SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 32396/96 by Lajos MAGYAR against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ) sitting on 13 January 2000 as a Chamber composed of

Mr C.L.Rozakis, President , Mr M. Fischbach, Mr G. Bonello, Mrs V. Strážnická, Mr P. Lorenzen, Mr A.B. Baka, Mr A. Kovler, judges ,

and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar ;

Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 9 August 1993 by Lajos Magyar against Hungary and registered on 24 July 1996 under file no. 32396/96;

Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 24 April 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 19 June 1997;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, born in 1937, is a Hungarian national and resident in Budapest . He is an electricity mechanic.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

A. Particular circumstances of the case

1. In March 1988 the Budapest 5th District Council, as confirmed by the Budapest Metropolitan Council in June 1988, expropriated the applicant’s house. He was granted an exchange flat and 1,110,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) as indemnification. On 1 August 1988 he brought before the Pest Central District Court an action against the Metropolitan Council, challenging the expropriation (“the 1988 action”). On 10 August 1988 the District Court suspended the proceedings, apparently pending the termination of the administrative proceedings concerning the enforcement of the expropriation decision, the applicant’s eviction as well as the implementation of the indemnification scheme. The Government state that the proceedings were later discontinued since the applicant did not pursue this action.

In September 1989 the applicant brought a further action before the District Court, this time claiming additional indemnity for the expropriated property (“the 1989 action”). On 8 November 1989 the District Court held a hearing and appointed a real-estate expert. On 14 February 1991 the expert presented his opinion as to the value of the property.

Meanwhile, in 1990 the applicant brought a third action (“the 1990 action”) before the District Court against the Budapest 17th District Council and other defendants claiming a comprehensive judicial review of the expropriation proceedings and compensation.

On 5 March 1991 the District Court held a joint hearing concerning both the 1989 and the 1990 actions, where the proceedings concerning the former were suspended, pending the outcome of the proceedings concerning the latter. On this occasion the applicant extended his 1990 action to the Budapest Mayor’s Office as defendant. The next hearing in this case was scheduled for 7 May 1991.

On 9 August 1991 the District Court separated the applicant’s compensation claims from the remainder of the 1990 action, with a view to transferring them to the Budapest Regional Court for further action. The applicant’s appeal against the transfer was to no avail. Due to a confusion of documents, the case-file concerning the compensation claims was forwarded to the Regional Court only on 1 March 1995, following a complaint from the applicant. On 19 December 1995 and 23 April 1996 the Budapest Regional Court held hearings. On 17 September 1996 it held a further hearing and dismissed the applicant’s compensation claims, as they were time-barred. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was filed with the Supreme Court on 3 December 1996. On 29 May 1997 the Supreme Court held a hearing. The applicant submits that no second-instance decision has so far been taken.

As regards the remainder of the applicant’s 1990 action, on 9 August 1991 the District Court discontinued the proceedings holding that the action in this respect had been lodged out of time. On 8 October 1991 the Budapest Regional Court finally dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the discontinuation order. On 21 March 1994 the Supreme Court rejected his petition for review as it had been lodged out of the 60-day statutory deadline - to be counted from the date of service of the final decision -, as provided by Section 272 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 9 May 1996 the Pest Central District Court rejected his request for the re-opening of the case. On 9 October 1996 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed his appeal. The applicant’s petition for a review of the decisions on re-opening is pending before the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, on 8 January 1995 the applicant requested the District Court to resume the proceedings concerning the suspended 1989 action. On 12 September 1996 the District Court held a hearing and again suspended the proceedings pending the potential re-opening of the 1990 action. Subsequent to the Regional Court ’s above decision of 9 October 1996, on 12 December 1996 the proceedings were resumed. On 22 May 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, holding that the applicant’s 1989 action had originally been lodged out of time. The applicant’s appeal is pending before the Budapest Regional Court .

2. On 24 June 1994 the Budapest V/VIII/XIII District Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment against the applicant. On account of having forcibly resisted the eviction measure in the course of the above expropriation proceedings, the applicant was charged with libel and violence against persons acting in an official capacity.

On 20 November 1996 the Pest Central District Court discontinued the proceedings, holding that the applicant’s indicted offence no longer represented a danger for the society.

On 13 June 1997 the Budapest Regional Court, upon the public prosecutor’s appeal, quashed the first-instance decision, convicted the applicant of violence against persons acting in an official capacity and sentenced him to a fine of HUF 10,000. The execution of the sentence was suspended for a probationary period of one year.

On 19 March 1998 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s petition for review.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 about the length of the court proceedings concerning the expropriation of his house.

2. Moreover, the applicant complains of the expropriation measure itself and his eviction; he invokes Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He also submits under Article 6 § 1 that the decisions reached by the Hungarian courts in the expropriation dispute were wrong.

3. Finally, the applicant, without invoking any particular provision of the Convention, complains about the Hungarian courts’ conduct concerning his conviction.

PROCEEDINGS

The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 9 August 1993 and registered on 24 July 1996.

On 27 February 1997 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 § 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure.

The Government’s written observations were submitted on 24 April 1997.

On 19 June 1997 the applicant submitted observations in reply to the respondent Government’s observations.

On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the European Court of Human Rights in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 about the length of the court proceedings concerning the expropriation of his house.

Article 6 § 1 provides that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial tribunal.

The applicant considers that the length of the proceedings exceeds the “reasonable time” requirement set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government contest this.

The Court notes that the three sets of proceedings complained of commenced in 1988, 1989 and 1990, respectively, and parts of the applicant’s original actions are still pending.

The Court recalls that the period to be considered begins only on 5 November 1992, when Hungary ’s recognition of the right of individual petition took effect ( Foti and Others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, § 53). In assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after this date, account must be taken of the then state of the proceedings. Accordingly, the period to be considered is about seven years and two months.

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established by the case-law of the Court on the question of “reasonable time”, and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is required.

2. The applicant complains of the expropriation measure itself and his eviction; he invokes Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He also submits under Article 6 § 1 that the decisions reached by the Hungarian courts in the expropriation dispute were wrong.

The Court observes that the complaints about the expropriation measure and the applicant’s eviction as well as parts of the court proceedings relate to events prior to 5 November 1992 and, therefore, fall outside the competence ratione temporis of the Court. These complaints are thus incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

Examining the subsequent period, the Court considers that - to the extent that the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 can be understood to concern those parts of the proceedings which were already finally decided - there is no indication that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. The applicant’s submissions in this respect do not disclose any appearance of a violation of his rights under the Convention. In so far as these submissions concern those claims, which are still pending, the applicant’s complaints are premature. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

3. Finally, the applicant, without invoking any particular provision of the Convention, complains about the Hungarian courts’ conduct concerning his conviction.

As regards the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the Court considers that there is no indication that the courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. The applicant’s submissions in this respect do not disclose any appearance of a violation of his rights under the Convention.

To the extent that the complaints concern the length of these proceedings, the Court finds that the overall length thereof, i.e. three years and nine months - a period involving three court instances -, does not exceed the “reasonable time” requirement set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without pre-judging the merits, the applicant’s complaint about the length of the court proceedings concerning the expropriation; and

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION.

Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis Registrar President