FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 47846/16 Sławomir DŁUGOSZ against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 23 March 2021 as a Committee composed of:

Erik Wennerström , President, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Ioannis Ktistakis, judges, and Atilla Teplan , Acting Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 August 2016,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the comments submitted by Res Publica,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Mr SÅ‚awomir DÅ‚ugosz , is a Polish national, who was born in 1974 and lives in Espergaerde , Denmark. He was represented before the Court by Ms M. GÄ…siorowska , a lawyer practising in Warszawa.

2 . The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska and subsequently by Mr J. Sobczak , of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . On 25 June 2015 the applicant had an accident on a motorway when he lost control of his motorcycle and fell onto the road. The police and an ambulance came and the applicant explained the accident to them. According to the police, at first the applicant advanced a version of events involving the participation of another vehicle in the accident. The police officers examined the motorcycle and the traces on the tarmac and found no such indication. The applicant then admitted that whilst driving on the right lane, on cruise control, he had lost his balance because of a blast of air when another car had overtaken him on the left lane.

5 . The applicant was taken to a hospital. According to the medical report, he was admitted with an injury to his vertebrae due to the accident. It was established that the applicant never lost consciousness during or after the accident. The medical report indicated that the applicant had “expressed himself in a logical manner” and had had “good orientation of his surroundings and time”. The applicant received painkillers including morphine.

6 . On 25 June 2015 at around 4 p.m., when the applicant was in hospital, two police officers arrived. They carried out a test to determine whether the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol. The test proved negative and the applicant signed the relevant report. The police officers again asked the applicant about the accident and handed him a fine for the sum of 100 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 25 euros (EUR)) for having driven at a speed preventing full control of his motorcycle (traffic offence under Article 97 of the Code of Misdemeanours, Kodeks wykroczeń ). The applicant accepted the fine and signed the form. The applicant also signed a third form confirming that the police had taken the vehicle registration document into the police deposit.

7 . On 2 July 2015 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, lodged a request to quash the fine ( wniosek o uchylenie mandatu ) with the Nowy Tomyśl District Court. He stated that he had not been correctly informed of his rights – in particular that he had had the right to refuse to pay the fine – and that he had not been in a fit state to make his own decisions correctly and in an unconstrained manner. The applicant requested hearing witnesses: a doctor who treated him at the hospital, his girlfriend whom he had called immediately after the accident, and Z.S., who had given him first aid. He argued that the accident had been caused by an unspecified car that had “brushed him” when it had been overtaking his motorcycle too closely and had made him lose his balance.

8 . On 9 February 2016 the Nowy Tomyśl District Court refused the request. The court underlined that the fine had been final ( mandat prawomocny ) since the applicant had accepted it. The domestic law provided for the quashing of the final fine only in specific circumstances when the action had not constituted an office, if it had been issued to a minor, or if the person had acted in a situation of legitimate self-defence or otherwise could not be held accountable for the action. The court had considered that the applicant’s behaviour on the motorway had constituted an offence, thus there had been no ground for quashing the fine.

9 . In particular the court established that, when the applicant had accepted the fine at the hospital, he had been in a state which allowed him to take conscious and independent decisions. Moreover, he had explained the events to the police officers immediately after the accident, before being taken to the hospital and receiving painkillers. That account was consistent with other elements collected by the police (the state of the motorcycle and the traces on the road). The police officers testified that they had interviewed the applicant in the hospital with the agreement of the medical staff and that the applicant had been conscious and had had no difficulty to express himself in a logical manner. They had advised the applicant about the legal consequences of accepting the fine. While the police officers were in his room the applicant had been involved in a telephone conversation with his brother giving detailed and clear explanations of his situation and instructions concerning picking up the motorcycle from the police car park. The court examined the medical documents, police notes made after the accident, and transcripts of the telephone conversations between the traffic police and their superiors. As regards the witness testimonies, it heard the applicant and the police officers and decided not to hear the applicant’s girlfriend and another person as neither had witnessed the accident.

10 . On 10 July 2015 the applicant notified the Nowy Tomyśl District Prosecutor that his accident had been caused by an unidentified car that had pushed him onto the hard shoulder. The prosecutor finally discontinued the investigation finding no evidence that an offence had been committed. On 6 April 2016 the Nowy Tomyśl District Court upheld the challenged decision. The court established that the applicant had provided two versions of the events: one to the police officers, whom he had told that he had lost his balance because of the blast of air caused by the car which overtook him, and the other to his girlfriend involving the direct participation of another vehicle in the accident. The court also noted that the police officers did not find any evidence on the site or on the motorcycle to prove that another vehicle had been involved; in particular the tyre marks left on the road by the motorcycle had excluded a violent manoeuvre by the driver. In conclusion, the court decided that the version put forward by the police officers was more plausible in the light of the evidence collected.

11 . The applicant wrote a complaint about the manner in which the police officers handled the event. The Nowy Tomyśl District Police Office informed the applicant that after having investigated his complaints they had been considered manifestly ill-founded and unsubstantiated.

Article 97 of the Code of Misdemeanours provides that a driver who breaches provisions of the Road Traffic Act or other regulations shall be liable for a fine of up to 3,000 Polish zlotys or a reprimand.

Article 97 provides, as far as relevant:

“[...] § 2. A person who commits a misdemeanour may refuse to accept the fine ( mandat karny ).

§ 3. The officer who imposes a fine is obliged to determine its amount, the misdemeanour committed, and to inform the offender about the right to refuse to accept the fine and about the legal consequences of such refusal.”

Article 99 provides, as far as relevant:

“In the event of refusal to accept the fine [...] the authority whose officer has imposed it lodges with a court a request for punishment. In this request it should be noted that the accused ( obwiniony ) refused to accept the fine [...] and, if possible, reasons should also be given for refusal.”

Article 101 provides, as far as relevant:

“[...] § 2 . The court competent to examine the request for annulment of the fine is the one in whose area the fine was imposed. The court shall examine the case at a hearing. The punished person and the authority which imposed a fine [...] have the right to participate in the hearing. Before issuing its decision the court may order appropriate actions to examine the grounds for annulment of the fine.”

COMPLAINT

12 . The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention of the unfairness of the proceedings in which he had accepted a traffic fine from the police.

THE LAW

13 . The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that his rights to a fair hearing had been breached in that he had accepted a traffic fine from the police whilst in hospital under the influence of painkillers. In its relevant parts, this provision reads as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

14 . The third-party intervener, Res Publica , elaborated on the concept of vulnerability and underlined its position that every suspect should be informed comprehensively of his rights.

15 . The Government submitted, amongst other things, that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage and argued that his application should be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:

(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”

16 . The applicant, represented by a lawyer, did not make any argument pertaining to the preliminary objections raised by the Government.

17 . The Court notes that the main element contained in the admissibility criterion relied on by the Government is the question of whether the applicant suffered a “significant disadvantage”. Inspired by the general principle of de minimis non curat praetor , this admissibility criterion hinges on the idea that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court (see Ladygin v. Russia dec. , no. 35365/05, 30 August 2011). The assessment of this minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case (see Gagliano Giorgi v. Italy , no. 23563/07, § 55, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). The severity of a violation should be assessed taking into account both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular case (see Korolev v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 25551/05, ECHR 2010; Finger v. Bulgaria , no. 37346/05, § 70, 10 May 2011; and Eon v. France , no. 26118/10, § 34, 14 March 2013). However, the applicant’s subjective perception alone cannot suffice to conclude that he/she has suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds (see Ladygin , decision cited above). A violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage without affecting pecuniary interest (see Korolev , decision cited above).

18 . In the present case the applicant was fined EUR 25 by the police for driving at a speed preventing full control of his motorcycle (see paragraph 6 above). No deduction of points from his driving licence had been imposed. He accepted the fine, thereby waiving the possibility of having his case heard by a criminal court. The applicant must have been aware of the consequences of accepting the fine and signing it. Moreover, in the subsequent proceedings (in which the applicant attempted to quash the final fine) or in the criminal proceedings against a third party (which he had sought to institute), the applicant did not substantiate his allegation that his state of health in the hospital had precluded him from taking a decision on accepting the fine (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). The Court further underlines that the applicant was not deprived of his liberty when he accepted the fine from the police. He was not in police custody but in a hospital and able to carry out telephone conversations with his brother and girlfriend.

19 . With regard to the first element contained in Article 35 § 3 (b), the Court can accept that the fine imposed on the applicant was of subjective importance to him. However, it notes that there is no indication that the amount of the fine represented a financial hardship for him, or that the subject matter of the complaint gives rise to an important matter of principle.

20 . Consequently, the Court cannot discern objective grounds for holding that the applicant suffered important adverse consequences as a result of the fine he accepted (see Rinck v. France ( dec. ), no. 18774/09, 19 October 2010, and Sylka v. Poland ( dec ), § 34, no. 19219/07, 26 June 2014).

21 . In the light of the above, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the case the applicant did not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result of the alleged violation of the Convention (see Ţiglar v. Romania ( dec. ), no. 47600/10, §§ 17-27, 28 November 2017).

22 . With regard to the second element contained in Article 35 § 3 (b) the Court notes that it is obliged to examine the case in any event if respect for human rights so requires. This would apply where a case raises questions of a general character affecting the observance of the Convention, for instance whether there is a need to clarify the State’s obligation under the Convention or to induce the respondent State to resolve a structural deficiency (see Korolev , decision cited above).

23 . Considering the present case in this way and taking into account the numerous cases in which it has already examined the compatibility with Article 6 of the Convention on various issues concerning traffic fines and of the fairness of the said proceedings (see, as regards applicability of Article 6, Siwak v. Poland , ( dec. ), no. 51018/99, 1 July 2004, and Lutz v. Germany , 25 August 1987, § 57, Series A no. 123 and, amongst many other authorities, Marčan v. Croatia , no. 40820/12, 10 July 2014; Anghel v. Romania, no. 28183/03, 4 October 2007; Ioan Pop v. Romania ( dec. ), no. 40301/04, 28 June 2011; Stevens v. Belgium ( dec. ), no. 56936/00, 9 December 2004; and Bosoni v. France ( dec. ), no. 34595/97, 7 September 1999), the Court does not discern any compelling reason to warrant its examination on the merits. Thus, the Court finds that respect for human rights does not require an examination of this case.

24 . With regard to the third element contained in Article 35 § 3 (b): the Court notes that it does not allow the rejection of an application under this admissibility criterion if the case has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. The purpose of that rule is to ensure that every case receives a judicial examination, either at the national or at the European level, so as to avoid a denial of justice. The clause is also consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, as reflected in particular in Article 13 of the Convention, which requires that an effective remedy against violations be available at the national level (see Korolev , decision cited above).

25 . The Court notes that the issue whether the applicant’s behaviour on the road on 25 June 2015 constituted an offence had not been examined by a court, since the applicant had waived his right by accepting the fine. The applicant’s allegations that his state of health had prevented him from taking an unconstrained decision to accept the fine was examined in the proceedings to quash the final fine; it was examined by a court which delivered a reasoned decision. Also, his request to open an investigation into the alleged involvement of another car in the accident had been dismissed by both the prosecutor and the court. Finally, his complaints about the police officer’s conduct were examined in disciplinary proceedings and dismissed as unfounded.

26 . In these circumstances the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts “duly considered” the applicant’s case within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. Therefore, the third element for rejection of an application under the above admissibility criterion has been satisfied.

27 . It follows that the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 22 April 2021 .

Attila Teplán Erik Wennerström              Acting Deputy Registrar President