K. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 11819/85 • ECHR ID: 001-607
Document date: October 16, 1986
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The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
16 October 1986, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
E. BUSUTTIL
G. TENEKIDES
S. TRECHSEL
B. KIERNAN
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. F. MARTINEZ
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Art. 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 9 September 1984 by
J.K. against the United Kingdom and registered on 17 October 1985
under file No. 11819/85;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1957 and resident in
Glasgow. The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as
follows.
On the evening of 23 April 1983, the applicant accompanied friends to
a party in a house in Glasgow. The applicant found himself the
object of hostility by others at the party and was preparing to leave
when a full-scale battle erupted, in which several people received
stab-wounds and the applicant himself received injuries in the neck
and head from being struck by a glass bottle. One of the men at the
party died after receiving a knife-wound in the heart.
The applicant was subsequently arrested in London on 23 October 1983
and charged on 17 counts, including one charge of murder and other
charges of assault, criminal damage and breach of the peace. The
applicant's defence was that any injuries he caused were inflicted in
self-defence or by accident.
The applicant was tried in the High Court before a jury in February
1984 and found guilty of murder and the majority of the other charges.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal was refused on
13 June 1984.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that he did not receive a fair trial as the
police failed to carry out a proper investigation of the scene of the
crime, e.g. looking for fingerprints on broken glass and identifying
the various bloodstains to be found in the house. He also complains
that the judge removed the issue of diminished responsibility from the
consideration of the jury and failed to instruct the jury properly and
fairly on the evidence submitted by the Crown and the defence.
He further complains that he did not have adequate time for the
preparation of his defence and that he was dissatisfied with the
conduct of his case by his counsel. He also alleges that he has been
deprived of the right of self-defence.
He accordingly invokes Article 2 (art. 2), Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) and Article 6 para. 3 (b) (art. 6-3-b) of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that the police failure to investigate
fully the scene of the crime and the judge's directions to the jury
regarding the evidence deprived him of a fair trial. He also
complains in this context of the conduct of his defence counsel.
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention provides that in the
determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
a) As regards the applicants complaints concerning his defence
counsel, the Commission recalls that under Article 25 para. 1
(art. 25-1) of the Convention, the Commission may only admit an
application from a person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals, where the applicant alleges a violation by one of the
Contracting Parties of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention and where that Party has recognised this competence of the
Commission. The Commission may not, therefore, admit applications
directed against private individuals. In this respect the Comission
refers to its constant jurisprudence (see e.g. Applications
No. 172/56, Dec. 20.12.57, Yearbook 1 pp. 211, 215 and No. 3925/69,
Dec. 2.3.83, Collection 32 pp. 56, 58).
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione
personae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(art. 27-2) of the Convention.
b) As regards the applicant's remaining complaints concerning the
fairness of his trial, the Commission recalls that in accordance with
its constant jurisprudence the question of whether a trial conforms to
the standards laid down in Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) must be
decided on the basis of an evaluation of the trial in its entirety and
not on the basis of an isolated consideration of particular incidents
or particular aspects of the trial (see e.g. Application No. 343/57,
Dec. 2.9.59, Yearbook 4 p. 548 and Application No. 5574/72,
Dec. 21.3.75, D.R. 3 p. 10).
The Commission has accordingly looked at the applicant's trial as a
whole on the basis of the information submitted by the applicant. An
examination by the Commission of this complaint as it has been
submitted does not however disclose any appearance of a violation of
Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant also complains of not receiving adequate time
and facilities for the preparation of his defence.
The Commission recalls however that the applicant was arrested on
28 October 1983 and that his trial took place in February 1984. The
applicant was represented by a solicitor and counsel. The Commission
has examined this complaint as it has been submitted by the applicant
but finds that the applicant has failed to substantiate his claim that
he did not receive adequate time or facilities for his defence.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the facts do not disclose
any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (b) (art. 6-3-b)
of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 2
(art. 2) of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 2 para. 2
sub-para (a) (art. 2-2-a).
Article 2 (art. 2) provides:
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence
of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty
is provided by law.
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this Article (art. 2) when it results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;..."
Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention however is an obligation placed
on the High Contracting Parties in respect of the right to life. The
applicant has failed to establish that his life has in any way been
endangered by any act for which the United Kingdom Government is
responsible.
The Commission accordingly finds that on the facts of the application
as presented by the applicant there cannot be said to have been any
interference with the applicant's right to life contrary to Article 2
(art. 2) of the Convention.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary President
to the Commission of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
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