SECOND SECTION

DECISION [Note1]

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Applications nos. 44915/98, 44916/98, 44917/98, 44918/98 and 44919/98

by Pasquale CECERE, Giuseppe ZARRO, Antonio FRANZESE,

Angelo Stefano DI GIOVANNI and Carmine IANNAZZONE

against Italy [Note2]

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ) sitting on 28 October 1999 as a Chamber composed of

M. C. Rozakis, président , M. M. Fischbach, M. B. Conforti, M. G. Bonello, M me V. Strážnická, M. P. Lorenzen, M me M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska, juges ,

and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar ;

Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the applications introduced on 25 September 1998 by the applicants against Italy and registered on 10 December 1998 under files nos. 44915/98, 44916/98, 44917/98, 44918/98 and 44919/98;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants are five Italian nationals, born respectively in 1947, 1948, 1943, 1952 and 1956. They all reside in Chianche . In 1988 and 1989, the first applicant was the mayor of Chianche ; the other applicants were members of the Chianche Building Commission (“ Commissione edilizia municipale ”), a body responsible for expressing opinions on the granting of building permits. Before the Court, they are represented by Mr Pietro Palma , a lawyer practising in Moiano .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.

On an unspecified date, the Benevento Public Prosecutor’s Office commenced criminal proceedings against the applicants on charges of abuse of public authority (“ interesse privato in atti d’ufficio ”) in the course of their duties as mayor and members of the Building Commission. On 1 March 1995 the Benevento Public Prosecutor’s Office requested that the applicants and four other persons be committed for trial.

In an order of 1 March 1995, the Benevento investigating judge scheduled the date of the preliminary hearing for 24 October 1995. This order was subsequently served on the applicants, who were thus given official notification of the charges brought against them.

In an order of 9 April 1996, the investigating judge committed the applicants and their four co-accused for trial, commencing on 13 March 1997 before the Benevento District Court.

On 13 March 1997 Mr D., one of the judges composing the bench of the court, withdrew from the case. On 2 June 1997 the proceedings were adjourned by reason that the order fixing the date of the hearing had not been served on one of the accused. On 11 July 1997 Mr D. observed that notwithstanding his withdrawal, the case was still pending before the section in which he was sitting; the case-file was therefore forwarded to the President of the District Court.

A hearing scheduled for 12 January 1998 was adjourned by the District Court of its own motion. On 9 February 1998 two witnesses were examined and the parties presented their final pleadings. The applicants requested to be acquitted or, in the alternative, that the charges against them be declared time-barred.

In a judgment of the same day, filed with the registry on 17 February 1998, the District Court declared that the charges brought against the applicants and their co-accused had become time-barred at the latest on 8 February 1998. This decision became final on 27 March 1998.             

COMPLAINT

The applicants allege that the length of the criminal proceedings instituted against them exceeded the "reasonable time" requirement in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

THE LAW

Given the similarities of the applications, the Court considers it necessary to order their joinder pursuant Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The applicants complain about the length of the proceedings instituted against them. They invoke Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, as far as relevant, reads as follows:

"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."

The proceedings at issue began on 1 March 1995 and ended on 27 March 1998, when the Benevento District Court’s judgment became final. Their overall length is thus three years and twenty-six days for one instance. However, the respondent State cannot be held responsible for the delay of one month and ten days which elapsed between the date on which the District Court’s judgment was filed with the registry (17 February 1998) and the date on which this decision became final (see, mutatis mutandis , the Scopelliti v. Italy judgment of 23 November 1993, Series A n° 278, p. 9, § 22).

The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicants and of the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, the Cazenave de la Roche v. France judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1327, § 47).

The Court finds, firstly, that the case was relatively complex, owing in particular to the nature of the charges and the number of accused persons.  On the other hand, the applicants cannot be held responsible for any of the delays which occurred in the course of the domestic proceedings.

As to the conduct of the national authorities, the Court observes that on 2 June 1997 the case was adjourned by reason of a failure to serve the order fixing the date of the hearing. Moreover, two hearings scheduled for 11 July 1997 and 12 January 1998 were postponed by the District Court of its own motion. As a result, the State authorities were responsible for a delay of little more than eight months.

However, having regard to the complexity of the case and the other circumstances, the Court considers that the overall duration of the proceedings complained of does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that the applications are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected according to § 4 of this same provision.

For these reasons the Court

ORDERS THE JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS;

Un animously

DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS INADMISSIBLE .

Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis

  Registrar                   President

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[Note2] First letter in capital letters plus the article according to normal speech.