1997 Criminal Code, failed to amend that classification following the coming into force of the 2011 Criminal Code – and only did so when lodging the indictment in January 2014 (see paragraph 17 above) – does not alter the fact that both Criminal Codes proscribed the conduct in question. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, in so far as the impugned conduct constituted, in substance, a criminal offence under the national law at the relevant time, it is not concerned with the formal classification of or names given to criminal offences under the domestic law (see paragraph 50 above).

53 . Moreover, bearing in mind the above considerations, while it is true that the position of the State Attorney ’ s Office and the investigating judge during the investigation was ambiguous as regards the applicant ’ s request that witnesses be questioned regarding their personal situation when contracting the loans (see paragraph 10 above), the Court notes that such ambiguity cannot in itself lead to the conclusion that the interference was unforeseeable to the extent that it was incompatible with the principle of lawfulness set out in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (compare Gochev v. Bulgaria , no. 34383/03 , § 47, 26 November 2009). In this context, the Court also notes that a three-judge panel of the County Court, when confirming the indictment against the applicant, found that during the investigation a great number of victims had testified as to their difficult personal situation and the circumstances in which they had contracted the loans. It therefore considered that although not all the victims had been questioned, this was sufficient to establish the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the impugned offence (see paragraph 23 above). The Court sees no reason to call those findings into question.

54 . As regards the applicant ’ s other arguments concerning the insufficiency of evidence that he had committed the impugned offence and the appropriate legal classification of the charges against him (including his reliance on the legal opinions of the university professors), the Court would stress that these are matters to be determined in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. The Court also reiterates that it is not its task to substitute itself for the domestic courts as regards the assessment of the facts and their legal classification. More generally, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court ’ s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Rohlena , cited above, § 51).

55 . In sum, in view of the above considerations, the Court is satisfied that in the present case there was a legal basis for the application of the preventive measures against the applicant in the relevant period and that the impugned interference was “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.

56 . Lastly, as regards the legitimate aim and proportionality of the interference, the Court notes that the applicant did not elaborate on and call into question the Government ’ s arguments in this respect. In any event, the Court accepts that the impugned interference pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It also finds that, in view of all the circumstances of the case, it was clearly proportionate in the period complained of by the applicant (see paragraph 45 above).

57 . The Court therefore finds that the applicant ’ s complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 4 June 2020 .

Renata Degener Armen Harutyunyan Deputy Registrar President