SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 45255/09 Süleyman AKKUŞ against Turkey

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 16 June 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Valeriu Griţco , President, Arnfinn Bårdsen , Peeter Roosma , judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Sec tion Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 August 2009,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Süleyman Akkuş , is a Turkish national, who was born in 1974 and lives in Iğdır . He was represented before the Court by Mr İ . Akkuş , a lawyer practising in Istanbul.

The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

The applicant ’ s complaint about his inability to examine the victims in person before the trial court was communicated to the Government under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was tried and convicted of establishing an illegal criminal enterprise, loan-sharking ( tefecilik ) and issuing threats, and was sentenced to seventeen years and six months ’ imprisonment. On 16 February 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court ’ s judgment.

On 19 August 2009 the Court received a letter dated 11 August 2009, consisting of a one-page long document from the applicant ’ s lawyer wherein he had informed the Court that the applicant had been apprised of the Court of Cassation ’ s judgment at some time during February 2009, and that he would wish to lodge an application with the Court concerning violations of Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention. As for the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, the letter contained the following phrase “Article 6 of the Convention was violated in the trial concerning the applicant” without any further explanation in that regard. The lawyer also alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention without giving any further details and a violation of Article 5 of the Convention, submitting that the applicant ’ s detention had exceeded the reasonable time requirement. The lawyer had stated that all the relevant documents would be sent in due time.

On 30 July 2009 the Court received a letter dated 24 July 2009 from the applicant wherein he merely stated that he had not been tried fairly.

On 6 October 2009 the applicant sent another letter, which was received by the Court on 12 October 2009, alleging violations of Articles 6 and 14 of the Conven tion, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 thereto. However, the applicant did not explain, save for the complaint under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, how those rights were violated.

On 23 February 2010 the applicant sent another letter, which was received by the Court on 4 March 2010, explaining certain factual inconsistencies, issues relating to the recording of his telephone conversations within the context of the criminal proceedings.

On 11 March 2010 the applicant submitted the full application form wherein he complained, inter alia , of his inability to examine the victims in person before the trial court.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that he had not had a fair trial owing to his inability to examine the victims in person before the trial court.

THE LAW

The Government raised a preliminary objection based on non-compliance with the six-month rule, arguing that the applicant had only raised his complaint relating to the alleged inability to examine the victims in person in his petition dated 11 March 2010, whereas the application was lodged with the Court on 11 August 2009. Moreover, that the six-month time-limit started running from 4 May 2009 – the date on which the Court of Cassation ’ s judgment dated 16 February 2009 was deposited with the registry of the trial court – was another indication that the complaint had been submitted late. In any event, no mention was made of the impugned complaint in the letter dated 11 August 2009 as the applicant ’ s lawyer merely invoked Article 6 of the Convention. In the Government ’ s view, that was not sufficient to raise all subsequent complaints made under that provision. Therefore, the applicant ’ s complaint that he was unable to examine the victims before the trial court was presented for the first time in his petition dated 11 March 2010, that is, more than six-months later.

The applicant submitted that he had adhered to all the time-limits given by the Court and there was no reason to reiterate all his complaints, which he had already raised before the domestic courts.

The Court reiterates that according to its practice at the time the present application was lodged, the running of the six-month period was, as a general rule, interrupted by the first letter from an applicant denoting an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the complaints made (see Allan v. the United Kingdom , (( dec. ) no. 48539/99, § 2, 28 August 2001). As regards complaints not included in the initial communication, the running of the six-month time-limit is not interrupted until the date when the complaint is first submitted to the Court Božinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ( dec. ), no. 68368/01 , 1 February 2005). Lastly, the mere fact that an applicant or his lawyer invokes Article 6 is not sufficient to raise all subsequent complaints made under that provision (see Zervakis v. Greece ( dec. ), no. 64321/01 , 17 October 2002, and Allan , cited above)

Turning back to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes at the outset that the applicant ’ s lawyer at the time submitted an introductory letter dated 11 August 2009 wherein he alleged violations of Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention. However, no details were given for the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, other than a general statement that the applicant ’ s rights under that provision had been breached during the criminal proceedings against him. Similarly, the applicant ’ s letters dated 24 July 2009 and 6 October 2009 only contained a vague statement that his rights under Article 6 of the Convention had been breached. Neither did any of the above-mentioned letters include, not even summarily, any complaint regarding the applicant ’ s inability to examine the victims before the trial court.

In the Court ’ s view, the fact that both the applicant and his lawyer at the time mentioned in passing, in the above-mentioned letters, that Article 6 was violated during the trial is not sufficient to interrupt the running of the six-month period for the complaint about the inability to examine the victims before the trial court. In fact, mention was made of it for the first time in the applicant ’ s forty-one-page long hand written petition dated 11 March 2010. Thus, the running of the six-month period for the impugned complaint was not interrupted until 11 March 2010.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the applicant ’ s complaint concerning his inability to examine the victims before the trial court was not sufficient to interrupt the running of the six-month period, hence the present application was introduced outside the six-month time limit and is therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 9 July 2020 .

Hasan Bakırcı Valeriu Griţco Deputy Registrar President