FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 33600/96 by H.L. against Finland

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section ) sitting on 20 January 2000 as a Chamber composed of

Mr G. Ress, President,

Mr M. Pellonpää,

Mr I. Cabral Barreto, Mr V. Butkevych, Mrs N. Vajić, Mr J. Hedigan, Mrs S. Botoucharova , judges ,

and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar ;

Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 24 September 1996 by H.L. against Finland and registered on 30 October 1996 under file no. 33600/96;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 7 January 1999 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 23 February 1999;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1938 and resident in Helsinki . He is represented before the Court by Mr Esa Käyhkö , a lawyer practising in Lahti .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was arrested on 16 September 1988 suspected of several offences concerning the insolvent liquidation of three different companies (X, Y and Z) he had been involved with as, inter alia , managing director. He was released on 28 September 1988 after a police investigation.

On 13 December 1988 the applicant was charged with tax offences concerning companies Y and Z before the Lahti City Court ( raastuvanoikeus , rådstuvurätt ; known as the Lahti District Court ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätt ) as from 1 December 1993). The prosecutor stated that the police investigations concerning suspected offences in relation to the insolvent liquidation had not yet been finished. A witness gave evidence at the hearing. The prosecutor and the applicant’s lawyer requested an adjournment, which was granted until 14 March 1989.

At the hearing of 14 March 1989 the prosecutor stated that four further charges against the applicant concerning the insolvent liquidations were still under consideration. He requested an adjournment until 18 July 1989. The request was not opposed, and the case was adjourned until the requested date.

The police investigations concerning company Z were finished on 18 May 1989. The results obtained were delivered to the prosecutor for a prosecution to be brought.

At the hearing of 18 July 1989 the prosecutor brought new charges against two co-defendants. The prosecutor stated that the police investigations concerning the liquidation of companies Y and Z had been finished, but the charges were still under consideration. Furthermore, most of the complainants had not been summoned. Thus, the prosecutor requested an adjournment of two months or more. A complainant and the two co-defendants concurred in his request. The applicant’s lawyer found no reason for a further adjournment and asked the case to be decided for the applicant’s part. As requested, the case was adjourned until 19 September 1989.

On 19 September 1989 the applicant was charged with offences in relation to the liquidation of companies X and Y. The applicant’s lawyer read and filed a written pleading and stated that he would answer the charges concerning company Y in writing. Three witnesses and a complainant gave evidence at the hearing. The prosecutor requested an adjournment in order to hear witnesses and to have a complainant summoned. Furthermore, he explained that the charges in relation to company Z were still under consideration. Several others, including the applicant, concurred in the request for an adjournment, which was granted until 28 November 1989.

At the hearing on 28 November 1989 the applicant’s lawyer filed a pleading. The applicant named a witness to give evidence and another witness was reheard. The prosecutor requested an adjournment in order to call more witnesses and as the consideration of further charges had not been concluded. The case was adjourned until 20 March 1990.

At the hearing of 20 March 1990 the substance of the charges was not dealt with at all. The prosecutor requested about two months’ adjournment. He explained that the consideration of charges concerning company Z had not been completed, but that it was in its final stage. He had the intention to prepare the subpoenas in the near future. Furthermore, he meant to hear evidence from some witnesses at the next hearing. All the four defendants concurred in the request, and the adjournment was granted until 29 May 1990.

On 29 May 1990 the prosecutor raised charges against a fifth defendant. The charges against the applicant were not dealt with. At the request of the prosecutor the case was adjourned until 18 September 1990.

At the hearing of 18 September 1990 charges against three of the applicant’s co-defendants were dealt with. The prosecutor stated that charges concerning two police investigation reports were still under consideration. He requested an adjournment, which was granted until18 December 1990.

By the hearing of 18 December 1990 the prosecutor had not concluded the consideration of charges in relation to company Z. The substance of any of the charges was not dealt with. At the request of the prosecutor the case was adjourned until19 March 1991.

On 19 March 1991 the prosecutor dropped some of the charges, one of which was against the applicant. He explained that the charges in relation to company Z and some further charges in relation to company X were still under consideration, and he requested an adjournment. The applicant’s lawyer objected to the adjournment. He stated that the prosecutor had already had three and a half years to complete the charges. The applicant’s lawyer also asked the prosecutor a question concerning the charges already made, but the prosecutor refused to answer at this point. Finally, the applicant’s lawyer stated that if the adjournment was granted, the case should this time be adjourned for a sufficiently long period of time. The case was adjourned until 27 August 1991.

Apparently no hearing was held on 27 August 1991.

The next hearing took place on 1 October 1991. A witness gave evidence. The prosecutor did not present any new charges, and at his request the case was adjourned until 26 November 1991.

On 26 November 1991 further charges concerning company X were brought against the applicant. The prosecution had called five witnesses who gave evidence at the hearing. The prosecutor and two co-defendants requested an adjournment. There was no objection. The case was adjourned until 4 February 1992.

At the hearing on 4 February 1992 the applicant’s lawyer filed some pieces of evidence. He also explained that he intended to ask for a criminal investigation to be conducted on the ground of contradictions between the witnesses’ statements given at the previous hearing. Therefore, he requested the case be adjourned. The prosecutor did not submit any further material. He stated that the charges concerning company Z were still under consideration and, thus, requested an adjournment. The case was adjourned until 26 May 1992.

At the hearing of 26 May 1992 the substance of the charges against the applicant was not dealt with. The prosecutor stated that the consideration of charges against the applicant had not been completed and requested an adjournment. The applicant’s lawyer concurred in the request. The case was adjourned until 1 September 1992.

On 27 August 1992 the applicant’s lawyer requested a further police investigation of charges concerning company X.

At the hearing of 1 September 1992 the substance of the case was not dealt with. At the prosecutor’s request, in which the applicant’s lawyer and a co-defendant concurred, the case was adjourned until 17 November 1992.

The further police investigation requested by the applicant was terminated on 6 November 1992.

The investigation report was submitted to the City Court at the hearing of 17 November 1992. The applicant requested an adjournment in order to provide written observations concerning the investigation and the prosecutor concurred in the request. The case was adjourned until 9 February 1993.

At the hearing of 9 February 1993 the prosecutor explained that he had completed the consideration of charges concerning the applicant in relation to company Z, but that the indictment was not ready yet. Therefore, he requested an adjournment. The applicant’s lawyer filed a written pleading. He concurred in the prosecutor’s request for an adjournment. Furthermore, he stated that if the prosecutor intended to bring new charges against the applicant in relation to company Z, he should definitely do so at the next hearing. The case was adjourned until 11 May 1993.

On 11 May 1993 the substance of the charges was not dealt with. The prosecutor assumed he would complete the new charges by the next hearing and he requested a further adjournment. The applicant’s lawyer concurred in the request and repeated what he had expressed at the last hearing insofar as new charges were concerned. The case was adjourned until 5 October 1993.

On 5 October 1993 the hearing was adjourned on the request of the public prosecutor as the new charges were still under consideration. The next hearing was ordered to be on 30 November 1993.

At the hearing of 30 November 1993 the prosecutor brought before the District Court the main charges concerning company Z. The applicant was accused of committing aggravated fraud as a debtor. As the serving of the summons on the applicant concerning the new charges had not been effected, the prosecutor requested an adjournment, which was granted until 1 February 1994.

The applicant was charged with offences concerning company Z on 1 February 1994, which was the twenty-first hearing in the case. The verbal indictment was almost identical to the factual findings set out in the police report. The presiding judge requested the prosecutor to complete the written indictments and to state more precisely, inter alia , who was being charged and of which offences. Seven witnesses were heard. The prosecutor requested an adjournment. The applicant’s counsel stated:

(translation from Finnish)

“Should the proceedings only concern company Z, the case would be ready for decision today as regards [the applicant]. The situation is that the charges here include charges concerning companies X and Y in addition to the charges brought today. It is probably clear to everyone that these companies have connections to each other through [the applicant], and I have gone through receipts until the year 1985. I hope to be able to finish this work during this spring, and in that connection I have the intention to hear ... office clerk T, and possibly other persons who have been in connection to companies X and Y. I do not object to the prosecutor’s request for an adjournment. I hope that the adjournment will be sufficiently long so that a further hearing will not be necessary.”

The case was adjourned until 10 May 1994.

On 10 May 1994 the applicant’s lawyer stated that he was still doing some checking on the accounts of companies Y and Z and, on that account, requested a further adjournment. The case was adjourned until 4 October 1994.

At the hearing on 4 October 1994 a witness called by the applicant gave evidence. The case was adjourned for deliberations until 13 December 1994

The charges concerning companies X, Y and Z were heard jointly all through the proceedings. It appears that the companies, Y and Z in particular, had been connected to each other. The case concerned mainly alleged economic offences related to those companies, but also to some other companies. There were six accused, who were charged with more than 20 offences all together. The applicant was charged with 17 offences. The number of the complainants was 115, as in principle all the creditors of the companies in liquidation were in the position of a complainant. Only a few of them were present at court or presented any claims.

At the twenty-fourth hearing on 13 December 1994 the District Court convicted the applicant of three aggravated frauds as a debtor, two tax offences and two accounting offences and sentenced him to two years and one month’s imprisonment, including a previous sentence of one year’s imprisonment. The applicant was acquitted of ten charges.

The applicant appealed to the Kouvola Court of Appeal ( hovioikeus , hovrätt ) which upheld the conviction in respect of the two accounting offences and acquitted the applicant of the rest of the charges on 9 November 1995. The applicant was given a suspended sentence of one year and twenty days’ imprisonment, including the previous sentence of one year’s imprisonment. The Court of Appeal’s case file contained 3,168 pages, mostly documents related to the pre-trial investigations.

On 26 March 1996 the Supreme Court ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused the applicant leave to appeal.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains that the length of the criminal proceedings against him and, especially, the length of time taken by the prosecutor to consider the charges concerning company Z, exceeded the “reasonable time” referred to in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

PROCEDURE

The application was introduced before the European Commission of Human Rights on 24 September 1996 and registered on 30 October 1996.

On 21 October 1998 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.

The Government’s written observations were submitted on 7 January 1999. The applicant replied on 23 February 1999.

On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that the length of the proceedings in his case, especially as regards the time taken by the prosecutor to consider the charges concerning company Z, exceeded a “reasonable time”. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, insofar as relevant:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by ... [a] tribunal ...”

The Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 10 May 1990, when the Convention entered into force with respect to Finland , and ended on 26 March 1996, when the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. Accordingly, the proceedings to be taken into consideration lasted five years, ten months and sixteen days. However, in order to assess the reasonableness of the length of time in question, the Court will have regard to the stage reached in the proceedings on 10 May 1990 (see, among other authorities, the Hokkanen v. Finland judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 299, p. 19, § 53, and the Humen v. Poland judgment of 15 October 1999, to be published in the official reports of the Court, § 59).

The Government submit that the case was extremely difficult for reasons relating to the complexity of the facts to be established, to the legal problems to be solved and to the very proceedings in question. They emphasise that the case involved very extensive and complicated economic offences and that it had been exceptionally complicated and time-consuming to investigate the mutual relation of the three companies in question. They, furthermore, refer to the number of parties involved in the case and the number of indictments presented as well as to the substantial case file.

The Government also submit that the delayed prosecution in respect of offences concerning company Z was just one factor contributing to the length of the proceedings, and not the sole or decisive factor. They refer, in particular, to the applicant’s request for further police investigations on 27 August 1992 and his requests for adjournment of the case on 17 November 1992, 9 February and 11 May 1993 and 1 February and 10 May 1994. They maintain that these requests demonstrate that the applicant had not been ready for case to be decided as regards charges concerning companies X and Y.

The applicant disputes the Government’s views. He maintains that the facts of the alleged criminal acts were not particularly complicated. Nor did they raise questions that were hard to clarify. As regards the alleged offences in relation to the insolvency of the companies, the main question was whether the applicant had acted deliberately when drawing up the inventories of the property of these companies. The applicant does not dispute that the investigation of the financial state and the accounts of the companies required a lot of work. However, he emphasises that the investigations concerning the companies were completed at the pre-trial stage and, consequently, as regards company Z they were finished by 18 May 1989 at the latest. Thereafter they were at the disposal of the prosecutor, who did not carry out any further investigations. Furthermore, the applicant submits that only a fraction of the pre-trial material given to the court was of importance in the deciding of the case.

The applicant maintains that no acceptable justification has been put forward to explain the prosecution’s delay in bringing the charges concerning company Z. He emphasises that the case was adjourned 19 times at the request of the prosecutor. The applicant also stresses that his requests for an adjournment in 1992 and 1993 had no effect on the length of the proceedings, as the prosecutor had not yet finalised the charges concerning company Z. Furthermore, the further police investigation was needed because the prosecution witnesses gave contradictory statements. Moreover, it became necessary to re-examine the questions relating to company Y in the light of the new material presented by the prosecutor in connection with the charges concerning company Z in 1994 and, thus, further adjournment was needed at that point. For these reasons the delay was not attributable to his conduct.

The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established by the case-law on the question of “reasonable time” and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is required.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE , without prejudging the merits of the case.

Vincent Berger Georg Ress Registrar President