THIRD SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 40432/98 by Paul Neville STACEY

against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section) sitting on 19 January 1999 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P Costa President ,

Mr N. Bratza,

Mr L. Loucaides,

Mr P. KÅ«ris,

Mr W. Fuhrmann,

Mrs H.S. Greve,

Mr K. Traja,

with Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar ;

Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 9 November 1997 by Paul Neville STACEY against the United Kingdom and registered on 25 March 1998 under file no. 40432/98;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1958 and currently residing on the Isle of Wight.

The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows :

A. The particular circumstances of the case

The applicant is a single parent, with a child or children residing with him, and between October 1996 to August 1997 he was in receipt of Income Support. It is not clear from the materials submitted by him how many children the applicant has living with him nor whether he is still in receipt of Income Support.

In October 1996, the applicant received a letter from the Child Support Agency asking him to indicate on a specific form whether he authorised the Secretary of State to contact the absent parent to arrange and collect child maintenance (Declaration A) or else to declare any reasons why there would be a risk of harm or undue distress if the Secretary of State did so (Declaration B). It appears that the applicant returned Declaration A. He then failed to complete the maintenance application form which was sent to him on 4 November 1996. A meeting followed with the Child Support Agency and the applicant explained that he was unable to give the information about the mother of the children because he did not have her consent. He said to do so would be in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, namely an interference in private life.

On 20 January 1997, the applicant was informed that he still had to complete the application form. On 3 February 1997, the applicant repeated that he could not do so as he would be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

On 7 February 1997, the applicant was notified that, since he had insufficient grounds for not complying with the requests for information, the Child Support Agency would consider reducing his benefits. A reduced benefit direction was subsequently imposed.

In April 1997, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review. Leave was refused on or around 25 June 1997 by Mr Justice Tuckey because :

"The Secretary of State has acted under clear statutory powers given to him under the Child Support Act 1991. I can see no arguable grounds for judicial review of his decision in the material < the applicant has> provided."

B. Relevant domestic law and procedure

The Child Support Act 1991 ("the Act") provides for the assessment, collection and enforcement of periodical maintenance payable by parents in respect of children not in their care. The Act was designed to improve the position of children whose parents live apart. Research commissioned for the Government White Paper ("Children come First", 1990 Cmnd 1264) had indicated that 30% of lone mothers and 3% of lone Fathers received regular child maintenance and that the average payment was very low. It was considered that the burden of supporting lone parents fell largely on the State.

Section 6 of the Act provides :

"(1) Where income support...is claimed by or...paid to ..the parent of a qualifying child (s)he shall if-

(a) (s)he is a person with care of the child; and

(b) (s)he is required to do so by the Secretary of State,

authorise the Secretary of State to take action under this Act to recover child support maintenance from the absent parent.

(2) The Secretary of State shall not require a person ("the parent") to give him the authorisation mentioned in subsection (1) if he considers that there are reasonable grounds for believing that -

(a) if the parent were to be required to give that authorisation; or

(b) if (s)he were to give it,

there would be a risk of her, or of any child living with her, suffering harm or undue distress as a result..... "                                                    

COMPLAINTS

The applicant alleges that the collection of information by officials of the State about an individual without his consent interferes with respect for private life in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant alleges that the Child Support Act 1991 does not fall within any of the exceptions set out in Article 8 § 2 because the basic principle of the Act is the obligation for parents to maintain their children.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that the requirement to provide information to the Child Support Agency infringes Article 8 of the Convention which provides :

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life...

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

The Court notes that Article 10, which he has not invoked, may also be considered as relevant in the context of a complaint about an obligation imposed with respect to the communication of information. Article 10 provides:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

The Court has however found it unnecessary to determine whether it is more appropriate to examine the complaint under one or other of the above Articles, since, in any event, even assuming there has been an interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by either of the two provisions, any interference would be justified under the second paragraphs of those provisions, for the reasons set out below.

In the present case, the Court observes that any interference was "in accordance with the law" or “prescribed by law” in the United Kingdom, the measures concerned deriving from the Child Support Act 1991 and the regulations implemented thereunder. The measures, which seek to provide for financial support for children from absent parents, may also be considered as pursuing the legitimate aims of safeguarding the economic well-being of the country under Article 8 § 2 and the protection of the rights of others, including in particular the rights of the child, under Articles 8 § 2 and 10 § 2.

In assessing whether any such interference is justified, the Court must consider whether the interference with the exercise of the individual’s rights was necessary. According to the Court’s established case-law, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (see, amongst many authorities, Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgement of 24 March 1988, Series A no.130, p 31 § 67).

As regards the necessity and proportionality of the measures, the Court recalls, firstly, that the applicant is seeking to protect the right to privacy of another, the absent mother of his child or children, rather than his own. Insofar as he complains that his own rights are affected by the coercion exerted on him to disclose her whereabouts, the Court notes that there is provision under the child support system to apply for exemption from the requirement of giving information where such would, when given, place a parent or child at risk of harm or undue distress. The applicant has not made any claim on this basis. His objection appears to be based solely on his perception that the absent mother’s privacy would be affected and that she had not consented to his passing on the information.

The Court is satisfied that a fair balance has been struck between the interests of individuals, namely, provision of a mechanism to avoid harmful disclosures, and the interests of the general community that the State recover child support maintenance from absent parents to reduce the burden on the tax-payer of single parent families. It finds accordingly that the requirement imposed on the applicant to provide information relevant to the enforcement of the financial obligations of absent parents arising in connection with their children is not disproportionate and may be regarded as necessary in a democratic society for the legitimate aims referred to above. There is accordingly no appearance of a violation of either Article 8 or Article 10 of the Convention.

It follows, therefore, that the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa

Registrar President