FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 21126/13 Mato BUTIJER against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 28 April 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Aleš Pejchal, President, Tim Eicke, Jovan Ilievski, judges, and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 4 March 2013,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Mr Mato Butijer, is a Croatian national who was born in 1927 and lives in Opatija.

2 . The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

(a) Main proceedings

4 . In the judgment of 11 February 1986 the Pula County Court ( Okružni sud u Puli ) found the applicant – who was at the time an investigating judge of the Rijeka County Court – guilty of several criminal offences, including defrauding a certain Mr M. Å . of 30,000 German marks (DEM). He was sentenced to twelve years ’ imprisonment and to a fine of 1 million Yugoslav dinars (YUD). The court also ordered the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, specifically of:

- a gilded watch;

- a fur coat worth 17 million Italian lira (LIT)

- the amount in YUD corresponding to LIT 28.9 million; and

- YUD 956,858.

5 . The court also allowed a civil claim M. Å . had submitted as an injured party (victim) (see Article 108 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted in paragraph 33 below). It ordered the applicant to pay him DEM 30,000 in compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by the criminal offence.

6 . By the judgment of 5 September 1986 the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ) overturned the judgment of the Pula County Court, reducing the applicant ’ s sentence to ten years ’ imprisonment and the fine to 200,000 Yugoslav dinars (YUD). He was also ordered to pay YUD 134,658 for the costs of criminal proceedings.

7 . The Supreme Court also overturned the County Court ’ s decision to allow M.Š. ’ s civil claim for compensation and award him DEM 30,000 in compensation (see paragraph 5 above). Instead, the Supreme Court confiscated that amount as the proceeds of crime and instructed M.Š. to pursue his civil claim by instituting separate civil proceedings (see Article 108 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted in paragraph 33 below). The relevant part of the Supreme Court ’ s judgment reads as follows:

“... [T]he court overturned the decision on the civil claim, [by ordering the] confiscation of the amount of DEM 30,000 ... as proceeds of crime and by instructing M.Š. as the injured party to pursue his civil claim in civil proceedings. The injured party M.Š. had given that amount to the accused for illegal purposes, specifically to secure the lease of socially-owned premises, which is not allowed without a public tender. The first-instance court thus could not have awarded him the said amount. It is, at the same time, evident that in that way the accused ... obtained pecuniary benefit by committing the criminal offence of fraud ...”

8 . Lastly, the Supreme Court also overturned the confiscation order and ordered the confiscation of:

- a gilded watch;

- the amount in YUD corresponding to 45.9 million Italian lire (LIT);

- YUD 906,708; and

- the amount in YUD corresponding to DEM 30,000, which the applicant had obtained by defrauding M. Å .

(b) Enforcement proceedings

9 . On 24 September 1987 the State, represented by the relevant State Attorney ’ s Office, applied to the Opatija Municipal Court ( Op ć inski sud u Opatiji ) for enforcement of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court in its part concerning the fine, the costs and the confiscated proceeds of crime (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). Specifically, the State sought payment of YUD 1,241,366 together with the amounts in YUD corresponding to LIT 45.9 million and DEM 30,000. The total judgment debt was to be reduced by the YUD 2,124,000 which the applicant had paid on 24 July 1987, that is to say before the institution of the enforcement proceedings.

10 . The State submitted that the applicant was co-owner of a house in Opatija and proposed that enforcement be carried out by seizure and sale of that house. However, it turned out that the applicant was not the registered co-owner of the house. Therefore, on 19 March 1990 the enforcement court invited the State to institute separate civil proceedings with a view to establishing his co-ownership of the house. The State did so on 15 May 1990. Those civil proceedings were concluded on 23 May 2011 when the State withdrew its civil action against the applicant.

11 . Meanwhile, on 2 September 1988 the applicant paid a further YUD 2,999,360 of the judgment debt. On 6 March 1989 he asked the enforcement court to discontinue the enforcement because he had paid the judgment debt in full. On 13 July 1989 the State contested that argument claiming that the judgment debt had been settled only in part.

12 . In view of the applicant ’ s payments made before and during the enforcement proceedings (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above), and the difficulties related to a number of devaluations and changes of the domestic currency in the period between January 1990 and May 1994, on 27 July 1995 the enforcement court decided to obtain an opinion from a financial expert with a view to establishing whether the judgment debt had been paid in full, and if not, which part had been settled and how much was still left to pay.

13 . On 7 December 1995 the expert submitted his report. He established that the sums the applicant had paid (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above) had covered the fine, the costs of the criminal proceedings and the confiscated proceeds of crime expressed in YUD (that is to say YUD 906,708) and had exceeded them by YUD 3,139,705.48. That excess amount could have been used to cover either the remaining part of the judgment debt expressed in LIT or the one expressed in DEM. Therefore, the part of the judgment debt which remained due was either:

- LIT 42,760,294.52 (of the original LIT 45.9 million), and

- DEM 30,000

or

- LIT 45.9 million, and

- DEM 25,707.88 (of the initial DEM 30,000).

14 . On 11 December 1995 the enforcement court sent the expert report to the State Attorney ’ s Office and invited it to specify the amount of the judgment debt which the State still sought to enforce.

15 . On 8 April 2011 the State Attorney ’ s Office proposed to change the method and object of enforcement and applied to the enforcement court for a garnishment order in respect of the applicant ’ s pension with a view to collecting the remaining part of the judgment debt (see paragraph 13 above). Specifically, given the introduction of the euro (EUR), the State Attorney ’ s Office sought payment of EUR 36,849.

16 . On 7 June 2011 the enforcement court discontinued the enforcement proceedings because the enforcement by seizure and sale of the house indicated by the State was impracticable given that it had not been established that the applicant was its co-owner (see paragraph 10 above).

17 . On 13 June 2011 the enforcement court allowed the State ’ s motion of 8 April 2011 (see paragraph 15 above) and issued a writ execution ordering garnishment of the applicant ’ s pension. On 24 June 2011 the applicant lodged an objection ( prigovor ) against the writ.

18 . On 12 March 2012 the enforcement court allowed the applicant ’ s objection, set aside its writ of execution of 13 June 2011 (see paragraph 17 above) and discontinued the enforcement. The court held that the enforcement legislation applicable in the applicant ’ s case had not allowed for the change of the method or the object of enforcement. The State motion of 8 April 2011 (see paragraph 15 above) could thus only be seen as a new application for enforcement. However, by that time the enforcement had become time-barred because the statutory ten-year limitation period to enforce the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 5 September 1986 (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above) had elapsed.

(a) Main proceedings

19 . Meanwhile, on 2 October 1987 M. Å . brought a civil action against the applicant in the Opatija Municipal Court. As a victim of the criminal offence committed by the applicant, M. Å . sought payment of DEM 30,000 in compensation for the damage sustained.

20 . During the proceedings the applicant argued that he had already paid the same debt on the basis of the confiscation order and that the only possibility under the relevant domestic law for M.Š. to pursue his civil claim was to seek payment of that amount from the State (see Article 86 § 2 of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia, quoted in paragraph 32 below). However, since M.Š. had failed to do so, the applicant invited the Municipal Court to dismiss his civil action.

21 . After several remittals, in a judgment of 29 October 2003 the Opatija Municipal Court ruled in favour of M.Š. and ordered the applicant to pay him EUR 15,338.75 (corresponding to DEM 30,000) in relation to the fraud committed by the applicant (see paragraph 4 above). That judgment was upheld in the judgment of the Rijeka County Court ( Ž upanijski sud u Rijeci ) of 6 September 2007. Those courts eventually held that:

- the applicant owed M.Å . EUR 15,338.75 in pecuniary compensation for the damage caused by the criminal offence;

- confiscation of the proceeds of crime could not exclude the right of the victim to obtain compensation for the damage caused by the criminal offence;

- under domestic law the decision of a criminal court instructing the victim (injured party) to pursue his or her civil claim in civil proceedings (see Article 108 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted in paragraph 33 below) did not acquire the force of res judicata and the reasons given by a criminal court for such a decision were not binding on the civil courts;

- contrary to the Supreme Court ’ s reasoning (see paragraph 7 above), M.Š. had not given the applicant DEM 30,000 for illegal purposes because obtaining a lease without a public tender had actually been allowed in the given circumstances under the local regulations in force at the time;

- by bringing his civil action M.Å . had not sought to satisfy his claim from the confiscated proceeds of crime but from the applicant as the perpetrator.

22 . The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court, reiterating his arguments before the lower courts (see paragraph 20 above).

23 . On 19 January 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law.

24 . The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that he had been ordered to pay the same debt twice (see paragraphs 20-21 above).

25 . On 17 January 2013 the Constitutional Court ( Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske ) dismissed the applicant ’ s constitutional complaint as ill-founded. It served its decision on the applicant on 30 January 2013.

(b) Enforcement proceedings

26 . Meanwhile, on 11 March 2011 M. Å . applied to the Opatija Municipal Court for enforcement of the above civil judgment of 29 October 2003 (see paragraph 21 above). He sought seizure and garnishment of the funds in the applicant ’ s bank accounts as well as seizure and garnishment of the applicant ’ s pension.

27 . On 21 July 2011 the enforcement court issued a writ of execution to that effect.

28 . On 7 February 2014 the Croatian Pension Fund informed the enforcement court that the applicant had stopped receiving his pension as of 1 May 2012 because he had started working as an advocate. It also informed the enforcement court that before that date it had withheld 15,432.45 Croatian kunas (HRK – approximately EUR 2,050) of his pension, which it was ready to transfer to M. Å . ’ s bank account as soon as the writ of execution became final.

29 . In a decision of 9 April 2014 the Rijeka County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the writ of execution (see paragraph 27 above), which thereby became final. Consequently, on 28 August 2014 the Croatian Pension Fund transferred HRK 15,432.45 [1] (see paragraph 28 above) to M. Å . ’ s bank account.

30 . On 30 January 2015 the enforcement court discontinued the enforcement in so far as it concerned the seizure and garnishment of the funds on the applicant ’ s bank accounts owing to a lack of funds in that account. The applicant appealed, arguing that the enforcement should have been discontinued also to the extent that it concerned the seizure and garnishment of his pension.

31 . In a decision of 7 July 2015 the Rijeka County Court allowed the applicant ’ s appeal and discontinued the enforcement also to the extent that it concerned the seizure and garnishment of his pension. The enforcement proceedings were thus discontinued in full. The decision became final on the same day.

(a) Criminal Code

32 . The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ( Krivični zakon Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 44/76 with further amendments), which was in force in the territory of Croatia until 31 December 1997, read as follows:

Chapter 7

CONFISCATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME

Grounds for confiscation of the proceeds of crime

Article 84

“(1) No one shall be allowed to keep pecuniary benefit obtained through a criminal offence [that is to say the proceeds of crime].

(2) The proceeds referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Code, be confiscated in a judicial decision finding that a criminal offence was committed.”

Methods of confiscation

Article 85(1)

“Cash, valuables and other proceeds of crime shall be confiscated from the perpetrator. If the confiscation is impracticable the perpetrator shall be ordered to pay the sum corresponding to the obtained pecuniary benefit.”

Protection of the injured party

Article 86

“(1) If the injured party ’ s civil claim was allowed in the criminal proceedings, the court shall order the confiscation of the proceeds of crime if they exceed the claim awarded to the injured party.

(2) The injured party who was instructed in the criminal proceedings to pursue his or her civil claim in civil proceedings may seek to settle his claim from the confiscated proceeds of crime if he or she institutes the civil proceedings within six months of the date on which the decision instructing him or her to institute [such] proceedings became final ...”

(b) Code of Criminal Procedure

33 . The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Zakon o krivičnom postupku , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 44/77 with further amendments), which was in force in the territory of Croatia until 31 December 1997, read as follows:

Chapter X

CIVIL CLAIMS

Article 103

“(1) A civil claim arising out of the commission of a criminal offence shall be examined ... in the criminal proceeding, if this would not significantly delay the proceedings.

(2) The civil claim may concern compensation for damage, repossession or invalidation of a certain legal transaction.”

Article 108 §§ 2 and 3

“(2) In a judgment finding the accused guilty, the court may allow the civil claim in favour of the injured party in full or it may allow [it] in part and for the remaining part refer [the injured party] to [pursue it in] civil proceedings. If the facts established in the criminal proceedings do not provide sufficient basis for either full or partial adjudication, the court shall instruct the injured party to fully pursue his or her claim in civil proceedings.

(3) When the court renders a judgment acquitting the accused or dismissing the charge or a decision discontinuing the criminal proceedings, it shall instruct the injured party to pursue his or her civil claim in civil proceedings ...”

(c) Relevant practice

34 . In its judgment no. I Kž 511/02-6 of 19 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Croatia held the following:

“... [C]onfiscation of the proceeds of crime ... has subsidiary character in relation to an awarded civil claim when they substantially overlap, as it is the case here. Otherwise, the accused, who was ordered to settle the civil claim ... and from whom the proceeds of crime were at the same time confiscated ... would be placed in the position of having to fulfil twice the obligation arising from the same cause.”

35 . The Obligations Act ( Zakon o obveznim odnosima , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 29/78 with further amendments, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 53/91 with further amendments), which was in force between and 1 October 1978 and 31 December 2005, was the legislation that governed contracts and torts and other non-contractual obligations.

36 . Sections 154-55 governing tort liability are quoted in Stojanović v. Croatia (no. 23160/09 , § 28, 19 September 2013).

37 . The relevant provisions of the Obligations Act governing unjust enrichment read as follows:

ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE

General rule

Section 210(1)

(1) When part of the property of one person passes, by any means, into the property of another, and that transfer has no basis in a legal transaction or in legislation [that is to say it is without cause], the person who received it [the beneficiary] shall return it. If restitution is not possible, he or she shall provide compensation [in the amount] corresponding to the value of the benefit obtained.

Paying a debt twice

Section 212

“Whoever has paid the same debt twice has the right, under the general rules on enrichment without cause, to seek repayment even if [the debt was] once [paid] on the basis of an enforcement title.”

COMPLAINTS

38 . The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, that he had been forced to pay the same debt twice: first to the State, and then to the victim (see paragraph 8 and 21 above).

39 . The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of the excessive length and the unfavourable outcome of the above civil proceedings (see paragraphs 19-25 above).

THE LAW

40 . The applicant complained that, as a result of the domestic courts ’ decisions in the above civil proceedings (see paragraphs 19-25 above), he had been forced to pay the same debt of DEM 30,000 twice: firstly to the State as the proceeds of crime (see paragraph 8 above), and then to the victim as compensation for the damage caused by the criminal offence (see paragraph 21 above). He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto.

41 . The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy , 19 February 1998, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ I, and Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 124, 20 March 2018), considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention only. That Article reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

42 . The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint on two grounds. They argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, and that the complaint was, in any event, manifestly ill-founded.

43 . The Court does not find it necessary to examine both inadmissibility objections raised by the Government or to reproduce all the parties ’ arguments related thereto, as the present complaint in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

(a) The Government

44 . The Government pointed out that a large share of the part of the criminal judgment of 5 September 1986 (see paragraph 8 above), which had concerned confiscation of the proceeds of crime in foreign currency (LIT 45.9 million and DEM 30,000), had remained unenforced, as established by the financial expert in the subsequent enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 13 above). Specifically, the share of that part of the judgment that had remained unenforced had equalled EUR 36,849 (see paragraphs 14-18 above). The State could no longer retrieve that sum because enforcement had become time-barred (see paragraph 18 above). The said confiscation order (see paragraph 8 above), in so far as it had concerned the disputed DEM 30,000, had thus not had any legal or practical effect on the applicant.

45 . Against that background, the fact that the civil courts had ordered the applicant to pay EUR 15,338.75 (see paragraph 21 above) – that is to say the same DEM 30,000 – to M.Š. as the injured party, had not meant that he had paid the same debt twice and, consequently, could not be seen as imposing an excessive individual burden on him.

46 . The Government thus invited the Court to find that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded.

(b) The applicant

47 . The applicant argued that under domestic criminal law (see paragraphs 32-34 above) the same sum of money or an item of property could not be both confiscated as proceeds of crime and awarded to the injured party (victim) with a view to satisfying his or her civil claim. In order to protect the interests of victims of criminal offences, civil claims by the injured party had precedence over confiscation. Thus a criminal court normally first allowed the injured party ’ s civil claim and then confiscated only the remaining unlawfully obtained pecuniary benefit as proceeds of crime. The factual findings in the criminal proceedings were frequently not sufficient to decide whether or not the civil claim was well-founded. In such situations criminal courts confiscated the proceeds of crime and at the same time instructed the injured party to pursue his or her claim by instituting civil proceedings (see Article 108 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted in paragraph 33 above). However, in such cases the injured party could only satisfy his or her civil claim from the proceeds of crime and thus had had to institute civil proceedings against the State (see Article 86 § 2 of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia, quoted in paragraph 32 above), and not against the perpetrator.

48 . Furthermore, for the applicant, it was important to understand that under the domestic law the courts in criminal proceedings could not dismiss the claim by the injured party. They could either allow the claim or instruct the injured party to pursue it by instituting separate civil proceedings. A decision by a criminal court instructing the injured party to pursue his or her claim by instituting separate civil proceedings could therefore mean that (a) the claim was ill-founded and should be dismissed, or (b) that the factual findings in the criminal proceedings were not sufficient to decide whether or not the civil claim was well-founded (see Article 108 § 2 and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quoted in paragraph 33 above).

49 . The applicant submitted that these rules provided in domestic law (see paragraphs 32-34 and 47-48 above) were important for understanding what had happened in his case.

50 . Turning to the circumstances of his case, the applicant first pointed out that the Supreme Court in its judgment of 5 September 1986 had overturned the judgment of the Pula County Court in the part whereby the county court had allowed M.Å . ’ s civil claim (see paragraphs 5-7 above). The reasons given by the Supreme Court suggested that it had overturned the County Court ’ s judgment because M.Å . ’ s civil claim had been ill-founded. Specifically, the Supreme Court had reasoned that M.Å . ’ s civil claim could not have been allowed because he had given the applicant DEM 30,000 for illegal purposes (see paragraph 7 above). Therefore, the Supreme Court had instead confiscated that amount as the proceeds of crime (see paragraphs 7 ‑ 8 above). However, since the Supreme Court had not been entitled in the criminal proceedings to dismiss M.Å . ’ s claim, as explained above (see paragraph 47), it had instructed him to pursue his civil claim in civil proceedings (see paragraph 7 above).

51 . In view of the above (see paragraphs 47-50), the applicant argued that the domestic courts ’ judgments (see paragraph 21 above) adopted in the civil proceedings complained of, ordering him to pay M.Š. EUR 15,338.75 (corresponding to DEM 30,000) in compensation for the damage caused by the criminal offence the applicant had committed had been contrary to the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 5 September 1986 (see paragraph 6-8 above) and thus in breach of the principle of res judicata . The civil courts had effectively ordered the applicant to compensate M.Š. for the sum M.Š. had given the applicant for illegal purposes.

52 . The applicant further submitted that, even leaving aside the reasons given by the Supreme Court for overturning the decision on M.Š. ’ s civil claim (see paragraph 7 above), the consequence of that court ’ s decision to confiscate the amount in question had been that under domestic law M.Š. could only institute civil proceedings against the State as in such cases he could only satisfy his civil claim from the confiscated proceeds of crime (see paragraph 47 above with further references). Yet, the domestic courts had in the civil proceedings complained of allowed M.Š. ’ s claim against him (see paragraph 21 above), instead of dismissing it for the lack of standing to be sued.

53 . Lastly, the applicant reiterated his main argument that he had been ordered to pay the same debt twice (see paragraphs 38 and 40 above), which had been contrary to domestic law (see paragraphs 47-52 above) and had imposed on him an excessive individual burden.

(a) Whether there was an interference

54 . It was not disputed between the parties that the civil courts ’ judgments ordering the applicant to pay M.Š. EUR 15,338.75 (see paragraph 21 above) constituted an interference with his right of property, and that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was therefore applicable. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.

(b) Lawfulness and legitimate aim

55 . As to the lawfulness of the interference, the Court notes that it had a legal basis in domestic law as it was based on the relevant provisions of criminal and civil law applicable at the time (see paragraphs 32-36 above). The Court also considers that the legislation in question met the qualitative requirements of accessibility and foreseeability. It is therefore satisfied that the interference with the applicant ’ s property rights was provided for by law, as required by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

56 . As regards the applicant ’ s arguments that the civil courts ’ judgments in his case were not in accordance with the relevant domestic law (see paragraphs 47-52 above), the Court reiterates that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention “incorporates” the rules of that law, since the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection. This is particularly true when, as in this instance, the case turns upon difficult questions of interpretation of domestic law. Unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court ’ s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see, for example, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC] , nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12 , § 149, 20 March 2018). In the Court ’ s view, the interpretation given by the civil courts in the present case cannot be considered arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.

57 . Furthermore, the Court finds that the interference pursued a legitimate aim in the public or general interest, namely, the protection of the right of victims of criminal offences to obtain compensation for the damage sustained.

58 . Accordingly, the remaining question for the Court to determine is whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed by the authorities to achieve that aim and the protection of the applicant ’ s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.

(c) Proportionality

59 . The Court reiterates that the applicant ’ s main argument was that he had been ordered to pay the same debt of DEM 30,000 twice, first to the State on the basis of the criminal judgment ordering confiscation of that sum as proceeds of crime, and then on the basis of the civil judgment as compensation awarded to the injured party for the damage caused by the criminal offence (see paragraphs 38-40 above). Even assuming that such a situation may be seen as imposing an excessive individual burden and thus raising an issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court considers that no issue would arise under that Article if either the confiscation order or the compensation award had actually not been enforced and could no longer be enforced.

60 . In this connection the Court notes that in the enforcement proceedings instituted with a view to enforcing the criminal judgment (see paragraphs 9-18 above) a dispute arose between the State and the applicant whether the debt arising from the confiscation order had been settled in full or only in part. In particular, the applicant argued that he had paid the debt in full whereas the State argued that EUR 36,849, that is to say a large share of the part of the debt expressed in foreign currency (LIT 45.9 million and said DEM 30,000), remained unpaid (see paragraphs 11-15 above). That dispute was never resolved because those enforcement proceedings were eventually discontinued on different grounds (see paragraphs 16 and 18 above). The domestic courts however did establish that the confiscation order could no longer be enforced because the enforcement had become time-barred (see paragraph 18 above).

61 . The Court notes that in those proceedings the financial expert established that the part of the debt expressed in foreign currency (LIT 45.9 million and DEM 30,000) was not paid in full, and that on 13 June 2011 the enforcement court issued a writ of execution ordering garnishment of the applicant ’ s pension to the tune of EUR 36,849 with a view to settling the unpaid share of that part of the debt (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). It is true that the same enforcement court, following the applicant ’ s objection, later set that writ aside (see paragraphs 17-18 above). However, that court did so because it had established that the enforcement had become time ‑ barred and not because it accepted the applicant ’ s argument that the debt had been settled in full (see paragraphs 11 and 18 above).

62 . The Court also notes that the proceedings for enforcement of the civil judgment were likewise discontinued and that the compensation award had not been paid in full either (see paragraphs 21, 29 and 31 above).

63 . In these circumstances the Court considers that, given the evidence at its disposal, the applicant did not demonstrate that he had actually paid the debt equalling DEM 30,000 twice. It thus cannot be said that he was forced to bear an excessive individual burden.

64 . It follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

65 . The applicant also complained that: (a) the length of the above civil proceedings (see paragraphs 19-25 above) had exceeded a reasonable time; and (b) that those proceedings had been unfair because the domestic courts had misapplied the relevant domestic law. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

66 . As regards the applicant ’ s complaint about the length of the proceedings, the Court first notes that the applicant limited his complaint to the length of the main proceedings (see paragraphs 19-25 above) thus excluding the subsequent enforcement proceedings (see paragraphs 26-31 above). It further reiterates that in the period between 15 March 2002 and 28 December 2005 parties to ongoing judicial proceedings in Croatia could have complained of their length by lodging a constitutional complaint, and in the period between 29 December 2005 and 13 March 2013 by lodging a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Court further reiterates that it had recognised both of those remedies as effecti ve for the purposes of Articles 13 and 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Slaviček v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002 ‑ VII, and Pavi ć v. Croatia , no. 21846/08, § 36, 28 January 2010). However, in the present case the applicant did not resort to any of those remedies while the case was pending before the ordinary courts. Moreover, his case was pending before the Constitutional Court for some two years (see paragraphs 23-25 above), which cannot be considered excessive. It follows that the applicant ’ s length ‑ of-proceedings complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 1 and 3 (a) of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and as manifestly ill-founded, and that it must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

67 . As regards the applicant ’ s remaining complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court notes that he complains of the domestic courts ’ interpretation of the law and challenges the outcome of the proceedings which, unless it was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court is unable to examine under that Article (see, among many other authorities, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08 , § 61, ECHR 2015 ). The applicant did not complain, and there is no evidence to suggest, that the domestic courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. In the light of all the material in its possession, the Court considers that the applicant was able to make submissions before the courts, which offered the guarantees set forth in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and which answered those submissions in decisions that do not appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. It follows that this complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 4 June 2020 .

Renata Degener Aleš Pejchal Deputy Registrar President

[1] Approximately, 2,020 euros at the time.