THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 41849/10 Irek Minzakiyevich MURTAZIN against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 23 June 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Alena Poláčková , President, Dmitry Dedov , Gilberto Felici , judges, and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 September 2010,

Having regard to the decision to give notice of the application to the Russian Government (“the Government”),

Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Irek Minzakiyevich Murtazin , is a Russian national, who was born in 1964 and lives in Moscow. He was represented before the Court by Ms N. Yermolayeva , Mr F. Tishayev , Ms T. Chernikova and Ms A. Razhikova , lawyers with the Memorial Human Rights Centre in Moscow, and Mr P. Leach, Mr B. Bowring and Ms J. Evans, lawyers with the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre in London.

The Government were represented by Mr M. Galperin , the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In 2007, the applicant published a book “ Mintimer Shaimiev : the Last President of Tatarstan ” which presented his critical view of the regional authorities, wide-spread corruption, and disconnect between the power and the population. In September 2008 he announced the death of President of Tatarstan which subsequently turned out to be a false rumour.

The applicant was charged with a violation of the President ’ s personality rights and publication of extremist material. On 24 November 2009 the Kirovskiy District Court found him guilty and sentenced him to one year and nine months ’ imprisonment.

On 15 January 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan upheld the conviction on appeal.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of unfairness of criminal proceedings and under Article 10 of the Convention of an unjustified restriction on his right to freedom of expression.

THE LAW

The Government submitted that the application was inadmissible because the application form had been submitted more than six months after the Supreme Court ’ s appellate judgment.

The applicant replied that he had complied with the six-month time-limit. He had sent a first letter setting out the subject matter of present case on 15 July 2010 and subsequently lodged the duly completed application form on 20 September 2010, within a time-limit laid down by the Court.

The Court notes that on 15 July 2010 the applicant ’ s representatives sent a fax to the Registry, indicating his intention to lodge an application alleging violations of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention. By a letter of 26 July 2010 the Registry acknowledged receipt of the letter of introduction and requested the applicant ’ s representatives to send back the completed application form no later than 20 September 2010. They were advised that failure to comply with that requirement would mean that the date of the submission of the completed application form rather than that of the first communication would be taken as the date of the introduction of the application. Together with the letter of 26 July 2010 the Registry sent an application package to the applicant, including Notes for Guidance, which indicated, in particular, that “applications to the Court [might] be made only by post” (point 14).

On 20 September 2010 the applicant ’ s representatives sent a fax to the Registry, consisting of a cover letter and a completed application form. They informed the Registry that they would send a “hard copy of the application form”, annexes and supporting documents by post. On 24 September 2010 they sent a fax which included a cover letter and a power of attorney authorising the representatives to act on the applicant ’ s behalf. On 7 October 2010 the Registry received by post an envelope containing the completed application form. The envelope was postmarked 24 September 2010.

The Court reiterates that, in accordance with its practice and Rule 47 § 5 of the Rules of Court, as it was formulated at the material time, it considered the date of the introduction of an application to be the date of the first communication indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the complaints. Such first communication – which could take the form of a letter sent by fax – was sufficient to interrupt the running of the six ‑ month period (see Kemevuako v. the Netherlands ( dec. ), no. 65938/09, § 19, 1 June 2010).

A failure to send back a completed application form within the time-limit fixed by the Registry could lead the Court to decide that the interruption of the six-month period was to be invalidated and that it was the date of the submission of the completed application which was to be considered as the date of its introduction (ibid., § 20).

The Court further emphasised that in principle it was to be provided with the original of the application form, and also of the authority form if the applicant was represented in the Strasbourg proceedings. Transmissions by fax of these documents were, without the originals of these documents being provided to the Court, insufficient to constitute a complete or valid application ( ibid., § 22).

The fact, therefore, that the completed application form in the present case was transmitted to the Registry by fax on 20 September 2010 is immaterial as long as the original form had not also been sent back within the eight-week period which ended on that date. Although the cover letter accompanying the application form, as well as that form itself, were indeed dated 20 September 2010, the envelope containing the original completed application form, as well as the signed authority form, were postmarked 24 September 2010.

The Court held that if a communication was postmarked more than one day after the date featuring on the letter or application form, it was the date of the postmark − rather than the date on the letter − that was to be considered as the date of dispatch (ibid., § 24).

Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the date on which the envelope containing the original application form was postmarked, 24 September 2010, should be taken to be the date of introduction of the present application (see also Rule 47 § 6 (a) of the Rules of Court in the current version). The six-month period having started to run on 15 January 2010, the application is out of t ime for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 16 July 2020 .

Olga Chernishova Alena Poláčková Deputy Registrar President