FOURTH SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 33379/96 by Edgar KLEIN against Germany

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section ) sitting on 9 December 1999 as a Chamber composed of

Mr M. Pellonpää, President , Mr G. Ress, Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo, Mr L. Caflisch, Mr J. Makarczyk, Mr I. Cabral Barreto, Mrs N. Vajić, judges ,

and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar ;

Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 9 January 1996 by Edgar Klein against Germany and registered on 7 October 1996 under file no. 33379/96;

Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 28 May 1998 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 22 July 1998;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, born in 1926, is a German national and residing in Bad Neuenahr .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 6 December 1985 the Rhineland Westphalia electricity-supply company instituted proceedings before the Moers District Court ( Amtsgericht ) against the applicant claiming outstanding payments for electricity supply.

On 28 April 1986 the District Court ordered the applicant to pay a sum of about DEM 141 as well as interest to the plaintiff. The Court found that the applicant had reduced the sums due following the annual statements of account, challenging the calculation mode as well as the coal-mining contribution, a contribution earmarked as a subsidy for the national coal-mining industry ( Kohlepfennig ). The Court considered that both the mode of calculation and the contribution could not be objected to from a constitutional point of view.

On 8 June 1986 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court ( Bundesverfassungsgericht ).

On 11 October 1994 the Second Division ( Senat ) of the Federal Constitutional Court rendered a decision (of about 30 pages) upon the applicant’s constitutional complaint. The Second Division declared that the relevant parts of the Act on the Use of EC Coal in the Electricity Supply ( Gesetz über die weitere Sicherung des Einsatzes von Gemeinschaftskohle in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft ), which were underlying the coal-mining contribution in question, were unconstitutional as the coal-mining contribution amounted to an inadmissible special levy ( Sonderabgabe ). The Federal Constitutional Court quashed the District Court’s decision of April 1986 in as much as the payment of the contribution was concerned and sent the case back to that court. It further ordered that the legislation in question, to the extent that it was unconstitutional, should not be applied beyond 31 December 1995. The Constitutional Court did not entertain the applicant’s complaint about the mode of calculation on the ground that the relevant regulations had changed meanwhile.

On 15 February 1995, in the resumed proceedings, the Moers District Court ordered the applicant to pay a sum of about DEM 80 as well as interest to the plaintiff. It found that, pursuant to the above legislation which continued to be in force, the applicant had to pay the above sum representing the coal-mining contribution.

On 22 August 1995 the Federal Constitutional Court refused a constitutional complaint by the applicant lodged on 24 May 1995. The applicant received the decision on 2 September 1995.

PROCEDURE

The application was introduced on 9 January 1996 before the European Commission of Human Rights and regi s tered on 7 October 1996.

On 14 January 1998 the Commission decided to communicate the applicant’s complaint concerning the length of the civil proceedings and to declare the remainder of the applic a tion inadmissible.

The Government’s written observations were submitted on 28 May 1998. The applicant replied on 22 July 1998.

On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Co n vention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.

THE LAW

The applicant ’s complaint relates to the length of the proceedings, which began on 6 December 1985 and ended on 2 September 1995, when the applicant’s representative received the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. They therefore lasted about ten years.

According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Government insist on the extreme complexity of the case before the Federal Constitutional Court, because it raised fundamental questions concerning constitutional law in financial matters ( Finanzverfassungsrecht ). The Government also emphasise the excessive caseload of the Federal Constitutional Court during this period, which had obliged it to deal with more urgent cases of considerable political and social importance, some of which were related to the German reunification. They further submit that the proceedings were not of a major importance for the applicant from an economic point of view, as the amount in issue in the case was only about 142 DEM.

According to the applicant, the case was not particularly complex because, when the law at stake was adopted, its unconstitutionality already appeared clearly . Furthermore, the other cases the Federal Constitutional Court had to deal with as matters of priority could not excuse the excessive length of the proceedings. Finally, the applicant stresses that these proceedings involved an important question of principle for him and other German citizens.

The Court notes that the proceedings started on 6 December 1985 and ended on 2 September 1995. They thus lasted for about ten years. The main delay in the procedure occurred before the Federal Constitutional Court in the first round of constitutional proceedings, which lasted for more than eight years (22 June 1986 to 11 October 1994).

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the issue of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant ’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICANT’S COMPLAINT CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS ADMISSIBLE , without prejudging the merits of the case.

Vincent Berger Matti Pellonpää Registrar President