JÄDERGÅRD ; OTHERS v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 13247/87 • ECHR ID: 001-922
Document date: July 8, 1991
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SECOND CHAMBER
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 13247/87
by Hans JÄDERGÅRD and Others
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber)
sitting in private on 8 July 1991, the following members being
present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
H.G. SCHERMERS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Mr. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber.
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 1 December 1986
by Hans JÄDERGÅRD and Others against Sweden and registered on
29 September 1987 under file No. 13247/87;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government
on 6 November 1990 and 25 March 1991 as well as the observations
submitted by the applicants on 12 December 1990, 19 February and
22 April 1991;
Having regard to the Commission's decision of 26 February 1991
to refer the application to the Second Chamber;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are set out in the Annex. Applicants No. 11
and 12 are Austrian citizens, the others are Swedish citizens. The
applicants are members of the Tyresö-Dyviksudds Tomtägareförening, a
local association of property owners. They are represented before the
Commission by the first applicant, Mr. Hans Jädergård, who is the
Chairman of the said association.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
Particular circumstances of the case
The applicants own properties in the area of Dyviksudde in the
municipality of Tyresö. On the properties the applicants have erected
buildings. (The surface of the respective main buildings is set out
in the Annex.) The area is subject to a building plan adopted in
1954, providing that on each property only one dwelling house could be
erected. The building surface could not exceed 150 m2, with the
exception of the right to furnish an attic, the total building
surface then amounting to 250 m2. An outhouse or a garage could not
exceed 40 m2. Furthermore, no water closets could be installed.
On 18 March 1969 the County Administrative Board
(länsstyrelsen) of the County of Stockholm confirmed new regulations
in the building plan for the area, to the effect that main houses
could not exceed 70 m2. There was no longer a right to furnish an
attic. Outhouses were limited to 30 m2. The purpose of the amendment
to the regulations was to prevent permanent residence in the area.
Property owners in the area appealed to the Government which
on 30 June 1972 upheld the decision.
On 4 May 1979 the County Administrative Board issued a
building prohibition pursuant to Section 109 of the 1947 Building Act
(byggnadslagen, hereinafter "the 1947 Act") pending the adoption of a
new building plan with a further restriction on construction from
70 m2 to 50 m2 for a main building.
Upon appeal by the property owners, this decision was
quashed by the Government (Ministry of Housing) on 30 April 1980.
On 18 January 1984 the County Administrative Board again
issued a building prohibition pursuant to Section 109 of the 1947
Act. The applicants' appeals against this decision were rejected by
the Government on 14 June 1984.
On 30 August 1984 the municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige)
of Tyresö adopted new regulations in the building plan covering the
applicants' properties, to the effect that main houses could not exceed
50 m2 and outhouses were limited to 30 m2.
On 21 February 1985 the County Administrative Board under
Section 108 of the 1947 Act confirmed these regulations.
Appeals were lodged with the Government, inter alia, by the
above-mentioned property association and by applicants Nos. 2-4, 14,
17 and 24.
They alleged inter alia that the County Administrative Board's
decision was based on incorrect information after an incorrect
procedure, that it was contrary to previous case-law and relevant
legal principles, and that the individuals would suffer serious
financial damage without this being in the general interest.
On 5 June 1986 the Government rejected the appeals. They
firstly stated that the property association had no right to appeal,
but since this appeal had been signed by the first applicant, it was
considered as lodged by him. On the merits of the appeals the
Government stated, inter alia, that the aim of the new regulations was
to prevent leisure houses from being transformed into permanent
residences. As regards Dyviksudd, the Government noted that many
existing houses already exceeded the 50 m2 limit and would thus be in
conflict with the plan. Moreover, in the said area permanent
residences had rather gone down than increased. Nevertheless, the
municipality's interest of preventing the risk of permanent residences
in that area outweighed the property owners' interest in keeping their
previous building rights. The Government further noted certain
transitional regulations, according to which construction on existing
buildings was permitted, provided that it would not increase the
building surface or the number of floors. Buildings which were
destroyed or damaged by accident could be re-erected, irrespective of
the new regulations. If an existing main house exceeded 50 m2 and
provided that the erection of a smaller outhouse did not risk creating
a permanent residence, the Building Committee could grant an exemption
from the building plan.
Relevant domestic law
Up to 1 July 1987 a property owner's right to erect buildings
on his property was regulated in the 1947 Act and the 1959 Ordinance.
Section 1 of the 1947 Act provided that construction on a
property required a building permit, insofar as this followed from
rules laid down by the Government. Such rules were to be found in
Section 54 of the 1959 Building Ordinance (byggnadsstadgan, herein-
after "the 1959 Ordinance"). A permit was required for all new
constructions, except certain buildings for public use, or smaller
additions to existing residences and farms or smaller houses on such
estates.
Section 5 of the 1947 Act called for an examination of whether
the property was suitable from a general point of view for building
purposes. Such examination should be carried out by planning
procedure in accordance with the 1947 Act, except for areas
classified as "non-urban" (glesbebyggelse) or as "urban developments
on a smaller scale" (tätbebyggelse av mindre omfattning). For the
latter categories, the required examination could be made when
an application for a building permit was examined.
Under Section 109 of the 1947 Act the County Administrative
Board could, if the question of the establishment of a building plan
or of an amendment to such a plan had arisen, on the municipality's
request issue a building prohibition pertaining to that area for a
period of one year. Such a prohibition could be prolonged at most for
two years at a time. Exemptions could be granted by the County
Administrative Board or by the Building Committee.
A decision by the County Administrative Board to issue a
building prohibition or, as the first instance, to refuse an
exemption from a building prohibition, could be appealed to the
Government.
A person, who wished to erect a building, for which a permit
was required, had to file an application with the local Building
Committee. An application coming under any of the above building
prohibitions was in practice considered as also including an
application for exemption from the prohibition in question. The
applicant could, on the other hand, choose to apply for an exemption
only, in order to apply for a permit when the matter of exemption had
been resolved.
The examination of an application for a building permit
involved ascertaining that the intended building would not run counter
to any confirmed plan, or, as the case might be, to the regulations of
non-planned areas, or to a building prohibition, and that it satisfied
technical demands on construction. In the absence of such obstacles,
a permit was to be granted.
If the intended construction required an exemption of any kind,
the Building Committee also had to take a decision on this matter. In
case the Committee lacked legal competence to do so, it would normally
refer the application, as regards the exemption, to the County
Administrative Board, suspending its decision on the permit issue,
pending the outcome of the exemption issue.
Decisions by the Building Committee to refuse building permits
and to refuse exemptions from building prohibitions could be appealed
to the County Administrative Board.
A decision by the County Administrative Board to reject an
appeal against the Building Committee's decision refusing exemption
from a building prohibition could be appealed to the Government.
However, an appeal against a decision of the County Administrative
Board to reject an appeal regarding an application for a building
permit was to be lodged with the Administrative Court of Appeal
(kammarrätten). A decision by the Administrative Court of Appeal
could be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (regerings-
rätten), which could refuse leave to appeal.
A decision by the County Administrative Board which resolved
both issues (the building permit and the exemption from the building
prohibition) could be appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal.
If the Court found that an exemption was not required, the matter was
subsequently processed as a case relating only to the question of a
building permit. Otherwise the case was referred to the Government
together with an opinion on the permit issue.
There was no limitation of the number of times a property
owner could apply for building permits or exemptions from a building
prohibition. The authorities were obliged to examine the matter each
time they were seized with an application.
The provisions concerning the adoption and the confirmation of
a building plan, including the general guidelines for such a plan,
were found in Section 107 and 108 of the 1947 Act. Section 107 also
provided for the possibility to include special regulations in a
building plan. According to Section 108, in fine, these provisions
were applicable also with regard to the amendment to an existing plan.
Under Section 150 of the 1947 Act appeals against the County
Administrative Board's confirmation of an adopted plan could be lodged
with the Government.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants allege that the decisions taken, with the effect
that their building rights were reduced, were contrary to Swedish law,
notably Chapter 2 Section 18 of the Instrument of Government
(regeringsformen), which protects the right to property. They submit
inter alia that some applicants have in fact lost 80 % of their
initial building rights, this situation being equivalent to a
regulatory taking or a de facto expropriation. The applicants complain
of violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
2. The applicants complain of a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention because of the difference in treatment of those who
constructed under the old regulations in the building plan, in
comparison with those who wish to construct under the new regulations.
Applicants Nos. 11 and 12 also allege discrimination on the ground of
their Austrian nationality.
3. The applicants complain of a violation of Article 6 of the
Convention, since they could not obtain a court examination of the
County Administrative Board's decision of 21 February 1985 to amend
the regulations in the building plan.
4. The applicants complain of a violation of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.
5. The applicants finally complain that under Swedish law they
have no right to compensation for the alleged violations. They
invoke Article 50 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 1 December 1986 and
registered on 29 September 1987.
On 6 July 1989 the Commission decided to give notice of the
application to the respondent Government without inviting them to
submit written observations. It adjourned the further examination of
the case until the European Court of Human Rights had delivered
judgment in the Mats Jacobsson case.
On 28 June 1990, the Court delivered judgment in that case
(Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A No.
180-A).
On 13 July 1990 the Government were invited to submit their
written observations on the admissibility and merits of the
application, limited to the complaint under Article 6 of the
Convention.
The Government's observations were submitted on 6 November
and the applicants' preliminary observations in reply on 12 December
1990. After an extension of the time-limit the applicants' further
observations were submitted on 19 February 1991.
On 26 February 1991 the Commission referred the application to
the Second Chamber.
Additional observations were submitted by the Government on
25 March and by the applicants on 22 April 1991.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain that the decisions taken, with the
effect that their building rights were reduced, were contrary to
Swedish law. They allege inter alia that some applicants have lost 80%
of their initial building rights, this amounting to a regulatory
taking or a de facto expropriation. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which reads:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties."
(a) The Commission has first considered the applicants' complaint
insofar as it pertains to the County Administrative Board's decisions
of 18 March 1969 and of 18 January 1984 reducing the applicants' right
to construction on their properties.
The Commission is not competent to decide whether or not
the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a
violation of the Convention as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention
provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within
a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken". According to the Commission's established case-law the "final
decision" within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) refers solely to
the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies
according to the generally recognised rules of international law. In
particular, only a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be
considered for this purpose (see e.g. No. 654/59, Dec. 3.6.60,
Yearbook 4 pp. 276, 282; No. 9266/81, Dec. 28.1.83, D.R. 30 pp. 155,
187).
In the present case, for the reasons set out under para. 3
below, the respective final decisions are the Government's decisions
of 30 June 1972 and 14 June 1984. The application was submitted to
the Commission on 1 December 1986, that is, more than six months after
the dates of those decisions. Furthermore, an examination of the
application does not disclose the existence of any special
circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the six month
period following those decisions.
It follows that the complaint has in this respect been
introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3
(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
(b) The Commission has secondly considered the complaint insofar
as it pertains to the County Administrative Board's decision of
21 February 1985. It considers that it is not necessary to resolve
the question whether applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 have
exhausted domestic remedies with regard to their complaint under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), as, in any case, the complaint is
manifestly ill-founded for the reasons below.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules.
The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph,
is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful
enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second
sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and
makes it subject to certain conditions; and the third rule, stated in
the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled,
amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest. The three rules are not "distinct" in the
sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned
with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful
enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light
of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (Eur. Court
H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A No. 163,
p. 16, para. 53).
The Commission considers that the amendment to the building
plan may be regarded as an interference with the applicants' right to
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as guaranteed by Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). This interference falls to be considered
under the second paragraph of Article 1 as being a measure of control
of the use of the applicants' properties.
Under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1) the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest by
enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose. However,
there must exist a reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In striking the
fair balance thereby required between the general interest of the
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights, the authorities enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation (above- mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 17, para.
55).
The Commission recalls that the Convention organs' power to
review compliance with domestic law is limited: it is in the first
place for the national authorities to interpret and apply that law (see
e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Håkansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February
1990, Series A No. 171-A, p. 16, para. 47).
The Commission observes that the amendment to the regulations
in the building plan was made under Section 108 of the 1947 Act. The
measure thus had a basis in Swedish law. The Commission is therefore
satisfied that the interference was lawful.
As regards the "general interest" served by the amendment,
the Commission notes that the purpose of the amendment was to prevent
transformation of leisure houses into permanent residences. It
further recalls that, in the increasingly complex and ever developing
society of today, it is indispensable that the use of land be
regulated by detailed and careful planning. It follows that States
must have instruments at hand in order to plan or regulate building
activities (Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Comm. Report 8.10.80,
para. 111, Eur. Court H.R., Series B No. 46, p. 50). The 1947 Act and
the planning procedure under it are in principle measures serving the
general interest. The Commission concludes that the amendment to the
regulations in the building plan served the general interest.
As regards the proportionality between the interference with
the applicants' property rights and the aim pursued, the Commission
notes that the new regulations in the building plan reduced the
applicants' building rights from 70 m2 to 50 m2 for main houses, while
the maximum building surface for outhouses remained unchanged. The
new regulations did not prohibit construction on existing buildings,
provided that it would not increase the existing building surface or
the number of floors. Already existing buildings which were destroyed
or damaged by accident could be re-erected in their original size,
irrespective of the new regulations. Moreover, in certain
circumstances exemptions from the regulations in the building plan
could be granted. This procedure provided a possibility for weighing
the public interest against that of the individual (cf.
above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, pp. 18-19, para. 62).
As regards construction which was not permitted under any of
the above terms, the Commission observes that under Section 1 of the
1947 Act and Section 54 of the 1959 Ordinance any person wishing to
construct a building, with certain exceptions, had to apply for a
permit from the Building Committee. It has not been shown that the
Building Committee would have been obliged to grant the applicants
building permits for further construction on their properties. Thus,
the Commission does not find it established that the amendment to the
regulations in the building plan deprived them of any unconditional
right to further construction which they had enjoyed before (cf.
above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 18, para. 60).
In view of the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the
Contracting State in this area the Commission considers that, in the
circumstances of the case, the amendment to the regulations in the
building plan was not disproportionate to its legitimate purpose.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicants also complain of a difference in treatment of
those who constructed under the old regulations in the building plan,
in comparison with those who wish to construct under the new
regulations. Applicants Nos. 11 and 12 further allege discrimination
on the ground of their Austrian nationality. The applicants allege a
violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, which reads:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status."
The Commission has examined this complaint in conjunction with
the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the
Convention.
According to the Court's established case-law, Article 14
(Art. 14) complements the other substantive provisions of the
Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence, since
it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application
of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not necessarily presuppose a breach of
those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can be
no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the
ambit of one or more of the latter (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Inze
judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A No. 126, p. 17, para. 14 with
further references).
The Commission has found above Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1) to be applicable in the present case. Although the complaint
under that provision is manifestly ill-founded, the facts at issue
fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 14
(P1-1, 14) of the Convention is therefore also applicable.
For the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14), a difference of
treatment is dicriminatory if it "has no objective and reasonable
justification", that is, if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or
if there is not a "reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised". The
Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing
whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations
justify a different treatment in law, but it is for the Convention
organs to give the final ruling in this respect (see above-mentioned
Inze judgment, p. 18, para. 41 with further references).
The Commission has found above that the purpose of the
amendment to the building regulations, that is to prevent permanent
residence in the area, was lawful and in the general interest.
Furthermore, the amendment was not disproportionate to that purpose.
Assuming for the purpose of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the
Convention that the applicants can be said to be in a similar
situation as compared with the other property owners referred to, the
difference in treatment complained of must be considered objectively
and reasonably justified.
Having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the
domestic authorities and to the subject-matter, the Commission finds
no appearance of discrimination, contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the
Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the
Convention, in respect of the complaint made under this provision by
all applicants.
Moreover, with regard to the additional complaint by
applicants Nos. 11-12 there is no substantiation of their allegation
of discrimination based on their Austrian nationality.
It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicants further complain that they could not obtain a
court examination of the lawfulness of the County Administrative
Board's decision of 21 February 1985 to amend the regulations in the
building plan. They allege a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention.
The Commission has examined the complaint under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which reads, in its relevant parts:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by an independent
and impartial tribunal..."
(a) Insofar as the complaint has been introduced by applicants
Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 the Government submit that it is
inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the
appeal against the County Administrative Board's decision as lodged by
the association of property owners on behalf of those applicants was
dismissed, the association lacking locus standi.
The Commission notes that applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23
and 25-26 did not appeal to the Government in their own names.
However, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention only requires the
exhaustion of remedies which can be regarded as "effective". In the
present case, as admitted by the Government, the decision by the
County Administrative Board of 21 February 1985 was not open to review
as to its lawfulness by either ordinary or administrative courts or by
any other body which could be considered to be a "tribunal" for the
purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that the possibility to
appeal to the Government was not a remedy which these applicants were
required to exhaust in order to comply with the conditions in Article
26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
The final decision with regard to the complaint as lodged by
applicants Nos. 5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26 is the decision of the
County Administrative Board of 21 February 1985, whereas the present
application was submitted to the Commission on 1 December 1986, that
is, more than six months after the date of that decision. Furthermore,
an examination of the application does not disclose the existence of
any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended
the running of that period.
It follows that the complaint, as lodged by applicants Nos.
5-13, 15-16, 18-23 and 25-26, has been introduced out of time and must
be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
(b) Insofar as the complaint has been introduced by applicants
Nos. 1-4, 14, 17 and 24 the Government waive objections as to its
admissibility and admit a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
The Commission considers that the complaint, as lodged by
applicants Nos. 1-4, 14, 17 and 24, is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention. It must be declared admissible no other ground for
declaring it inadmissible having been established.
4. The applicants also allege a violation of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) to the Convention, which reads:
"1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the maintenance of
ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject,
in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance
with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic
society."
An examination of this complaint as it has been submitted
does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 4 (P4-2).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
5. The applicants finally complain that under Swedish law they
have no right to compensation for the alleged violations. They invoke
Article 50 (Art. 50) of the Convention, which reads:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting
Party is completely or partially in conflict with the
obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the
internal law of the said Party allows only partial
reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision
or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary,
afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
The Commission observes that it has no competence to examine
the applicants' complaint under Article 50 (Art. 50) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the complaint under Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as it has been lodged
by applicants Nos. 1-4, 14, 17 and 24; and
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
ANNEX
Surface of main
building erected on
Applicant Property the property (m2)
1. Hans Jädergård Dyvik 1:262 68
2. Conny Bennerson Dyvik 1:190 34
3. Berndt Franking Dyvik 1:255 48
4. Alice Widell Dyvik 1:264 89
5. Birgit Denckert Dyvik 1:211 58
6. Olof M Söderlind Dyvik 1:297 69
7. Staffan Wetterling Dyvik 1:180 70
8. Börje Eriksson Dyvik 1:216 68
9. Torbjörn Lindgren Dyvik 1:214 77
10. Yngve Sundberg Dyvik 1:261 44
11. Heinz Jelovcan Dyvik 1:237)
12. Monica Jelovcan Dyvik 1:237) 47
13. Hans Hedlund Dyvik 1:258 67
14. Lars Horney Dyvik 1:242 70
15. Bertil Åberg Dyvik 1:182 42
16. Ulla-Britt Olausson Dyvik 1:177 60
17. Åke Åsberg Dyvik 1:207 70
18. Elisabeth Karlsson Dyvik 1:235 71
19. Astrid Ryderholm Dyvik 1:234 50
20. Bertil Nordqvist Dyvik 1:236 63
21. Gun Häggmark Dyvik 1:256 63
22. Rune Thysk Dyvik 1:284 51
23. Magnus Zetterqvist Dyvik 1:259 70
24. Åke Nyberg Dyvik 1:228 150
25. Karin Ericsson Dyvik 1:285 61
26. Hans Linder Dyvik 1:191 53